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Abstract 
Political mobilisation in rural Egypt is a phenomenon that is mediated by power 
relations. Since the end of the 1980s the Egyptian agricultural sector has experienced 
a major transformation as the decaying state infrastructure of rural institutions were 
gradually replaced by the market. Both international financial institutions and the 
government promoted the market reforms in the agricultural sector. In Egypt the 
reforms were implemented in the agricultural sector in ways that converged with the 
class interests of the dominant rural bourgeoisie. Small farmers, tenants, and rural 
poor experienced the reforms as increased hardship and increasing insecurity.  
The rural bourgeoisie had in turn become the key constituency of the state in 
the rural areas in a process of “retraditionalisation” from the 1960s onwards. The 
result was that the networks between the state and this class dominated the state’s 
rural institutions. These networks that stretched between the state apparatus and the 
rural bourgeoisie bridged social, economic, and political categories of power. Similar 
developments in the fishing sector illustrate the extent of the domination.  
The land reforms in turn gave rise to protests among dispossessed rural 
inhabitants whose livelihoods were threatened. The relationship between political 
mobilisation and hegemony is an intricate relationship of power and counter-power. 
The form and content of rural protests has been structured by a dialectical relationship 
with the networks of power. Protests in the countryside emerged as a reaction – an 
antithesis – to the land reforms. After the 25th of January uprising, these protests 
became organised in trade unions. However, some of these trade unions did not 
emerge from the practice of protest, rather they were attempts to control and direct the 
rural political mobilisation, which can be understood as a synthesis of dialectics of 
protest.  
The attempts to control the political mobilisation in the countryside coincided 
with the two dominant political forces that competed for control of the state at the 
time. The voting patterns in the 2012 presidential election reveal the different 
geographical and social location of the political forces’ networks of support. The 
importance of directing the rural mobilisation efforts for the purposes of the political 
forces at the centre is thus revealed.  
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A note on transliteration 
I have followed the standard of transliteration used in the Hans Wehr’s Dictionary of 
Modern Standard Arabic. All material from Arabic sources, including names and 
places are transliterated according to this model. So are specialised Arabic terms. I 
have, for the sake of expediency and readability made one (consistent) omission, 
which is to leave out the definite article (al-) in front of transliterated place names 
were it features in Arabic. I have made an exception for all names of people and 
places that have an accepted English spelling, for example Gamal Abdel Nasser or 
Cairo. There is an exception to the exception; I do transliterate these names however, 
if I refer to them as an Arabic source.   
 
I have generally sought to avoid specialised Arabic vocabulary. Writing about 
agriculture, the term faddān, pl. fadādīn, or spelled feddan, pl. feddans, sometimes 
appear in English texts. I have chosen to use the English word acre, as that word 
denominates approximately the same area. 1 faddān = 0,42 hectare (=1.038 American 
acre) = 24 qarārīṭ (sing. qīrāṭ).  
  
	  	   IX	  
Contents 
 
Introduction:	  Political	  mobilisation	  in	  the	  countryside ........................................................1	  
1	   “Come	  on,	  ask	  him!”	  Fields	  of	  literature	  and	  fields	  of	  work...........................................6	  
1.1	   “Peasants”	  and	  literature................................................................................................... 8	  
1.2	   Hegemony	  and	  resistance ................................................................................................12	  
1.3	   Hegemony	  and	  Egypt........................................................................................................16	  
1.4	   Positionality	  and	  the	  countryside ...................................................................................20	  
2	   “What	  do	  I	  do	  for	  dinner?”	  Market	  reforms	  and	  agriculture ..................................... 27	  
2.1	   The	  shortcomings	  of	  agribusiness ..................................................................................28	  
2.2	   The	  social	  networks	  of	  markets:	  The	  “crisis	  of	  fertiliser” ...........................................31	  
2.3	   The	  social	  networks	  of	  market	  reforms:	  A	  free	  market	  for	  fertiliser ........................36	  
2.4	   Everyday	  ideology:	  The	  hegemony	  of	  the	  market ........................................................39	  
3	   “They	  are	  the	  authorities”:	  state,	  market,	  farmers,	  and	  fishermen ........................ 41	  
3.1	   The	  social	  origin	  of	  state	  interests..................................................................................42	  
3.2	   After	  Kamšīš:	  The	  social	  foundation	  of	  the	  state’s	  institutions..................................46	  
3.3	   Fishing	  for	  profit:	  State,	  market	  and	  fishermen ...........................................................52	  
4	   “What	  did	  the	  revolution	  do?”	  Political	  mobilisation	  in	  the	  countryside .............. 60	  
4.1	   (Re)claiming	  the	  land	  1:	  Law	  96	  of	  1992 ......................................................................61	  
4.2	   (Re)claiming	  the	  land	  2:	  state,	  market,	  violence .........................................................64	  
4.3	   (Re)claiming	  the	  land	  3:	  “Second	  phase	  of	  the	  Egyptian	  revolution”.......................68	  
4.4	   The	  spread	  of	  labour	  unions ............................................................................................70	  
4.5	   Trappings	  of	  power:	  politicisation	  from	  above ............................................................73	  
4.6	   Rural	  revolutionaries:	  politicisation	  from	  below .........................................................77	  
4.7	   Dialectics	  of	  protest:	  Post-­uprising	  political	  mobilisation .........................................80	  
5	   Elections,	  mobilisation,	  politics............................................................................................ 83	  
5.1	   From	  voice	  to	  vote:	  rural	  electoral	  mobilisation .........................................................84	  
5.2	   The	  Islamist	  vote ...............................................................................................................87	  
5.3	   Mursī’s	  farmers ..................................................................................................................91	  








Introduction: Political mobilisation in the countryside 
 
 
Political mobilisation in rural Egypt is a complex phenomenon. Originally my interest was 
peaked by the 25th of January uprising, which spread to and included the rural areas of Egypt. 
Lila Abu-Lughod has written on how the revolution was “lived” in a village in Upper Egypt. 
Abu-Lughod describes how villagers who had experienced the heavy hand of the police state 
were able to organise themselves and mobilise against the “regime”.1 In the Delta, Mukhtar 
Saad Shehata and Samuli Schielke documented how the revolution manifested in a small 
Delta village called “the Secret Capital”.2 There the “village revolutionaries” organised sit-
ins, a clean-up campaign in the village, and demonstration marches. Taken together, Abu-
Lughod, and Shehata and Schielke suggest the uprising politicised the rural population.  
The notion of politicisation, however, is built on an implicit assumption that the 
countryside was not politicised before the uprising. Mona El-Ghobashy has suggested that 
“the revolution” was the result of the demonstrators who successfully defeated the state’s 
security apparatus in Cairo.3 She continues that these demonstrators used knowledge they had 
gained after a decade of protests preceding demonstrations on the 25th of January.4 Different 
social forces, for example workers, political opposition organisations, football ultras, and 
Islamist movements contributed to the success of the urban uprising. Similarly, in the 
countryside, behind the demonstrations, marches, and sit-ins were people making “the 
revolution” as they went along. And on the 11th of February 2011, these forces overthrew 
Hosni Mubarak.  
The initial personal motivation for carrying out this study was the uprising in Taḥrīr 
and a curiosity about its impact on Egyptian society and politics. The thesis is based on 
information I collected during two and a half months of fieldwork in Egypt in the fall of 
2012, as well as extensive use of documents, reports, and academic books and papers on the 
Egyptian countryside. I analyse different forms of political mobilisation in the Egyptian 
countryside. Initially I intended to analyse the political protests of farmers and fishermen 
after the uprising. As the project unfolded, I saw the advantages of including farmers and 
fishermen in a broader analysis of rural political mobilisation. The rural population accounts 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Lila Abu-Lughod, "Living the “revolution” in an Egyptian village: Moral action in a national space," American 
Ethnologist 39, no. 1 (2012). 
2 Mukhtar Shehata and Samuli Schielke, Documentary Film, "The Secret Capital," (2013). 
3 Mona El-Ghobashy, "The praxis of the Egyptian revolution," Middle East Report, no. 258 (2011). 
4 Ibid. 
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for a significant portion of Egyptians; almost 55 percent live in rural areas or small towns, 
while agriculture employs 29 percent of the labour force.5 A significant portion of the rural 
population does not work in agriculture, which is exacerbated by the many farmers who rely 
on additional income for their sustenance.6 Thus by broadening the perspective I am able to 
analyse the impact of the uprising on the political and social initiatives in the countryside. 
Through Antonio Gramsci’s notion of hegemony, I analyse how economic, social, and 
political power converge, and how the resulting networks go beyond the imagined spaces of 
“state” and “market”. Taking this argument further, I show how these networks are key in 
understanding the political mobilisation in the countryside. I argue that the farmers’ protests 
are shaped in a dialectical relationship with these networks between the state and its rural 
institutions and the rural bourgeoisie.  
Some of the previous contributions on this subject build on a theoretical claim that 
politics in the countryside are based on “the moral economy” of the rural population. Nathan 
Brown’s, and partly Sayyid ‘Ašmāwī’s, books are in this tradition.7 The proponents of “the 
moral economy” theory build their claims on an assumption that farmers (“peasants”) are 
autonomous subjects able to determine their acts independently of power relations.8 Timothy 
Mitchell shows how this assumption leads to a series of paradoxes within the writings of “the 
moral economy” school and suggests an alternative understanding using Gramsci’s notion of 
hegemony.9 Looking closer at the concept of hegemony, Perry Anderson has shown how 
Gramsci’s use of it renders the concept contradictory.10 Drawing on Mitchell, I argue that it 
can nevertheless be used to understand the condition of domination that follow from the 
emergence of modern institutions and their ability to regulate political and social practices.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 CIA Central Intelligence Agency, "The World Factbook: Egypt," (2014). 
6 Robert Springborg, "Rolling Back Egypt's Agrarian Reform," Middle East Report, no. 166 (1990); Robert 
Springborg, "Agrarian Bourgeoisie, Semiproletarians, and the Egyptian State: Lessons for Liberalization," 
International Journal of Middle East Studies 22, no. 04 (1990). 
7 Sayyid ‘Ašmāwī, Al-Fallāḥūn wa-l-Sulṭa: 'Alā Daw' al-Ḥarakāt al-Fallāḥīya al-Miṣrīya (1919-1999), 1. ed. 
(Cairo: Mīrīt, 2001); Nathan J. Brown, Peasant politics in modern Egypt : the struggle against the state  (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1990); Nathan J. Brown, "The Conspiracy of Silence and the Atomistic Political 
Activity of the Egyptian Peasantry, 1882-1952," in Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance, ed. Forrest D. 
Colburn (Armonk, N.Y. : M.E. Sharpe, 1989). 
8 Forrest D. Colburn, Everyday forms of peasant resistance  (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1989); James C. 
Scott, Decoding subaltern politics : ideology, disguise, and resistance in agrarian politics, Asia's 
transformations (New York, NY: Routledge, 2013); James C. Scott, Domination and the arts of resistance : 
hidden transcripts  (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990); James C. Scott, Weapons of the weak : everyday 
forms of peasant resistance  (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985); James Scott, "Hegemony and the 
Peasantry," Politics & Society 7, no. 3 (1977); James C. Scott, The moral economy of the peasant : rebellion 
and subsistence in Southeast Asia  (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1976); James C. Scott and Benedict J. 
Tria Kerkvliet, "Special Issue on Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance in South-East Asia," Journal of 
Peasant Studies 13, no. 2 (1986). 
9 Timothy Mitchell, "Everyday metaphors of power," Theory and society 19, no. 5 (1990). 
10 Perry Anderson, "The antinomies of Antonio Gramsci," New Left Review, no. 100 (1977). 
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In the Egyptian countryside, social change has since the mid 1980s taken the form of 
market reforms included in a narrative of development. According to my informants, during 
the course of these market reforms the benefits and support that farmers and fishermen 
enjoyed have been removed. Simultaneously, the social security of the rural population in 
general has eroded. Critical accounts however reveal the networks of power behind the 
concrete implementation of market reforms. Through the example of the market for fertiliser, 
I argue that market reforms have not removed “the state” from “the market”. Instead they 
have enabled afforded networks to use their influence within “the state” or “the market” to 
gain advantages and economic benefits from the possibilities that the market reforms offer. 
This is replicated all the way down to village level where nexuses of social, economic, and 
political power dominate. With that in mind, I argue that the market should also be 
considered an institution because it structures the behaviour of people. The force of the 
market is evident in the farmers and fishermen’s articulation of “the silent compulsion of 
economic relations”.11  
Next I trace the historical trajectories of these nexuses of power and the historical 
development of the relation with the expanding state apparatus since the 1960s. I argue that 
throughout the ensuing decades, the state apparatus came to rely on the rural bourgeoisie to 
project power. In turn, the continuing recruitment of members from the rural bourgeoisie into 
the state institutions opened the state apparatus for the influence of class interests of the rural 
bourgeoisie. It was through these relations between the state institutions and the rural upper 
class that produced the nexuses of power that came to dominate the countryside. It is 
important to note that this process occurred over a long time, and it was not straightforward 
but riddled with contradictions and factional struggles. However, over this time, the 
agricultural and rural policies have gradually come to reflect the class interests of the rural 
bourgeoisie.  
Looking at the fishing sector, I find the same pattern. The political economy of the 
sector has been changed under a narrative of development to conform to the economic class 
interests of the rural bourgeoisie. Concretely this manifests as the promotion and expansion 
of an aquaculture sector which threatens the livelihoods of the artisanal fishermen in the 
northern Delta lakes. Lastly, I turn to the forms of political mobilisation that emerge in the 
networks of power of social forces and the state apparatus. Political mobilisation is here 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Karl Marx, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, trans. Ben Fowkes, vol. 1 (London: Penguin Books, 
1976). p. 899. 
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understood to be various ways in which people organise to influence political decisions that 
affect their lives. This can be both within and outside established political procedures.  
Outside the established procedures I examine the protests that emerged with the 
implementation of law 96 of 1992. This law caused social instability in many parts of the 
countryside since it became a tool for landowning interests to reclaim land lost during Nasser 
land reform laws.12 These protests emerged as responses to localised efforts to dispossess 
tenant farmers or land law beneficiaries of land. The protests did give rise to a few non-
governmental organisations that established rural networks. After the January 2011 uprising, 
many of these conflicts intensified or re-emerged. However, a novelty in the countryside was 
the rapid dissemination of the trade unions and syndicates. Although most of these were local 
efforts, four emerged on the national level with the aim of mobilising farmers and defending 
farmers’ interests. All four national syndicates were tied to different networks that had been 
established prior to the uprising, some of which had negative consequences for the 
politicising potential of the syndicates. There were also local trade unions that represented a 
genuine politicisation at the local level, but where politicisation came at the cost of 
mobilisation.  
I proceed to analyse rural mobilisation in the countryside, through a discussion of 
turnout patterns and voter preferences in the first and second rounds of the 2012 presidential 
election. Using the statistical database of the Presidential Elections Commission, I compare 
differences in turnout statistics and preferences. The voting patterns suggest the geographical 
and social composition of some important rural constituencies of different ideological and 
political currents. However, based on an analysis of the policies of the victorious candidate, 
Muḥammad Mursī, compared to some of the literature on elections in Egypt, I also suggest 
that although the elections may be competitive, the shape of the mobilisation effort in the 
countryside originated and relied on the networks of power that I referred to above.  
Thus I conclude that although political mobilisation in the countryside happens, these 
efforts have not yet been successful in establishing a counter-hegemonic rural-based 
presence. Political mobilisation efforts with counter-hegemonic potential either remain local 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Ray Bush, Counter-revolution in Egypt's countryside: land and farmers in the era of economic reform  
(London: Zed Books, 2002); in particular Ray Bush, "More losers than winners in Egypt’s countryside: the 
impact of changes in land tenure," in Counter-Revolution in Egypt’s Countryside: Land and Farmers in the Era 
of Economic Reform. (London: Zed Books, 2002); Ray Bush, "Land Reform and Counter-Revolution," in 
Counter-Revolution in Egypt's Countryside, ed. Ray Bush (London: Zed Books, 2002); Land Centre for Human 
Rights, "Farmer Struggles against Law 96 of 1992," in Counter-Revolution in Egypt's Countryside: Land and 
Farmers in the Era of Economic Reform, ed. Ray Bush (London: Zed Books, 2002); Reem Saad, "Egyptian 
politics and the Tenancy Law," in Counter-Revolution in Egypt's Countryside: Land and Farmers in the Era of 
Economic Reform, ed. Ray Bush (London: Zed Books, 2002). 
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or, if they expand, they risk being co-opted into the existing power structure and hence 
become another hegemonic institution.  
In the first chapter, I discuss previous literature on rural politics in Egypt, and this 
literature’s shortcomings. I then discuss Antonio Gramsci’s notion of hegemony and the 
problems associated with this theory, including its application in the context of modern 
Egypt, and suggest a possible solution, before I proceed to account for my fieldwork in 
Egypt. In the second chapter I analyse the social foundation of the market reforms to show 
how “the market” and “the state” are social institutions. Underlying the practices 
implemented under the aegis of market reform, are influential networks of interest. I move on 
in chapter three to describe the historical development of the interested networks focusing on 
the expansion of modern state institutions and practices into the countryside and the ensuing 
interaction with the dominant classes. I then show how the same underlying mechanisms are 
evident in the fishing sector. In the fourth chapter, I continue a different plot from chapter 
two, and analyse how rural protests are linked to the market reforms, and how they are 
continuously structured by the power networks that extend between the centre of the state 
apparatus to the countryside. Finally, in chapter five, I look at electoral mobilisation through 
voting patterns in the countryside, arguing that they can suggest the social and geographical 
location of the networks on which different political forces in the centre rely. The conclusion 
follows at the end of the fifth chapter.  
	   6	  




I conducted most of my interviews with farmers and fishermen in a small village in the Delta 
governorate of Kafr al-Šayḵ. At one point I found myself along with a friend, searching in the 
fields outside the village for a contact that had promised to set up a meeting with some other 
farmers for me. I was thinking about the questions, answers and follow-ups. As we were 
searching the field for my contact, he saw me from the other side, and shouted “Come on, ask 
him!” “Him” was another farmer nearby that we had just passed. I had not anticipated having 
to interrupt a stranger in his work to carry out my interview; I was expecting to be 
introduced. The surprise threw me off and left me feeling out of control over the selection of 
informants. As it turned out, all of the farmers I interviewed in the field that day were very 
helpful. However, standing there in the field I felt quite helpless at the time. Least of all I 
failed to situate myself within the long line of writers on rural Egypt who had preceded me – 
if not in that village then in countless others. These writers and researchers had already 
framed many of the questions, though not always helpfully. Their writings had also framed 
my thinking, however, and I need to reflect on that impact.  
Significant previous writings on the politics of the Egyptian countryside are within a 
tradition labelled “peasant studies.” Timothy Mitchell shows that although these writings 
have addressed different elements within the countryside to explain its politics, from 
institutions and state policies to local culture, they often suffer from the same blind spot.13 He 
criticises the literature for continuously failing to grasp the extent to which violence and 
power is directed towards the poor. Thereby, the symptoms of this violence are 
misinterpreted or silenced.14 Mitchell traces the problem to two origins. One was how, within 
modern social science, “development” has been understood as an outside force, which 
interferes with and changes the independent space of a village. With development thus 
conceptualised, it feeds into and draws on the development industry. Authors who then move 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Timothy Mitchell, "Fixing the economy," Cultural studies 12, no. 1 (1998); Timothy Mitchell, Rule of experts 
: Egypt, techno-politics, modernity  (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002).see esp. pp. 145-6, 164, 
178, 268-9 
14 Mitchell, "Everyday metaphors of power."; Mitchell, Rule of experts : Egypt, techno-politics, modernity: pp. 
166-7. 
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back and forth between the two spheres are, according to Mitchell, loath to criticise or go 
beyond the limited understanding of development.15  
A related source lies in the very definition of the term peasant. Development as a 
concept of change is founded upon a notion of modernity as distinct from history and 
tradition. That is, development only makes sense if there is a difference between what is and 
what was. The category of “peasants” was from the very beginning defined as an uneasy mix 
between these two ideal spheres. “Peasant studies” became a distinct field in the late sixties 
and early seventies, drawing on several precursors within anthropology, area studies and 
travel literature. The Journal of Peasant Studies, for example, was founded in 1973. Yet the 
earliest attempt to define “the third world-peasant” occurred in 1966 in Eric Wolf ‘s 
Peasants. There he defines the category of “the peasant” as “rural cultivators” distinguishable 
from “primitives” on the one hand and farmers on the other.16 Wolf saw “peasants” at an 
intermediary stage, or “mode of production”, between pre-modern cultivators and modern, 
capitalistic farmers.17 Thus the theoretical position of the “peasants” was partly on the outside 
of the global division of labour. Within such a framework, “peasants” were construed as an 
object in need of (further) modernisation. However, as long as they remained “peasants” they 
could never be modern. As such, the definition lent itself to the politicised development aid 
during the Cold War.  
The connotation of the word “peasant” is also present in Egypt, where the Arabic 
word fallāḥ often implies ideas of backwardness, simplicity, and tradition. Only rarely did I 
hear the word used positively, and then as a self-description by informants who claimed 
authenticity and familiarity with the fallāḥūn, though without necessarily working the land. 
Many more farmers rejected it, some preferring muzāri‘ūn, which means cultivators. Given 
the problematic history and local connotations of the term “peasant”, for the purposes of this 
text I choose to use the term “farmer”, by which I mean to denote those who cultivate land 
that they either own or rent – regardless of that holdings size. I separate farmers from 
agricultural workers, who cultivate land but have no holdings, and landowners, who own but 
do not cultivate.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Mitchell, Rule of experts : Egypt, techno-politics, modernity. 
16 Eric R. Wolf, Peasants, Foundations of modern anthropology series (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.,: Prentice-Hall, 
1966). p. 2. 
17 Ibid., pp. 10-3. 
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1.1 “Peasants” and literature  
Returning to the literature on the Egyptian countryside, there are a few contributions that 
avoid the problem discussed above. There is Timothy Mitchell’s work on the Egyptian 
countryside, along with Ray Bush, Sayyid ‘Āšmāwī’s Al-fallāḥūn wa-l-ṣūlṭa: ‘Alā ḍaw‘ al-
ḥarakāt al-fallāḥīya al-Miṣrīya, and Nathan Brown’s Peasant politics in modern Egypt: the 
struggle against the state.18 In addition, there are numerous other contributions in anthologies 
and journals. However, in the following I focus on the above listed contributions as they form 
the foundation of and inform the theoretical considerations of this text.  
Timothy Mitchell’s writings on the Egyptian countryside are a central point of 
departure for this text.19 A central concern for Mitchell is to expose the modern forms of 
power that enable certain policies and forms of intervention in the countryside. In several 
careful readings of previous texts on the Egyptian countryside, he excavates the assumptions, 
prejudices and silences that in his opinion have “framed” the Egyptian countryside as a 
testing ground for neoliberal policies. He accomplishes this by illustrating how economics 
creates an object called the economy – or capitalism – through assuming it has an inner logic. 
Going beyond that, he shows how that this assumption cannot correspond to the lived 
practices of ordinary people. On a broader level Mitchell questions what he calls the “techno-
politics” of the modern world: the practice of creating the world as a representation and with 
it the expertise to interpret these representations.20  
In Rule of Experts Mitchell criticises many of the metanarratives of development and 
change, in particular that of capitalism as modernity. Though I agree with many of his points, 
this book retains a metanarrative of its own, that of modernity. Thus his gesture is not one of 
removal, but replacement. Instead of describing modernity in neoliberal terms as the 
expansion of the market, or in Marxist terms, as that of capitalism, he relies on a third 
category: techno-politics. Techno-politics becomes a mode of power that defines all other 
modes in Mitchell’s account. The critical question is why specifically this power arises and 
takes its particular form. This theoretical problem does not take anything away from 
Mitchell’s account of the politics of rural Egypt, where he describes how violence directed at 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 ‘Ašmāwī, Al-Fallāḥūn wa-al-Sulṭa; Brown, Peasant politics in modern Egypt : the struggle against the state; 
Bush, Counter-revolution in Egypt's countryside; Ray Bush, Economic crisis and the politics of reform in Egypt  
(Westview Press Boulder, CO, 1999); Mitchell, Rule of experts : Egypt, techno-politics, modernity. 
19 Mitchell, Rule of experts : Egypt, techno-politics, modernity. A collection of earlier articles on Egypt; see 
alsoTimothy Mitchell, Colonising Egypt  (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988). 
20 Mitchell, Rule of experts : Egypt, techno-politics, modernity: pp. 14-5. 
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the poor has been an integral, but hidden part of the political projects, and how it has shaped 
the responses by farmers and rural dwellers. The strength of Mitchell’s account is that he also 
avoids the contradiction that often occurs in explanation for political quiescence or political 
mobilisation in rural Egypt.  
Ray Bush’s work centres the causes and effects of one recent political project, namely 
the neoliberal reforms that the government of Egypt undertook in the agricultural sector from 
the late 1980s onwards.21 Many of Bush’s texts concern the ways in which these reforms, 
despite their apparent success, have adversely affected the most vulnerable of the rural 
community. On the other hand Bush does not systematically treat the responses of the rural 
dwellers, and to the extent that he does, he seems to underestimate their ability to organise 
collectively.  
In a text written after the 25th of January uprising, Bush takes his criticism further, 
and seeks to theorise it under the heading of “abjection” defined as the “’active 
dispossession’ of people.”22 Abjection is an alternative to marginalisation. It seeks to define 
poverty as absence of access to, or distance from, an economic and political centre. The 
theory of marginalisation re-presents the causes of poverty in accordance with the liberal 
tradition. Poverty, according to the theory of marginalisation, is caused not by capitalism and 
the market, but failure to be properly and fully included into the market economy.23 Bush’s 
alternative theory of abjection hypothesises that the market in fact causes marginalisation, 
and that people, through their inclusion into the market can be dispossessed, both 
economically and politically. However, the theories abjection and marginalisation share a 
common assumption about the essential political disenfranchisement of the poor and their 
inability to have voices.  
There are a few works that present contrasting views, for example Sayyid ‘Ašmāwī 
and Nathan Brown. In Al-fallāḥūn wa-l-ṣūlṭa, ‘Ašmāwī provides a history of peasant political 
activity where he traces it from the early parts of the twentieth century until and including the 
land disputes that followed reform legislation in the nineties.24 And while ‘Ašmāwī traces 
peasant political activity throughout the century, the advantage of his account – and the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 See in particular Bush, Counter-revolution in Egypt's countryside; Bush, Economic crisis and the politics of 
reform in Egypt., as well as numerous articles quoted throughout this thesis.  
22 Ray Bush, "Marginality or abjection? The political economy of poverty production in Egypt," in Marginality 
and Exclusion in Egypt, ed. Ray Bush and Habib Ayeb (Cairo: The American University in Cairo Press, 2012), 
p. 55. 
23 See Asef Bayat, "Marginality: cure or curse? ," in Marginality and Exclusion in Egypt, ed. Ray Bush and 
Habib Ayeb (Cairo: The American University in Cairo Press, 2012). 
24 ‘Ašmāwī, Al-Fallāḥūn wa-al-Sulṭa. 
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drawback – is the inclusion of an account of the crucial Nasser era for reshaping the 
relationship between state and the agricultural sector and rural Egypt at large. The drawback 
is that this account is too limited, and that the extent of the changing relationship is not 
sufficiently accounted for. He does, however, answer the question on political activity among 
farmers in the affirmative.  
Nathan Brown’s Peasant Politics in Modern Egypt is very similar, but only draws on 
the period before 1952.25 Yet his argument can be generalised, thus I will render it in a 
simplified form. Briefly stated, Nathan Brown claims that farmers undertake political actions 
in many forms, from rebellions to petitions and protests to some of which is covert or even 
criminal in nature like theft or sabotage. This interpretation is based on the assumption that 
“[p]easant politics is not passivity punctuated by rebellion but rather a continuous struggle 
against a wide variety of adversaries.”26 Brown aims his criticism at both the traditional 
image of the passive peasant, and the Marxist stereotype of the proto-revolutionary peasant. 
In so doing he draws on the “everyday resistance” school associated particularly with the 
work of James C. Scott.27 This theoretical position has been criticised for a number of 
problems relating to its conceptualisation of peasants and its intellectual heritage; some of 
which I recount below.  
The strength of Brown’s, and Scott’s position is that it enables them to describe 
activities as political that are not usually conceived of in that manner. In addition to 
rebellions, petitions, and protests, covert and individual actions like murder, larceny, and 
arson are political action according to Brown. “Peasants” could do this because they were 
protected by the refusal of their compatriots to cooperate with the authorities – a “conspiracy 
of silence” as Henry Ayrout, author of the Egyptian Peasant, calls it.28 According to Brown, 
the collective silence illustrated the communal approval of the (criminal) acts, which in turn 
illustrates shared cultural values between the peasants, including particular norms for right 
and wrong: a “moral economy”.29 The “moral economy of the peasants” thus also provides 
the motivations of “the peasants”; it explains why peasants acted in these ways. Brown 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 Brown, Peasant politics in modern Egypt : the struggle against the state.  
26 Ibid., p. 214. 
27 Scott, Decoding subaltern politics : ideology, disguise, and resistance in agrarian politics; Scott, Domination 
and the arts of resistance : hidden transcripts; Scott and Kerkvliet, "Special Issue on Everyday Forms of 
Peasant Resistance in South-East Asia."; Scott, Weapons of the Weak; Scott, The moral economy of the peasant 
: rebellion and subsistence in Southeast Asia. 
28 Henry Habib Ayrout, The Egyptian peasant  (Boston: Beacon Press, 1963). 
29 Brown, Peasant politics in modern Egypt : the struggle against the state: pp. 98-105; here, Brown is referring 
to Scott, The moral economy of the peasant : rebellion and subsistence in Southeast Asia. 
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claims that “peasants” “[see] politics in concrete, local and personal terms.”30 And, following 
this view, if “peasants’” sense of right is transgressed, they respond by avoiding authorities 
and taking matters into their own hands.  
Nathan Brown thus answers the question about rural political activity positively. By 
widening the definition of politics to also account for actions that neither government nor 
rural notables and large landowner sanctioned, he is able to construct a separate sphere in 
which peasants engage politically. Yet it is this sphere of the “moral economy” that makes 
Brown’s – and Scott’s – claims problematic. The “moral economy” creates a basic dichotomy 
between the two forms of politics; the subversive acts of everyday resistance on the one hand 
and the formally organised on the other. And although Brown begins with the assertion that 
the political activity of farmers is a continuum, by the end, he concludes:  
rebellion, voting, and petitioning reveal less about peasants themselves than about the 
prevailing relations of power […] Peasants merely followed the leads of notables or large 
landowners when engaged in these activities. Atomistic and communal action were therefore 
far more revealing of peasant values and attitudes.31  
Here Brown distinguishes between the different forms of political action. He writes that the 
local group (“communal”) and individual (“atomistic”) acts are to “reveal more” about values 
and attitudes, as if he claims it to be a truer form of peasant politics. By presenting this 
distinction, Brown also re-presents “peasants” as autonomous political agents. This, however, 
creates a paradox in the text.  
Timothy Mitchell criticises the concept of the “moral economy”. According to 
Mitchell, the “moral economy” which allows Scott (and Brown) to present “the peasants” as 
political actors, also endows them with an autonomous political consciousness. Such an 
approach creates several paradoxes in the text.32 According to Scott, the “moral economy of 
the peasants” enables “peasants” to demystify the ruling ideologies because they have values 
and culture formed autonomously from that of their superiors. It is these values and that 
culture that “peasants” draw upon in the numerous daily acts of subversive resistance as well 
as in rebellions, and help them, says Scott, to see through the ideologies that legitimate the 
ruling hierarchies of which they are at the bottom. Thus rather than being “subalterns” – 
subjects whose voices are not heard33 – Scott is able to present “the peasants” as historical 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 Brown, Peasant politics in modern Egypt : the struggle against the state: p. 221. 
31 Ibid., pp. 214-5. 
32 Mitchell, "Everyday metaphors of power."; Scott, Weapons of the Weak; see also Scott, Decoding subaltern 
politics : ideology, disguise, and resistance in agrarian politics; Scott, Domination and the arts of resistance : 
hidden transcripts; Scott, "Hegemony and the Peasantry."; Scott, The moral economy of the peasant : rebellion 
and subsistence in Southeast Asia. 
33 Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, "Can the subaltern speak," in Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture, ed. 
Cary Nelson and Lawrence Grossberg (Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1988). 
	   12	  
agents capable of conscious and autonomous political action.34 Mitchell then arrives at the 
resulting paradox in Scott’s text: because Scott’s “peasants” are able to demystify the 
ideological dominance, the choices they make faced with clear economic and political 
domination becomes accordingly rational. And hence Scott needs to claim that “peasants” 
choose the quiet subversive everyday resistance rather than large-scale revolt as they often 
lead to undesirable results.35  
The same paradox appears in Brown’s text: if “peasants” are able to discern the 
ideological components of domination, why are they happy to go along with the rural 
bourgeoisie for political purposes that are not their own? And if to them politics are 
“concrete, local and personal”, why do they engage in “national” causes? To generalise the 
particularity of this question into a general one; how do subalterns act politically, and why do 
they choose some strategies over others? This is a problem at the level of epistemology, 
insofar as subalterns are defined as those whose voice are not heard. That is, it is impossible 
to answer this question because as soon as a subaltern voice is heard, that particular voice 
seizes to be a subaltern. This relation, between “peasant studies” and the wider 
historiographical problem of subalternity appears also in Scott’s latest book, Decoding 
Subaltern Politics.36  
 
1.2 Hegemony and resistance  
The field of “peasant studies” rose to prominence during the political economy of the Cold 
War at a time when competing regimes in “the North” made space for newly independent 
regimes from “the South”. Understanding the recurrence of rural revolts and insurgencies – 
Vietnam, Malaysia, Algeria, Cuba, and Nicaragua – became an aspect of the politics at the 
time. And with the newfound political independence came claims of historical independence, 
to challenge the dominant “Western” historiography. James C. Scott’s work is one such 
attempt; a second is the Indian Subaltern Studies projects associated with Ranajit Guha and 
others.37 Both attempts, despite their different political outsets, largely end up confronting the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 See Mitchell, "Everyday metaphors of power," pp. 549-56. 
35 Scott, Weapons of the Weak: pp. 29, 320. There is another problem with Scott’s point, which asserts that the 
everyday resistance is more rational than rebellion. He needs to prove that small farmers in fact consistently 
cheat, trick, and subvert the landowners and the government. However, in modern Egypt, the aspects of 
government policy “intended to extract a surplus from agriculture, apply in discriminatory fashion to peasants, 
since evasion o them, legally or illegally, is directly related to farm size;” Springborg, "Agrarian Bourgeoisie, 
Semiproletarians, and the Egyptian State: Lessons for Liberalization," p. 464. 
36 Scott, Decoding subaltern politics : ideology, disguise, and resistance in agrarian politics. 
37 For the Subaltern Studies group, 10 volumes have been published from 1982 until 1999, Ranajit Guha, A 
Subaltern studies reader, 1986-1995  (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997); Ranajit Guha, 
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same foundational problem of the knowing subject.38 Furthermore, both do so attempting to 
draw on the notion of subalternity while criticising the concept of hegemony, both from the 
theoretical writings of Antonio Gramsci.39  
Timothy Mitchell argues against Scott’s criticism of Gramsci, and shows how Scott’s 
evidence can be interpreted to support the idea of hegemony rather than disprove it. Mitchell 
explains the two complementary strategies on which Scott relies to argue against the 
existence of hegemony. First, Mitchell points to Scott’s definition of hegemony as too 
narrow. Second, he shows how Scott re-labels several of the realities of domination as 
“obstacles to resistance”. By narrowing hegemony to mean only “ideological domination” – a 
false consciousness – Scott is able to use the existence of resistance to disprove the notion.40 
This however leaves a host of other mechanisms of domination, which Scott is then forced to 
re-label as “obstacles to resistance” or simply as “givens”.41 O’Hanlon demonstrates that the 
same problem exist in the writing of the Subaltern Studies group, namely that resistance is 
construed to disprove of hegemony.  
Hegemony in the above discussion is pictured as something very narrow, relating only 
to ideas, yet within this narrow sphere it is omnipotent and pervasive. Scott, Brown, and 
Guha all define hegemony loosely in the sense of “ideological dominance”, as absolute 
domination of the mind as detached from the wider world. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak notes 
that in the search for what she labels “the pure consciousness” – the autonomous subaltern 
subject – the omnipresent domination arises because “the association of ‘consciousness’ with 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Subaltern studies: writings on South Asian history and society  (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1982); Ranajit 
Guha and Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, Selected Subaltern studies  (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988). 
38 On this point, both critics and supporters are in agreement, it is also admitted of a member of the project, 
Gayatri Chakraborty Spivak; see Rosalind O'Hanlon, "Recovering the Subject Subaltern Studies and Histories 
of Resistance in Colonial South Asia Subaltern Studies. Writings on South Asian History and Society. Edited by 
Ranajit Guha. Oxford University Press: Delhi. Volume I, 1982, pp. viii, 241; Volume II, 1983, pp. x, 358; 
Volume III, 1984, pp. x, 327; Volume IV, 1985, pp. vi, 383," Modern Asian Studies 22, no. 01 (1988); Gyan 
Prakash, "Subaltern studies as postcolonial criticism," The American Historical Review (1994); Spivak, "Can 
the subaltern speak," pp. 283-6; Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, "Subaltern Studies: Deconstructing 
Historiography," in Subaltern Studies IV: Writings on South Asian History and Society, ed. Ranajit Guha (Delhi: 
Oxford University Press, 1985). 
39 Ranajit Guha, "Dominance without Hegemony and its Historiography," in Subaltern Studies VI: Writings on 
South Asian History and Society, ed. Ranajit Guha (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1989); Scott, Weapons of 
the Weak. 
40 There is another important point here, that hegemonic domination at the level of ideas can only apply to the 
subjects of the study, Scott’s “peasants” or Guha’s for that matter. The question of their own relation to 
hegemony is never raised in the texts. O’Hanlon points out the significance of this silence: “if we ask ourselves 
[…] why we seek to find a resistant presence which has not been completely emptied or extinguished by the 
hegemonic, our answer must surely be that it is in order to envisage a realm of freedom in which we ourselves 
might speak.” O'Hanlon, "Recovering the Subject Subaltern Studies and Histories of Resistance in Colonial 
South Asia Subaltern Studies. Writings on South Asian History and Society. Edited by Ranajit Guha. Oxford 
University Press: Delhi. Volume I, 1982, pp. viii, 241; Volume II, 1983, pp. x, 358; Volume III, 1984, pp. x, 
327; Volume IV, 1985, pp. vi, 383," p. 219. 
41 Mitchell, "Everyday metaphors of power," p. 553. 
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‘knowledge’ omits the middle term of ‘ideological production’”.42 “Ideological production” 
suggests it is necessary to go beyond the purely ideational and symbolic realm in which the 
above authors seek to contain hegemony, to look at the institutions that regulate the 
conditions for knowledge. Mitchell similarly criticises the separation between the symbolic-
ideological and the material, suggesting that the Gramscian concept of hegemony can be a 
synthesis of notions of power across the binary of “material” and “ideational”.43  
There is a common definition of hegemony that gives rise to the re-presentation above 
of it as “ideological dominance”. An early scholar of Gramsci, Joseph Femia, defines 
hegemony precisely as “a situation wherein a social group or class is ideologically 
dominant.”44 A second early interpreter, Thomas R. Bates, defines it as “political leadership 
based on the consent of the led, a consent which is secured by the diffusion and 
popularisation of the world view of the ruling class.”45 Here I want to highlight the textual 
rendering of “the diffusion and popularisation of the world view of the ruling class” in the 
passive tense – “is secured by”. The passive sense renders “the diffusion and popularisation” 
agent-less and leaves it as a process that simply happens. As such it removes hegemony from 
the realm of practice. Within this view, hegemony either is or is not, rather than being re-
created through practices of power.  
Bates – along with the others – defines hegemony in such a way to solve a problem 
created by Antonio Gramsci himself, who used the concept of hegemony in a (or rather two) 
very specific empirical sense(s). As part of theorising those examples, Gramsci gives three 
separate definitions of the term in his main theoretical work, the Prison Notebooks.46 Perry 
Anderson demonstrates how these definitions differ due to the changing application and the 
evolving intellectual influences on Gramsci.47 Anderson argues that the root cause is the 
separation Gramsci makes between the hegemonic position of the proletariat vis-à-vis the 
rural population before and during the Russian revolution, and the hegemonic position in 
Western Europe of the bourgeoisie vis-à-vis the proletariat. Whereas in the former hegemony 
was used to explaining the success of a revolution, in the latter, hegemony was the organising 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 Spivak, "Can the subaltern speak," p. 286. 
43 Mitchell, "Everyday metaphors of power." 
44 Joseph Femia, "Hegemony and consciousness in the thought of Antonio Gramsci," Political Studies 23, no. 1 
(1975): p. 29. 
45 Thomas R Bates, "Gramsci and the Theory of Hegemony," Journal of the History of Ideas 36, no. 2 (1975): p. 
352. 
46 Antonio Gramsci and Joseph A. Buttigieg, Prison notebooks, European perspectives (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1992).  
47 Anderson, "The antinomies of Antonio Gramsci."; see also Derek Boothman, "The sources for Gramsci's 
concept of hegemony," in Rethinking Gramsci, ed. Marcus E. Green (Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon, England; 
New York: Routledge, 2011). 
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principle behind the revolution’s failure. Throughout, hegemony is defined variously as 
consent of the ruled in opposition to coercion and as a rule that combines the power of both 
coercion and consent.48 Only hegemony’s “consensual thread” permits the extension and 
unites the definitions.49 It is on that common thread of consent that Bates, Femia and Scott 
spin their definitions of hegemony as (unconscious) consent to being ruled.  
In no instance is the dissemination of hegemony “automatic”. On the contrary, 
Gramsci emphasises the role of institutions in “the diffusion and popularisation of the world 
view.”50 According to Gramsci, hegemony is disseminated through the institutions of civil 
society, for instance schools, political parties, churches, clubs and journals.51 It is possible to 
add the media, non-governmental organisations, religious societies, charities and tribes or 
clans. Although that seems simple at a distance, Gramsci never specified the ways in which 
such a process would work. Rather he focused on the relation between civil society and the 
state, or power as coercion and as persuasion. That separation ultimately led Gramsci into 
some blind alleys, and gave rise to some of Gramsci’s most contradictory claims, which 
Perry Anderson shows is not possible to reconcile.52 Mitchell points out that the two types of 
power that Gramsci relies on, coercion and persuasion, using the Machiavellian image of the 
centaur, half man and half beast, is not at all absolute. Rather, they appear separate because 
they correspond to the common dichotomy of mind and body.53 Following this argument it is 
possible to go beyond the dichotomy and yet present a theory of hegemony not riveted by 
internal contradictions.  
The suggestion is that hegemony is not purely “ideological” or “symbolic”. 
Borrowing another point from Timothy Mitchell: although institutions appear “fixed” – like 
structures – they are in fact (re)created everyday through a regularised set of everyday 
practices structured by power relations.54 Following along these lines, I thus define 
hegemony as the control over the institutions that structure the everyday of their subjects. The 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 Anderson, "The antinomies of Antonio Gramsci," pp. 18-25; see also Roccu, whose take differ in that he 
attempts to reconcile Gramsci's different definitions, Roberto Roccu, "Gramsci in Cairo: neoliberal 
authoritarianism, passive revolution and failed hegemony in Egypt under Mubarak, 1991-2010" (London School 
of Economics, 2012). 
49 Anderson, "The antinomies of Antonio Gramsci," p. 44. 
50 Other authors, who have contextualised Gramsci’s theories in light of his experiences as a male Italian 
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54 Mitchell, "Everyday metaphors of power," p. 572. 
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power of hegemony is not in controlling ideas but regulating practice, not limiting thoughts 
but determining actions. This still leaves the question of the autonomous space, the site of 
“pure conscience” unresolved, as one could well argue this point while keeping open the 
possibility of existence of such a space. In fact, it resonates with Scott when he argues that 
“everyday resistance” is subversive and covert because overt action is controlled and 
sanctioned.  
Returning to Spivak’s point about the “ideological production” that separates 
consciousness from knowledge, I argue that institutions are such a site of “ideological 
production”. It is hardly controversial to claim that schools, political parties, churches and 
mosques deliver ideologically loaded messages. Yet other institutions such as aid 
organisations, companies, the market, and, most powerfully of all, the state with its laws, 
courts, parliament, elections, state parties, and especially bureaucracy, are also institutions 
that have mechanism to encourage some actions and sanction others. Throughout this, these 
institutions are loaded ideological rational explaining and justifying those mechanisms. And 
at no point is there a border, a threshold where force turns into more subtle forms of power, 
rather power exist at all points simultaneously.  
 
1.3 Hegemony and Egypt 
The above outline of hegemony seems to leave little room for resistance, if any at all. This 
contradicts Gramsci, who as a revolutionary Marxist theorised the possibility of the 
overthrow of the bourgeois regimes in Western Europe. At the centre of his theories, he also 
developed the concept of counter-hegemony.55 This concept suffers from the same 
contradictions and paradoxes that do hegemony. The contradictions of Gramsci’s text mean 
that this issue cannot be resolved theoretically. However, by opening the possibility of 
resistance (or revolution), I need to set out the parameters of its practicability. In line with my 
definition of hegemony as control over the institutions and ideological apparatus in society, it 
seems reasonable that counter-hegemony should also rely on institutions of a similar power. 
However, there is no certainty that such a counter-hegemonic formation might overcome the 
hegemonic one in order to institute its own control. And it is not possible to theorise the 
development of a counter-hegemonic force within a hegemonic society; the balance between 
stability and change is an empirical question.  
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Turning to authors who have already employed Gramscian terms to understand the 
modern politics of Egypt provides some nuances to the totality of hegemony indicated above 
and concretises it.56 Roberto Roccu provides the most recent contribution on Egyptian 
politics in a Gramscian perspective. In The Political Economy of the Egyptian Revolution, 
Roccu seeks to explain the success of the 2011 uprising as consequence of a failed 
hegemony. According to Roccu, through the implementation of neoliberal reforms the 
Egyptian elites did away with the hegemony on which Mubarak and his regime relied to 
claim political legitimacy and some degree of support from subaltern groups.57 And although 
Roccu criticises the interpretation of hegemony as “ideological domination”, he understands 
hegemony’s “consent” to mean the ability of subaltern groups to accrue material benefits 
from the hegemonic regime.58  
This conception of hegemony opens for two criticisms, one empirical and one 
theoretical. I agree – as most authors do – that the current neoliberal political economics of 
Egypt do less for the poor than Nasser’s development state. Roccu’s argument rests on the 
assumption that subaltern groups in fact benefitted from it. However, as I return to below, 
Nasser’s agricultural system was flawed, and although some groups received entitlements 
that have since been removed, most of the actual benefits often disappeared through 
corruption or other related causes. Additionally, the agricultural system of the Nasserist state 
was not for the benefit of the poor farmers, but designed in such as way as to transfer the 
agricultural surplus to that state; it was state capitalism. Secondly, on a theoretical level, it is 
clear that Nasser’s state also included a powerful ideological component, which appears 	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when farmers today draw on that ideological heritage in order to criticise the neoliberal 
reforms. Together, the above problems mean that his general argument – that Egypt was 
characterised by failed hegemony – is flawed because it underestimates the extent to which 
continuing control over social institutions on part of the regime enables them to resist 
attempts to construct counter-hegemonies.  
Hazem Kandil argues that the Muslim Brotherhood did attempt to construct a counter-
hegemony during the late 1990s and early 2000s. According to Kandil, through consciously 
using existing institutions such as political parties, trade unions, media, and courts, as well as 
establishing their own educational facilities, the Muslim Brotherhood sought to win the 
population over to its own world view.59 Kandil first criticises the popular notion of 
hegemony that I outlined above, of hegemony as simply cultural or ideological. However, his 
analysis lapses into such an understanding. Thus in the end, he criticises counter-hegemonic 
strategies for failing. Not winning the majority over to their worldview – which it did – but 
failing to grant the Islamists in general and the Brotherhood in particular control over the 
state.60 In his analysis, he thus credits the Brotherhood for the islamisation of Egypt, but 
explains their corresponding failure to take over power with increased regime repression. 
Kandil’s evidence of regime repression may, however, just as easily be interpreted as a 
regime re-instituting its control over “the socialisation structures”, passing new laws and 
regulations as well as amending existing ones. Through such measures, they were able to 
limit members of the Muslim Brotherhood’s hold on the institutions, as well as limit the 
operation of the organisation itself.61  
Although there are clear elements of coercion in the regime’s approach, it also needed 
the consent of for example the courts for new laws to take effect – the same courts that the 
Muslim Brotherhood had so expertly used to further their own agenda. The paradox above 
arises because the realm of ideology is separated from that of behaviour. Thus, Kandil is able 
to ascribe the Islamists in general and the Muslim Brotherhood in particular a “worldview” 
based on Islam, which competes with an unspecified ideology of the regime. However, if 
there is one thing most rulers know, it is to draw on the popular currents of ideology to 
describe and legitimate their rule. Mubarak’s own National Democratic Party is a case in 
point. So often reduced in commentaries to a mechanism for buying support, it is easy to 
forget that it did ascribe to an ideology of social conservatism and economic liberalism that 	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effectively competed with the Islamists and logically must have appealed to a part of the 
electorate. Thus the islamisation which Kandil credits the Muslim Brotherhood, was, if not 
initiated by the regime, co-opted and used by the regime to further its own agenda. I agree 
with Kandil’s assertion that ideologies are not enough for counter-hegemony, but I disagree 
when he lays the blame at the feet of Gramsci. Gramsci may have understated the importance 
of institutional control, but he was too much of a militant revolutionary Marxist to 
underestimate it in actual practice. Thus, the true failed attempt at Islamist hegemony did not 
happen during the nineties and early 2000s, but after the 25th of January uprising. The rise 
and fall of Muḥammad Mursī, which I return to in chapter 5, is an interesting instance of 
hegemony (and a failed counter-hegemony).  
There is a final problem in the texts above on Gramsci. Throughout I have used the 
terms of the text in question to describe hegemony’s “immaterial” dimension, the space of 
ideologies, values, cultures, ideas and worldviews, and the multiplicity of terms needs a 
clarification. Returning to my definition of hegemony – control of social institutions as sites 
for “ideological production” – I first want to emphasise the connection between ideology and 
institution. Gramsci discusses the dissemination of hegemony through Ford’s factories as an 
institution that contributes to controlling the potential for radical politics, by simultaneously 
using force and persuasion, for example by limiting the potential of trade unions:  
Since these preliminary conditions [higher selling prices and lower production costs] existed, 
already rendered rational by historical evolution, it was relatively easy to rationalise 
production and labour by skilful combination of force (destruction of working-class trade 
unionism on a territorial basis) and persuasion (high wages, various social benefits, extremely 
subtle ideological and political propaganda) and thus succeed in making the whole life of the 
nations revolve around production. Hegemony here is born in the factory and requires for its 
exercise only a minute quantity of professional political and ideological intermediaries.62 
In Gramsci’s example, the ideological component comes into play when workers acquiesce to 
the working conditions, including the limitations in their rights. The ideology espoused 
through the factory is not “total” in the sense that it requires specific acts in other “spheres of 
life”. However, by acquiescing to the conditions, the workers fail to challenge hegemony. 
Rather they act on hegemony’s behalf by serving the existing relations of capital. 
Simultaneously, they are also capable of objectifying their situation, and explaining it to 
others. This I refer to as an “everyday ideology”: the narratives that are created as workers (or 
later farmers and fishermen) try to objectify their situation.  
Secondly, my definition points to the inherent linkage between ideology and 
positionality; that the power of words is mediated by and situated within a material context. 	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This means that words should always be interpreted in their context and who utters them. 
Conversely, words can also be made to reveal certain things about those who say them. 
Similarly, the authority of my own words derives from my position as a (white male) student 
at a Western university. And like my informants in Egypt, my words here can be used to 
reveal certain things about myself – and my politics. It leaves me with a sense of doing 
injustice as I structure our experiences and conversations into a coherent narrative. 
Furthermore, by analysing my experiences and the conversations with the villagers, I reveal 
and analyse their lives, and I re-present their experiences and narratives. The power to re-
present them in the following narrative contrasts with the vulnerability and confusion I often 
experienced “in the field.” In the following section, I want to reflect on that contradiction.  
 
1.4 Positionality and the countryside 
My intention when I arrived in Cairo in late September 2012 for two and a half months of 
fieldwork was to study political actions of Egyptian farmers after the revolution. As I 
progressed, I made contact with my research assistant, who became both a friend and a 
research assistant. We made contact through Samuli Schielke, an anthropologist who does 
fieldwork in rural Egypt. My research assistant graciously invited me to join him and his 
family for the ‘īd al-’aḍḥā, the second largest Muslim feast of the year, which he was going to 
celebrate in his village. This village, located in the Kafr al-Šayḵ governorate in the Northern 
Delta, is where I conducted the most extensive fieldwork. Staying as my research assistant’s 
friend when I visited his village meant his friends also received me hospitably. In addition to 
the week I spent there as my research assistant’s guest for ‘īd, we went back for a further 
week at the end of November.  
The village in question was both a farming and fishing village. Hence I was able to 
expand upon my original research objective of farmers, to also include fishermen, and 
particularly those who fish in the large mixed water lakes in the Northern Delta. There was a 
conflict between the farmers and fishermen. Its origin is as a conflict of interests caused by 
state interference under the program for land reclamation. During the 1980s and 1990s parts 
of the lake were dried up in order to turn shallow lake bottom into agricultural land. These 
are but the latest occurrences in a project that has been ongoing since the beginning of last 
century. However, according to my informants, it was then that the conflict damaged 
relations in the village. The ramification was a degree of social disconnection between the 
farmers and the fishermen. My research assistant, as the son of a fisherman, situated me as 
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his guest within that “side” of the village. Whenever I interviewed farmers, after asking about 
me, they would always also ask about him. And partly because I was his guest, and partly 
because he was a research assistant, it was not really possible for me to undertake these 
interviews alone. Still, at no point had I any suspicions that it affected the willingness to 
answer my questions.  
The comparative brevity of my stay in the village limited the opportunities for 
observation and familiarisation. It also meant that to maximise the research, I came to rely on 
my research assistant and his network, which was most extensive among the fishermen and 
their families. As my research assistant’s guest, all the fishermen received me warmly. They 
also seemed eager to show me the trade union, which they were still in the process of 
establishing when I first arrived there. I met some of them already the first day, and I later 
visited an office they had set up in the village. There I met four of the fishermen that 
originally took initiative to found a syndicate. I met them again several times, and especially 
one of them, an older fisherman, became a key informant on that union. He was one of its 
founding members and very active in organising and formalising it. And as in any fieldwork, 
a lot of knowledge came to me during conversations and tales of the village. Among the most 
important informants in that regard was my research assistant and several of his friends.  
Reaching out to the farmers in the village was done with a bit of luck and a bit by 
design. Again the network of which I had become a part was central. ‘Īd is one of very few 
holidays in Egypt where people have the ability to travel back to their native villages, and so 
it is also a time when people see old friends. As such, a lot if not most of the evenings were 
spent in a café, drinking tea. There I met a local farmer (or rather, as it turned out, a teacher 
who was the son of a farmer) who told me of a local branch of a newly started farmers’ union 
and offered to help me contact the leader for a meeting. During my two stays in the village, I 
interviewed him three times. Additionally I undertook interviews with three other farmers, 
and one agricultural engineer in the village on my second visit.  
My other main source of information is the network of activists associated with the 
Land Centre for Human Rights (LCHR). This centre, founded in December 1996, has worked 
with farmer related issues and problems since then. Particularly have they been active in 
monitoring the effects of the implementation of Law 96 of 1992, making reports of 
transgressions, and offering legal assistance. Throughout this process they established a 
nationwide network, which they have begun to organise into trade unions after the revolution.  
I had initially hoped that the centre could facilitate contact with farmers who had been 
dispossessed of their land or otherwise had been politicised. What I did not realise was that 
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much of the social reorganisation caused by Law 96 was done long before the revolution 
albeit other connected issues remain. Thus the network that they had established by being on 
hand to provide assistance to disaffected farmers, they now sought to organise into 
syndicates. I interviewed two people that worked with the centre: one activist and researcher 
who worked with the farmers, and one lawyer often working with the LCHR to register trade 
unions. I interviewed the researcher in his home in Daqahlīya governorate.  
I met the lawyer trice. Twice in his office, and once as I visited him in his home in 
Qalyūbīya. There, I also met three other farmers including his cousin, his uncle, and a board 
member for a local non-governmental agricultural cooperative. Their location in northern 
Qalyūbīya meant that they had a few distinct problems, particularly in relation to irrigation – 
in addition to those I recognised from elsewhere. The meeting with these farmers in 
Qalyūbīya is another example of the way networks structure opportunities and limits. Even 
clearer than with my research assistant, I did not feel in control of the situation, but rather as 
a guest – which I was. This was magnified as the interview became closer to a focus group 
where the questions were discussed and answered collectively. I analyse some of the 
consequences of this below.  
Additionally, I interviewed a few other people, one of which was a professor at the 
American University of Cairo, with whom I discussed the general situation of farmers in 
Egypt and the impact of the revolution. I met a lawyer working for the Egyptian Centre for 
Economic and Social Rights (ECESR). The ECESR has been working a lot with assisting 
diverse groups – workers, fishermen and farmers – in order to establish independent trade 
unions after the revolution. He helped me understand the changing dynamics around this 
issue, and he gave me a very good picture of the general state of affairs on workers’ rights in 
Egypt. A third interviewee was the founder and leader of a second trade union for fishermen 
based in Burj al-Burullus, with whom I discussed the situation of unions and fishermen in 
general, as well as the situation on the lake after the revolution. Again, the meeting with him 
was facilitated by the fishermen in the village offering their help and assistance with my 
project, which once more illustrates the centrality of the networks a researcher comes to rely 
on.  
I also met with several of my informants more than once, especially in the village 
where it was common to meet with the same people in different situations. A lot of 
information would also appear from different, sometimes unexpected sides, generating 
further questions, which I would raise later. Oftentimes if I initiated a conversation by asking 
about events or reasons, others would also offer their opinions freely. This was mostly 
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relevant to the social circles closest to my research assistant such as his family and friends. 
They trusted me as his guest, which ultimately made me also their guest. I kept all the 
information from the village – as well as other interviews – in a fieldwork diary. There I 
wrote down interviews and other notes from observations or conversations. This journal was 
with me throughout my fieldwork in the village. I was also careful to note names and dates so 
that I could tie the information to the relevant actors. As all interviews but two were 
completed without the use of a recorder, interview reports were also filed in the notebook.  
Another point about the village is that Samuli Schielke has often worked there.  Being 
the second “anthropologist” in the village made for a few interesting episodes. For example, 
at one point when at the market with my research assistant, as I was left in the street while he 
was in a shop, three older men invited me to their table. They were eager to talk, introducing 
themselves, and asking if I was the “scientist from Europe”. During the conversation it 
emerged that they thought I was Mr. Schielke. And they were very disappointed when they 
discovered I was not. Mr. Schielke has become quite famous in the village – everyone had 
heard about him – and the three men had wanted to talk to this “foreigner” who kept coming 
to their village. His good standing in the village no doubt has made “foreigners” less 
“foreign”. At least, I suspect that his good standing helped to make the villagers less 
suspicious of my questions (and me).  
There are several problems related to fieldworks and interviews, with both ethical and 
practical dimensions. The main rule is to treat informants with respect and integrity – also 
after the fieldwork is finished. General issues and dilemmas associated with observations and 
interviews are treated thoroughly elsewhere,63 but I wish here to emphasise some concrete 
problems arising from my own fieldwork. One particular problem arising from fieldwork and 
“participant observation” is that it is not always clear which role I’m in with respect to the 
informed consent of informants. I met a number of people in different ways. Some I spoke to 
in conversational settings, such as in cafés, or on home visits. Other times I had scheduled 
interviews. Quite a few times in the village I simply met people and started asking them 
about different topics. The blurring of the lines between interviewing, questioning and 
conversing described above leads to a certain blurring of the lines of the informed consent. 
Things could have been told me in confidentiality. Since I was open about my project 
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throughout my fieldwork I have however no reason to believe that I was given information 
that my informants did not intend for me to use.  
The nature of the information conveyed also creates difficulties, especially in relation 
to the anonymity of my subjects. In general I experienced a very high degree of willingness 
to answer my questions, and on more than one occasion people actively sought me out with 
relevant information. Yet the topic was political in nature, which historically has been and 
still can be touchy in Egypt. Nonetheless offers of anonymity were declined, and 
simultaneously politics were openly discussed in cafes and in the street. And some people 
were interviewed in their official capacity, which means that I cannot establish their authority 
without giving away some clues to their identity. However, given the shifting circumstances 
in Egypt, I have chosen to leave my informants anonymous. While I have given some 
information out of necessity, it means that I must obscure some other information, which I 
would otherwise have liked to include.   
Some methodological points that give rise to practical difficulties also need to be 
noted. The formal interviews I undertook were semi-structured. That is, I prepared a list of 
themes and questions in advance of the interview while leaving room for follow-up 
questions. This also accounts for the farmers where I had a list of questions that I prepared as 
a starting point. Not all farmers were asked all questions, and I often came across new and 
interesting ones during the conversations. As such, semi-structured interviews are often dense 
with information, but the results are not always directly comparable. For example, one of the 
questions I asked was on the farmers’ view of the Principal Bank of Development and 
Agricultural Credit (PBDAC). The question was not applicable to many tenants because the 
bank takes security in the land. As tenants they cannot offer security. They still sometimes 
have a general opinion on the bank, and asking them could lead to reflection on the position 
and role of farmers.  
A few of the interviews ended up as group interviews rather than with a single 
interviewee. This led to added dynamics, and an open space for discussion to which I could 
listen, highlighting differences of opinion on controversial subjects. In this way, as Brandh 
discusses, group interviews can highlight conflicts, but also agreements within the group.64 It 
can also build confidence among otherwise suspicious informants. In at least one instance 
having two interviewees together made it easier to speak about social and political issues. 
The openness of one of the informants made the other feel more secure when he told his 	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views. However, as I also experienced, sometimes informants can withhold opinions and 
information due to the other members of the group. During my interview with informants in 
the Qalyūbīya village, they frequently mentioned a local, farmer-initiated cooperative (as 
opposed to the local branch of the government agricultural cooperatives). This initiative was 
generally cited as a success providing cheaper fertilizers and seeds. One of the farmers 
present served as the cooperative president. As he left the group while the others, who were 
relatives of my host remained, they gave other and seemingly more candid descriptions of the 
cooperative, saying it no longer functioned as well as it had used to. It was becoming 
somewhat of a store and had started providing not only agricultural inputs but also washing 
machines and refrigerators. This they claimed was making the farmers in the hamlet less 
interested in participating. Having often found myself in similar situations, it is possible that 
such mechanisms – deferring one’s opinion to maintain the group harmony – have happened 
at other times too.  
There is another issue at stake here as well, that of language. All my interviews save 
the one with the AUC professor were conducted in Arabic. And although I am adept, Arabic 
is a language both difficult and with a wide register. There were problems especially relating 
to technical terms – though these lessened, and more seriously to dialects. Due to my 
language training in Damascus, I am more familiar with the Syrian dialect, and I did find the 
local dialects challenging especially among the older generations in the countryside. But I 
was mindful of the problem, and, as a foreigner, my informants were very patient when 
explaining to me. In the village I was also with my research assistant, and was able to discuss 
with him and clarify points I was unsure about.  
Only twice did I use a recording device during interviews. Not using a recording 
device was a conscious choice deriving from certain perceived problems. The local farmers’ 
union leader was interviewed both with and without the recorder and I found him much more 
relaxed without it. Based on this experience I decided to proceed without the recorder. It 
could be coincidence, but it could also be suspicion generated by life in an autocratic state. 
Other informants might not have restrained themselves in the presence of the recorder, but it 
was not a chance I wanted to take, especially as writing interview reports based on notes 
taken during the interviews worked well.  
Again, the above highlights an underlying theme here, namely that fieldwork is also a 
personal experience. As I retrospectively reflect on the fieldwork it seems to me that in many 
respects my native village in Norway is just as far from the centres of capital as the villages I 
visited. Many of the underlying problems are the same. On an abstract level, the driving 
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forces for “change” seem to be power of market forces. Rural life is now about production of 
food, yields, cost-effective production, investment opportunities, consumer needs and 
economic growth. Under the hegemony of these and similar terms, the experiences of farmers 
and fishermen have become a secondary issue. Security of livelihoods is not a concern for the 
market. The adverse effects of market rule, its human cost, are not an issue that surfaces in 
many development reports. They are at best marginal concerns among the development and 
state agencies, just as the countryside is seemingly on the margin of the economy. And yet, as 
Samuli Schielke and Mukhtar Saad Shehata pointed out, “in capitalism the margin is the 
profit.”65  
If there is a purpose here, it is to be able to question some of the hegemonic ideas, the 
taken for granted notions, about what rural life is and what it should be. I doubt if I can say 
what villagers really are like, neither there or here. I hope to say a little bit about what it 
means or might mean to be a villager.  
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2 “What do I do for dinner?” Market reforms and 
agriculture 
 
We want to see Egypt being the Mecca for investors 
Former Prime Minister Hisham Qandil66 
 
Egypt today is a country for sale. You can buy everything, but you cannot get anything 
without buying it. 
Fisherman, Kafr al-Šayḵ67 
 
 
The complaints of farmers revolve around the unfavourable position they have in the chain of 
agricultural production. With a gradual liberalisation of the Egyptian agricultural system over 
the past quarter of a century, the market has become the prevalent mechanism for guiding and 
regulating agricultural production. Due to several reasons, however, the market relations 
work to the disadvantage of small farmers and tenants. One informant from a village in Kafr 
al-Šayḵ gave as an example the cotton harvests. He said that to grow one acre worth of cotton 
required 3-4000 Egyptian pounds in seeds, fertiliser and pesticides, and another 4-5000 
pounds in work to harvest. The cotton harvest from that acre would be worth around 7000 
pounds.68 Thus even the best of cases leaves the farmer without a profit, and potentially, 
harvesting the cotton causes him to lose money.  
The difficult situation of farmers in the market causes a gradual increase in daily 
social hardship, which in turn negatively affects their future prospects. Reem Saad has 
highlighted the “costs of coping”.69 She analyses the strategies used to cope with the negative 
impact of law 96 of 1992, which caused many tenant farmers to lose access to land. Coping 
with the diminished livelihoods, these former farmers resorted to taking children out of 
school, eating less and cheaper food, taking loans, and child labour to generate income. These 
measures were short term and meant that long-term improvement would become even more 
difficult.70 Ray Bush similarly finds that the market reforms negatively affects the most 
vulnerable among the rural poor.71  
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Simultaneously, farmers asserted in interviews that the state institutions built under 
Nasser’s regime to regulate the agricultural sector have become dysfunctional.72 Groups with 
privileged access now often use these institutions, especially the agricultural cooperative 
societies and the village banks, for their benefit. As agricultural institutions created to assist 
farmers, they are now mechanisms to enrich selected networks of patronage.  
 
2.1 The shortcomings of agribusiness 
Since the early 1980s, international development agencies like the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF), the World Bank and the United States Agency for International Development 
(USAID) have all advocated the same brand of neoliberal development ideology. The 
government of Egypt has been under pressure by these institutions as well as the United 
States government to accept economic and political reforms along neoliberal lines. This 
neoliberal reform program has framed agricultural policies in Egypt since the mid-1980s. 
Since then several legal and practical changes sought, in the language of reforms, to liberate 
the markets from repressive state regulations. The reforms in the agricultural sector were 
guided by the assumptions of agricultural export led growth. This model suggested that 
liberalising the market in the agricultural sector for inputs, produce and land, would attract 
investment. This investment would turn Egypt’s agriculture into profitable agribusiness 
focused on supplying the European winter market for vegetables and cut flowers. Within the 
model, Egypt’s favourable climatic conditions and cheap labour costs would make Egyptian 
produce competitively in the international market.  
The first reforms were implemented in 1986. They focused primarily on “creating” a 
market for agricultural products, both inputs like seeds and fertilisers, and for the harvests. 
The Ministry of Agriculture gradually removed crop allocation and delivery quotas along 
with the price regulating policies on the harvests. Previously farmers had been forced to 
deliver percentages of their yearly harvests of certain staple goods and cash crops: 
predominantly wheat, barley, rice, cotton and sugar. To begin with, the regime abolished 
controls for all grains except rice, cotton and sugarcane. By 1992, only sugarcane cultivation 
was still regulated by the state.73 The story of liberalisation is only partly true, however, 
because even though the Ministry of Agriculture abandoned the control of crop areas and 
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quotas, and allowed private actors to import wheat, it still controlled around half of the 
domestic production, along with processing and marketing. Simultaneously the Ministry of 
Supply continued to buy large quantities of wheat for the state owned bakeries providing 
subsidised bread. Thus price controls lingered on in a somewhat haphazard fashion. Hence, 
former president Mursī was able to promise on the 9th of September 2012 an increase in the 
gate prices of rice. The problem is that the price rise of rice was not reflected in the market 
where the vast majority of farmers operate.  
Market reforms also demanded the liberalisation of agricultural land, the single most 
important factor of production, and perhaps the single most important part of the reforms. 
Liberalising the laws that regulate landholdings proved to be one of the most contested parts 
of the reform. Law 96 of 1992 thus became one of the cornerstones of the reforms. The law, 
officially named “the law to regulate the relationship between the farmer and the tenant”, 
aimed at liberating the land from state regulations, which meant removing the protections 
tenant farmers enjoyed vis-à-vis landowners. The law changed the stipulations for renting 
land, and removed the security of tenancy that tenant farmers had enjoyed since the land 
reform laws of the Free Officers. Centrally, the law removed price controls on the rent of 
land, which led to rapid and significant increases in prices. Secondly, they removed the 
demand that contracts needed the approval of both parties to be terminated. In effect, tenants 
whose contracts had been hereditary and who had inherited the land they lived off, and thus 
felt a strong entitlement, lost their entire claim to it, when after a five year transition period, 
the law was implemented in 1997.  
The rational of the law was nominally to make it easier to buy and sell land through 
investment landholdings, which would, according to neoliberal thought, be more effective. 
This was part of the reforms’ rational; to create space for an agribusiness sector, which was to 
become the engine for agricultural export-led economic growth on the model of Chile.74 
Specifically, the prescription is for the promotion of a horticultural sector, which would 
export high-value fruits and vegetables to the European market. A decade after the reforms, 
the agribusiness sector was still failing.75 Critical studies have revealed serious problems 
relating to the rational of the reforms, both practical and theoretical. To begin with the latter, 
the invoked model of Chile originates with the liberalisation carried out by the Pinochet-
government in the 1980s. As such, along with South Africa and New Zealand, they pioneered 	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a market in off-season fruits and vegetables during the winter months. Yet Chile was a 
newcomer in the market while Egypt has to compete with several established producers, 
which alongside the above-mentioned countries include Israel, Brazil, Argentina, India, USA 
and Kenya.76  
The classic economic problem of late-coming is accentuated by severe structural 
difficulties relating to infrastructure and bureaucratic capabilities. The underlying cause is the 
nature of Egypt’s crony capitalism in which there is no pressure on the state apparatus to 
improve the facilities for exporting horticultural produce. Sfakianakis finds that all the 
dominant actors in the sector have attained their position through connections within the state 
bureaucracy, and access to credit and information. This means that only existing elite 
businesspeople have the ability to invest in this sector, or indeed invest in any sector.77 They 
in turn have no interest in reform of the system, in which they are the beneficiaries. 
Agribusiness then becomes a venerable side project and nothing more. As one of 
Sfakianakis’ informants put it:  
I am happy with my exports and the fact that I am making money out of my grapes and 
strawberries. It is nice to say and for people to know that you have a successful and big 
agricultural project – after all there is an important connection between the people of Egypt 
and agriculture – but the real money is outside this sector; for example, I have this real estate 
project.78  
The quote is reproduced because it captures so well the discrepancy between economic praxis 
– where the money lies, in this case in real estate – and the official rhetoric that hails 
agribusiness as a future growth sector for the Egyptian economy.  
Despite the failure of the agribusiness sector, the proponents of reform have never re-
evaluated the undertaking. Both the IMF and the government have defended the successes of 
the agricultural reforms by pointing to production increases in the main staple foods such as 
rice and wheat.79 Yet, while critical observers agree with the nominal increases in production, 
they also point to two problems. Bush, for example, emphasises that the increases seem to be 
generated by farmers through new cropping patterns and improved yields rather than as a 
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response to higher prices.80 Mitchell adds that prior underreporting of production yields at 
least in part caused the initial, statistical gains.81 He also points out the irony that production 
increases in basic cereal production is cited as proof of the success of liberalisation reforms, 
when the intention was for farmers to grow more high value crops, fruits and vegetables, for 
export. Growing basic crops such as wheat, barley, maize and rice in stead was in fact a move 
“not toward the market but toward increased self-provisioning and protection from the 
market.”82 Along the parameters of the linear understanding of reform success, the 
agricultural sector reforms have been a failure, moving farmers towards self-provisioning.  
There is other evidence that supports this conclusion. One of the main arguments of 
the government in favour of a law was the need for investment, which the landowners would 
provide, according to the argument. Tenants, on the other hand, were unable to invest in 
agriculture because they were either too lazy or too poor.83 The supporters of reform 
combined the two mutually exclusive representations into a campaign for the law and against 
the tenants. There is little evidence to prove the existence of the ostentatiously wealthy 
tenants too lazy to invest in the land. There is however a lot to suggest that many tenants 
were too poor to invest. And the government abetted this situation when it changed the 
Principal Bank for Development and Agricultural Credit (PBDAC) from an institution tasked 
with offering capital to farmers into a commercial bank. By transforming the bank, the 
government limited and removed smaller farmers’ access to credit. Other subsidies that 
contributed to the farmers’ profits were also cut. For example, the ministry ended subsidies to 
help mechanise agriculture and assist farmers in purchasing tractors. As a sign of the times, 
Mitchell observed that farmers in one village had started to reintroduce animals such as cows 
and camels to do farm work, replacing tractors that had previously dominated.84 This is 
another instance in which the reforms got the opposite result of what was claimed. It is 
logical to expect increased investment in agriculture to cause further mechanisation of 
agriculture. A de-mechanisation points to the opposite result.  
 
2.2 The social networks of markets: The “crisis of fertiliser” 
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Returning to the liberalising market reforms, one important part of removing the state’s 
influence was to also remove its control of the input sector. Here the state was present as a 
provider and producer of subsidised fertilisers, seeds and pesticides. The implementation of 
the liberalising project in this sector sheds light on the shortcomings of the reforms, and how 
they have suited the interests of certain groups close to power. In 2005 several cases of food 
poisoning led to an investigation that revealed how government employees including an 
undersecretary of the Ministry of Agriculture, had taken advantage of their position to import 
and market the pesticides that caused the food poisoning. At the same time, however, the 
ministry had dissolved the committee tasked with supervising pesticide imports, making it 
easier to import the low-cost, hazardous pesticides.85 This shows the double roles many of the 
“reformers” in government had, also being among the actors in the “liberalised” markets.  
Another example is the market for fertilizers. Egypt has one of the most fertiliser 
intensive agricultural systems in the world. The Aswan High Dam enabled year round 
irrigation based crop cultivation in Egypt because the yearly Nile floods were contained, but 
so were the silt that had for centuries provided nutrients for Egypt’s agriculture. To 
counterbalance this the Egyptian government started to provide subsidised fertilisers through 
the agricultural cooperatives in a system where the government regulated production, 
distribution and pricing. During the seventies, the PBDAC assumed this function though 
mostly it operated out of buildings of the cooperatives. As part of the reforms, the state 
gradually withdrew from this market between 1988 and 1992 and allowed private sector 
actors to import and purchase domestically produced fertilizer. Thus it was estimated that by 
1992 the private sector’s share of this market was at around 75 percent.86 
Private actors have dominated the market for fertilizers since, enjoying sizeable 
profits while farmers find that their margins are squeezed. Several of the farmers I 
interviewed stressed that the cooperatives still provided some fertilizers, but very little and 
sometimes too old. At the same time, the market saw prices double that. One farmer put it 
like this: prices for one bag of “urea” stood at 76 Egyptian pounds in the cooperative, while 
“nitrat” was available for 74 pounds. In the market, the prices reached more than 150 pounds 
for each bag of fertilizer.87 Other informants also claimed that the prices in the market are 
much higher than in the cooperatives, and similar stories were reported in the newspapers, 
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citing instances of prices reaching 170 and even 180 Egyptian pounds.88 Such price hikes 
happen almost yearly, and especially during the planting season, when farmers need fertiliser 
the most. This “crisis of fertiliser” recurs almost every year with nominal prices doubling or 
even tripling. As most farmers lack the storage facilities and the capital to buy the fertiliser 
when it is cheap, merchants can double their money for the same fertiliser when demand 
soars.  
Even though the government officially has sanctioned the breakup of the distribution 
monopoly of the PBDAC, farmers and media alike continue to denominate the market in 
fertiliser as a black market.89 As such it confirms findings in a previous study that farmers 
continue to view the cooperatives as not just an input supplier, but the legitimate input 
supplier.90 The study, carried out in Qinā and Aswān in 1995, assesses the impact of the 
reforms on farmers’ perceptions of the cooperatives. One of the findings is that small farmers 
continued to view the cooperatives in more positive terms than farmers with larger 
landholdings. This suggests that smaller farmers are not able to navigate the market and thus 
continue to rely on the cooperatives.91 Hence there is a continuous demand for the services of 
the state cooperatives to operate. Simultaneously, the state remains a notable producer and 
supplier of fertiliser through state owned factories.  
The same study shows that richer farmers are much less positive towards the 
cooperatives, and more positive towards the market. Abdel Aal suggest that the larger 
landholders have the financial and logistical resources – that is, the money and the 
connections – to better take advantage of the opportunities provided. There are examples 
from the fieldwork that substantiate this claim. Some farmers in a village in Northern 
Qalyūbīya had set up a private cooperative in 2005 to take advantage of the opportunity. By 
pooling their resources and buying in larger quantities they had been able to get better prices 
on the private market. The private cooperative had initially been very successful by focusing 
on the basic needs of the farmers, like fertilisers and pesticides, but the same farmers claimed 
that it was now corrupted and inefficient.92 The cooperative had started to provide additional 
services and marketing everything from agricultural machines to laundry machines and 	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refrigerators. Other farmers also failed to contribute their share thus reducing the efficacy of 
the cooperative, and by now the farmers had withdrawn because they no longer got 
advantageous prices.  
The experiment of the private cooperative illustrates both the ability of some farmers 
to gain from the market, and the difficulties for smaller farmers to do so. It was the bulk 
purchases that made the private cooperative profitable to begin with, but with diminishing 
interest in the venture the profits were reduced. Due to distrust between some of the members 
and the leader of the cooperative – I was presented with allegations of corruption – I suspect 
that a dwindling membership mass had caused the venture to be less profitable. Richer 
farmers are not presented with such a need for transparency. Thus they are much more able 
than poor farmers to reap the benefits of the market. Smaller farmers are on the other hand 
doubly cursed. Unable to benefit directly from the market, the alternative of creating 
institutions to compensate requires additional social capital they may or may not have access 
to.  
There is a second, historical, reason that contributes to the ability of richer farmers to 
take advantage of the market. That the market is at all called “the black market” testifies to its 
creation not due to the reforms, but due to the controls of agricultural production under 
Nasser. The black market arose at the demand of richer farmers and rural notables with 
networks that made it possible for them to circumvent the production restrictions that the 
state had imposed. Accordingly, the rural upper class that also circumvented the ownership 
restriction on land, were already by the time of the reforms embedded in market networks 
from which they benefitted. Farmers that depended on the agricultural services of the state 
institutions like the village banks and the cooperatives lost their support and were forced onto 
a scene in which they had not experience. There they faced established structures, including 
merchants who had already entered into mutually beneficial oligopolistic arrangements.93 In 
Egypt’s countryside, “markets” are better understood as a web of social relations of which the 
exchange of goods is but one aspect.  
Thus “the market” creates differing logics for different farmers given that they are 
unequally positioned within these social networks. Malak Rouchdy, writing on the history of 
landownership in a Delta village called Batra, provides an interesting example of how the 
mutuality of political and economic power dominates the village.94 Rouchdy tells the story of 	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a field merchant called Hag Latif Nigma, who came up through his relations with one of the 
leading landowning families, the Fakhri, in the village. Hag Latif Nigma made his wealth 
through the marketing of fruits during the 1960s and 1970s, eventually monopolising the 
marketing of the crop from the Fakhri estate. However, after a falling out between Nigma and 
the Fakhri family, the family sought and found other buyers for their crop, ultimately 
accepting a lower price, but they were able to break his monopoly. The break-up of relations 
between Nigma and the Fakhri family were caused by perceived transgression on their land 
and authority. Through his economic position, Hag Latif Nigma was able to gain 
considerable political power in the village, although his position was later undermined by the 
break in his relations with the Fakhri family. Rouchdy concludes by noting the shifts in the 
merchant classes following the market reforms, which seems to challenge some of the field 
merchants, like Hag Latif Nigma, and reinforcing market relations.95 
The story of Hag Latif Nigma and his relationship with the Fakhri family can be made 
to illustrate a few aspects about the power relations of the market in Egypt. First, Hag Latif 
Nigma – as the Fakhri family – made his fortunes through fruits and vegetables, a sector in 
which the rural upper class centred their production to avoid state regulations. The 
comparatively free market in fruits led to it being from Sadat’s years a sector dominated by 
the large landowner and rural notability. Secondly, the relationship between Nigma and the 
Fakhri family shows the social aspect of market relations in the villages. Nigma was the 
preferred salesman of the Fakhri family in part because the family needed to stand on good 
footing with important power brokers in the village, of which Nigma was an accepted 
representative. Yet when the relations between Nigma and the Fakhri family soured, the latter 
were able to break off their reliance on Nigma since they won over large parts of the village 
to their side in the struggle. The motivation behind this move was political, not economic, 
because the Fakhri family accepted a lower selling price. Finally it is clear that the many 
small farmers and peddlers in the village that were dependent on Hag Latif Nigma did not 
have an equal opportunity to navigate the market in a similar way. They are caught in an 
economic dependence portrayed as social relations.96  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Press, 1998). 
95 Ibid., pp. 248-52. 
96 The same social relations also appear in other sectors, for example fishing (see also the next chapter). About 
the fish farm workers next to Lake Manzala, Fatemah Farag reveals   
The relationships between local residents and more wealthy outsiders are demonstrated 
in Umm Mohamed's business, which is supplied by a merchant who makes regular visits to 
the area. Using a traditional barter system, the merchant, says Umm Mohamed, ‘gives us rice, 
flour and inputs for the fisheries. We go to him if we need cash for a doctor or something like 
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2.3 The social networks of market reforms: A free market for fertiliser 
Returning to the history of the fertiliser market, a closer look at the implementation of the 
market reforms shows the underlying problem of the reforms. When the government ended 
its regulatory authority, an oligopoly of three producers assumed the control of the “market.” 
By exporting fertiliser abroad, the domestic supply diminished and the prices quadrupled in 
the early nineties, according to Mitchell.97 No challenge to the market power of the oligopoly 
ever emerged from the regime or the international financial institutions. During the 2000s the 
export of fertilizer continued and grew considerably. As a country well endowed with both 
natural gas and rock phosphate, two key ingredients, Egypt is well suited for production of 
fertiliser. And it is especially competitive in the international market given the huge subsidies 
on petroleum products.  
The fertiliser industry is one of the major consumers of natural gas in Egypt, and 
natural gas alone accounted for 40 percent of the total expenditures of the petroleum 
subsidies in the fiscal year 2005/06 – although it declined to 21 percent the following fiscal 
year – while the remainder subsidised prices of diesel, gasoline varieties, LPG and fuel oil 
(māzūt).98 The subsidy ratio for natural gas reached 77 percent that year; that is, the domestic 
price was on average 23 percent of the international price. In all, energy subsidies are by far 
the biggest post in the government subsidy program, and four fifths of the subsidies go to 
energy intensive industries like cement steel, aluminium and fertiliser.99 In Egypt, the natural 
gas the state so heavily subsidises, contribute to give the fertiliser factories very reliable and 
competitive terms, by evening out the fluctuating market prices on natural gas. Those 
fluctuations included a massive top in late 2005 and early 2006, which then the government 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
that. He keeps all these items listed on a piece of paper.’ Once the fish harvest is sold on the 
market, the merchant deducts the cost of the items he had advanced the fish farmers, plus a 
certain agreed percentage in lieu of interest. 
The merchant in other words did more than just buy the produce. The fish farm workers are in a 
dependent relationship that structures their options in the market; that is, they do not really have an 
option as this cannot be called a “market relation” in the conventional meaning of the term. Fatemah 
Farag, "Engineering Conservation," Al-Ahram Weekly 641, 5. June 2003.  
97 Mitchell, Rule of experts : Egypt, techno-politics, modernity: p. 261. 
98 Abdallah Shehata Khattab, "The impact of reducing energy subsidies on energy intensive industries in egypt," 
in The Egyptian Economy: Current Challenges and Future Prospects, ed. Hanaa Kheir-El-Din (Cairo: The 
American University in Cairo Press, 2008), pp. 273-4; this chapter also exist as Abdallah Shehata Khattab, "The 
impact of reducing energy subsidies on energy intensive industries in Egypt," in Working Paper No. 124 (Cairo: 
The Egyptian Centre for Economic Studies, 2007). See also Soheir Abouleinein, Heba El-Laithy, and Hanaa 
Kheir-El-Din, "The impact of phasing out subsidies of pertroleum energy products in Egypt," in Working Paper 
No. 145 (Cairo: The Egyptian Centre for Economic Stuies, 2009). 
99 'Amr Ādlī, "Da'm al-Ṭāqa fī-l-muwāzana al-miṣrīya: namūḏijan li-l-ẓulm al-ijtima'ī," (Cairo: Egyptian 
Initiative for Personal Rights, , 2012); Shokr, "Reflections on Two Revolutions." 
	  37	  
ended up financing. And the fertilisation industry alone accounts for nearly a tenth of the 
total consumption of natural gas in Egypt, and a quarter of the consumption if the sole biggest 
post – production of electricity – is left out. As such, petroleum products account for by far 
the largest share of the government’s subsidy program.   
The reasons for the priorities of the government are connected to the networks that 
influence policy decision in Egypt. As an important constituency of the Mubarak regime, a 
class of elite businessmen close to the regime had a significant ability to influence regime 
decisions including the pace and the direction of the privatisations. This was to ensure that 
the reforms did not threaten to eliminate the advantages from which these businessmen 
benefitted, or their privileged access to information and decision makers.100 At the same time, 
the state sought to maintain its role as a distributor of rents, and the crony capitalists’ 
protected monopoly or oligopoly positions hinged on this ability.101 The result was that 
privatisation was never carried out quite in the way it was imagined.  
Privatisations did nonetheless offer up opportunities for new networks that linked in 
particular state officials and former bureaucrats. Take for example the Abū Qīr fertiliser 
factory in Alexandria. The government of Egypt included it as a privatised company under 
law 203. This was the law that listed the companies that were to be privatised, and organised 
these under different holding companies tasked with selling them. The shareholders in the 
Abū Qīr plant after the privatisation were however not private enterprises but various 
government entities. A report prepared for USAID later acknowledged that privatisation had 
not corrected the flaws in the fertilizer market: “despite the [holding company]’s divestiture 
of Abou Kir [sic], privatization has not been able to spur competitive forces or any new 
market entry into this segment of the Egyptian fertilizer market.”102 The “privatised” 
company was able to keep the regulations that made it profitable all the while profits ended in 
personal rather than public bank accounts.  
Such underhand methods happened in other sectors as well, where “the state” was 
supposed to relinquish its control. Sfakianakis describes identical practices in the 
privatisation of the cement industries in Egypt.103 In brief, former bureaucrats and public 
sector managers used their position to take over the “privatised” state owned enterprises 	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ed. Steven Heydemann (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), p. 86. 
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while the state’s holding companies also kept sizeable ownership shares. The private sector 
business elite shied away from these “privatised” companies and did not acquire shares. They 
made the most money as “suppliers and subcontractors” in “multiple and diversified 
operations.”104 Another of the regime’s strategies was to establish parallel business ventures. 
When cement factories were finally privatised and sold to foreign investors in the late 
nineties because the government needed the income, the regime linked business elite, like the 
Sawiris family, was simultaneously given licences for additional cement factories. Cement 
was at the time an extremely profitable industry due to the building boom Egypt experienced 
at the time.105 Thus the regime managed to “privatise” profitable state owned ventures, while 
keeping their business constituency happy by giving them lucrative contracts.  
The Sawiris family also operates in the fertiliser market. The family’s holding 
company Orascom owns two fertiliser plants, built in 1998 and 2007 respectively. Combined 
they have the potential to manufacture more than any other “private” producer of fertiliser in 
Egypt, of which, the Abū Qīr factory is the biggest. The two Orascom-factories are however 
both located on the Suez Canal. There they can produce for export to an international market 
where the factories are competitive thanks to the lucrative benefits accorded them by the 
Egyptian government in return for “investing in” the country. Yearly domestic fertiliser 
production in Egypt far outweighs consumption. The production potential of both factories 
are enough to make up the gap in domestic supply during the planting season when the “crisis 
of fertiliser” recurs.106  
Smaller farmers, the vast majority of farmers in Egypt, have neither the storage 
facilities nor the capital to buy their fertiliser supplies in advance. In the year round 
agriculture of Egypt, they buy the necessary inputs for one season with the profits from the 
preceding harvest. However, in conditions of an inelastic demand, that is a demand that is 
less responsive to the changes in price, the conditions are ripe for hoarding, speculation and 
monopolisation. Accordingly, farmers without the economic or social capital to circumvent 
these market deficiencies are caught in the grinder between merchants and “the silent 
compulsion of economic relations”, as Marx called the imperative of everyday survival.107  
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2.4 Everyday ideology: The hegemony of the market 
This market is a social institution given its “form” by the networks within which it is 
practiced – that is, acted out. This applies whether it is on the top of society, where the 
business elites meet the regime power brokers, or if it is in the marketplaces of the villages. 
Understanding the market as an acted out institution also opens for understanding it not in its 
economic sense of offer and demand, but as a network of social relations. Finally, as a 
network of social relations, the market is a network of power relations, both at the local level 
and at the “national” level. The last claim I make is that the market is a hegemonic institution, 
and hence that the power relations of the market are part of the institutions of hegemony.  
The “silent compulsion of economic relations” effectively structures people’s lives. 
During the market reforms, securing a descent living has become harder for both economic 
and ecological reasons.108 The economic reforms of the eighties and nineties have caused an 
estimated loss of over 700 000 jobs in the countryside altogether, and conditions have 
become more difficult for those who continue to work the land.109 One of the farmers I 
encountered in the fields whose total landholdings amounted to less than a third of an acre, 
also worked as a day labourer for the village fishermen. Besides the seasonal proceeds from 
the rented land, where most of it was household production, a day of work for the fishermen 
brought in about five Egyptian pounds: “Five pounds is enough to buy lunch for me and my 
family, but what do I do for dinner?”110 These words describe his situation caught between 
the limitations of the market and the “silent compulsion of economic relations”. It is an 
expression – an “ideological production” of an everyday ideology – of power as regulating 
behaviour rather than thoughts.  
Another farmers expressed the same exasperation the following way: “The farmer 
works all day, every day, and if he doesn’t work, he only hurts himself.”111 The farmer again 
expresses a feeling of imprisonment in the work relation; that he has no option but to keep 
working. He too expresses a dependence on capital that limits the options of protest. It is an 
ideological statement that any act of opposition would ultimately “hurt himself”. This 
everyday ideology is the corresponding version to calls about the necessity of “stability” that 
international financial institutions and the government of Egypt makes. “Stability” means the 
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continuation of status quo, and the maintenance of the existing economic relations. Hence for 
the farmers “stability” means the continuation of work “all day, every day” – without protest.  
The power of the market is that it structures the actions of farmers, merchants and 
businessmen alike. And even though several of the farmers oppose the market as an 
organising ideal of agricultural production, they are nonetheless compelled to deal with it. In 
the neoliberal age, the market has become the organising principle not just in the 
marketplace, but also for the organisation of vast parts of society. That is the lesson of the 
fisherman’s words of Egypt as “a country for sale”.112 Powerful forces within the state and 
without, including the international financial institutions, the capitalist elites and the 
bourgeoisie class promote this ideology. Turning Egypt into a “Mecca” for investors 
translates to assuring the stability of the “free” market, but with little considerations for those 
caught in the web of dependence disguised as “market relations”. Yet by organising the 
agricultural sector thus, “the market” has become inescapable to farmers. And throughout the 
expansion of “the market” – or the idea of the market – as the preferred principle for 
organising production in Egypt, it has changed the position of farmers and forced many to 
enter into new social relations in which they are at a disadvantage.  
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The neoliberal reforms were supposed to remove the presence of the state from the 
agricultural sector in order to liberalise the market. As I argued in the previous chapter, the 
market is a social institution, made up of networks in which power relations are the 
organising principle. When discussing the market, the state never seems that absent. When 
the business elite competed for privileged contracts and preferential access, the decision 
makers were the state’s bureaucrats and regime politicians. Thus, the state’s agents control 
the market, but are in turn dependent on the powerful actors in society.  
The ties between economic and political power holders, between “state” and 
“market”, are replicated in the villages. In Malak Rouchdy’s account of the village of Batra, 
he explains how the dominating position of the different families in village politics rest on 
their economic power and the social position that affords them. Small farmers, who are 
dependent on the larger for access to irrigation pumps and markets, as well as more direct 
financial and social support, find it hard to challenge their dominating position. The large 
farmers – the rural bourgeoisie – in turn use their dominating socio-economic position to 
reinforce their political status through their ability acts as intermediaries with the state’s 
institutions. This intermediary role in turn situates the rural bourgeoisie within the state’s 
network of patronage, and the resources that entails.113 However, as the state relies on the 
social status and economic power of rural landowning families and mercantile upper class, 
these social groups are able to use state institutions to their benefit. State run institutions like 
the cooperative societies and the village banks became embedded in the established relations 
of power in the countryside. Below I argue that this was – if not explicitly intended – the 
result of regime choices in the 1960s. According to Hamied Ansari, a political effort to 
mobilise the farmers caused increasing social upheaval, which in turn made conservative and 
statist forces within the regime realign the state with the interests of the rural bourgeoisie 
through a strategy of “retraditionalisation”.114  
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3.1 The social origin of state interests 
The international financial institutions promoted the market reforms, but in Egypt they were 
ultimately carried out in a prolonged negotiation process between regime figures, business 
elites and different interest groups. Agriculture was one of the first sectors to be subjected to 
such reforms. Agriculture became an initial site for reforms because those controlling the 
sector – and the state institutions within the sector – were able to shape the reforms in 
accordance with their interests. The rural bourgeoisie and large landowning families had over 
time monopolised the access to the state and the regime. Networks extended well into the 
ministry of agriculture and in parliament, and the cooperative union and the PBDAC were 
under control. The entrenched position of these classes was in turn the result of state policies 
under Nasser and Sadat’s presidencies.  
The large landowning families had been the backbone of the monarchy that ruled 
under British suzerainty in the post-colonial era. When the Free Officers’ took power, one of 
their first acts was to announce the land reform law, or law 178 of 1952, which put a ceiling 
on landownership. Initially, the law determined the ceiling to be 200 acres for individuals, 
and 300 for a father with two sons. The ceiling was later reduced to 100 acres in 1961, and a 
further decrease in 1969 saw it reduced to 50 acres. Sadat quickly reversed the latter change, 
however, on his ascension to the presidency. The state appropriated excess land was by in 
return for government bonds, and plots were then sold to landless agricultural workers and 
tenants. It is estimated that the land reform laws led to the redistribution of approximately 12-
14 percent of the total cultivated area.115  Additionally, the 1952 law fixed rents and 
demanded that rental contracts last at least three years. Lastly, the law established a minimum 
wage for agricultural workers. In addition to the regulations established by law, the Free 
Officers established agricultural cooperatives for the beneficiaries of the land reforms to 
secure the small farmers’ access to seeds, fertiliser and pesticides as well as a selling point for 
the agricultural produce. The agricultural cooperatives were since expanded to include not 
just the land reform beneficiaries, but also other farmers in Egypt.  
The land reform laws of the Free Officers were also pursued in the interest of 
breaking the economic – and thus political – power of the big landowners who until then had 
dominated the political scene in the country. Absentee owners were affected, but many of 
these families had by then become established in the cities. For the tier below the richest, 	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who had kept their links with the land, the laws failed. Most of these families were able to 
spread their holdings on several members, while they continued to farm the land as one unit. 
The land laws were gradually rolled back through these families consolidating their holdings 
as well as their hold on power. The way in which Nasser’s land reforms were undermined 
reveals the nature of power and its dispersion through networks in rural Egypt.  
Law 96 of 1992 reversed the last vestiges of the land reforms, namely the security of 
tenancy that tenant farmers had enjoyed. Immediately after it was passed by the parliament 
the law tripled rents on land. After a five year transition period, it removed the regulations on 
rent altogether. The second part of the law made it possible for landowners to unilaterally end 
tenancy agreements. It made it possible for landowners to “reclaim” land that they had “lost” 
to tenants.116  
Law 96 of 1992 came about partly due to the IMF reforms, and were presented as a 
part of that reform package. Yet the drive to liberalise the restrictions on land ownership and 
the associated land accumulation antedate the implementation of the economic reform 
program of the IMF. The official reforms in the agricultural sector were linked with the 
appointment of Yūsuf Wālī as Minister of Agriculture in 1982. From his appointment to his 
dismissal in 2004 he was running the ministry of agriculture and its extensions, like the 
PBDAC, as an extensive network of patronage.117 Yūsuf Wālī was the grandson of Amīn 
Wālī, one of the largest landowners in Fayyūm. He not only represented the large 
landowners; he was one. He and his extended family benefitted directly from the reversal of 
Nasser’s land reform laws. His appointment for the job was symbolic of the rural classes that 
had become the regime’s primary constituency since Nasser’s “failed revolution”, namely the 
rural bourgeoisie and the old landowning class.118 The reforms from 1986 onwards were in 
line with the economic interests of the larger landholders and the rural bourgeoisie. For 
example, removing crop allocation regulations and forced delivery quotas enabled the rural 
bourgeoisie to transfer more of their land into fruit production, which was more lucrative 
market than that of staple crops.119  
Ultimately the reforms continued and sanctioned the developments in the countryside 
since the 1970s. Through law 96 alone, it was estimated that 432,000 tenant farmers (out of a 
total of 905,000) lost their access to land. And only 1.5 percent of those affected were 	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actually compensated with plots in the reclaimed lands, which the government promised 
when it implemented the laws.120 However, the land that tenants lost overwhelmingly 
returned to the landholding families of 1952. That land added to another 900.000 acres, 
which had already shifted from the hands of tenant farmers to landowners prior to the law.121 
The rural notables and upper class farmers, the driving forces of this reversal of the 
land reform laws, had been growing in economic power and political importance for some 
time. It is visible in the landownership statistics, where holdings of ten acres or above were 
recovering from the impact of the agrarian reforms already in the 1970s. Springborg, 
analysing the agricultural censuses of 1982, uncovers the trends that have dominated 
Egyptian agriculture since. There was a division into a smallholder sector and a capital-
intensive sector. This was accompanied by a growing inequality in access to land, which 
manifested as land loss by small holders and a decrease in the rented area. This in turn forced 
small holders to seek off-farm employment. Simultaneously the larger landholdings 
increasingly claimed both the cultivated area and the high-value production.122 Between 1977 
and 1982 the largest absolute increase in overall land gains came for landholdings between 5-
10 acres, followed by those between 10-50 acres. Smaller holdings on the other hand became 
more numerous, but failed to expand in terms of acreage. This means that more farmers had 
to divide less land among the smallholders, while the big farms got bigger. Hence already the 
Sadat era was “characterised by increasing inequality of access to land.”123 Despite the laws 
that were nominally still in place, the effects of the land reforms of 1952 were being reversed 
on the ground.  
The beneficiaries at that time were particularly the rural middle and upper classes. 
Waterbury suggests them to be those with landownership of ten to fifty acres whose 
ownerships were untouched by the successive agrarian reform laws.124 With their economic 
power intact and with the economic power of the upper stratum of landowners challenged, 
this segment could be expected to take over power locally. There was indeed a shift in the 
power holders, but that shift was subtler than what Waterbury claims: “The biggest 
beneficiaries were large landowners living in the countryside […] able to preserve and often 
enlarge their holdings.”125 The rural bourgeoisie did so by dividing up their land among 	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several branches of the extended family, and was thus able to circumvent the law. Through 
such extended family networks, they thus kept their hold on local power.  
In Rouchdy’s village of Batra, stories of the influential families illustrate the above 
statistics and trends.126 The Khalil-family, for example, was in the middle of the twentieth 
century the largest landowning family in Batra, with holdings of seven hundred acres. 
Owning to the land reform laws, the Khalil family, which at that point still owned the land, 
but were unable to farm it directly, started to sell out. The Yasin and Yusif families bought 
most of the land. Both families had started as labour supervisors for the Khalil family, but 
had as the Khalil moved to the city, been running the estate by subletting properties on a 
sharecropping basis. They had established control over the farmers through monopolising the 
marketing of their crops.127 In this case, the land reforms did not break the power of 
landowners, but simply shifted the power from the absentee owners to the rural bourgeoisie. 
The power of the latter became more firmly established as they acquired ownership to the 
landholdings.  
The Khalil described above lost the land because they no longer had any direct links 
with it. Another landowning family of Batra, the Fakhri family, managed to keep parts of 
their land as they still administered it at the time of the land reforms. Though they were 
forced to sell some land to tenant farmers. Ali Fakhri also tried – but failed – to avoid losing 
the additional land in excess of the 100-acre limit by registering it in the name of his children. 
After the land reforms the Fakhri family’s holdings were almost halved, 85 acres compared to 
175 before.128 The story of the Fakhri family demonstrates the significance of direct links 
with the land; the links that the Khalil family lost as absentee owners.  
The two stories from Batra also reveal the ways in which the rural bourgeoisie 
remained as a class despite the loss of power of some families. In the countryside and in the 
villages, their hold on power was never seriously threatened. Muḥammad Ḥāfiẓ Diyāb calls 
the Free Officers’ regime social transformation for “the aborted revolution”. Diyāb argues 
that the regime, despite aiming rhetorically for social liberation, failed to change the existing 
class structures in Egypt.129 The government, according to Diyāb, became a victim to the 
state’s internal “interest groups” because it did not allow for the influence of society or social 
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movements.130 At the local level, according to Sayyid ‘Ašmāwī, this meant that the rural 
bourgeoisie and their agents became intertwined with local village councils, local party 
branches and cooperative councils, and were able to use these institutions to influence state 
policies.131 In other words, because the Free Officers isolated the decision-making apparatus 
of the state from society, the regime became vulnerable to pressure groups within the state 
apparatus. As an educated middle class drawn from the city bourgeoisie and the upper 
stratum of landowners staffed the state, over time the interests of these classes came to 
dominate the state apparatus.  
 
3.2 After Kamšīš: The social foundation of the state’s institutions  
Hamied Ansari identifies the breaking point when the power struggle within the expanding 
state shifted decisively in the direction implied by Diyāb’s and ‘Ašmāwī’s assertions.132 
According to Ansari, the chain of events that started in 1966 in Kamšīš, led the conservative 
forces within the regime to ally with the statist forces against the radical faction associated 
with ‘Alī Ṣabrī, which had been ascendant until then.133  
The events of Kamšīš refer to the murder of the socialist activist Ṣalāḥ Ḥusayn 
Maqlad. His death was supposedly the work of the Fiqī family, the old landowning family in 
Kamšīš, against whose political and economic domination of the farmers, Ḥusayn fought. 
More to the point, he used his position within the Arab Socialist Union (ASU) to mobilise the 
farmers, and call for even more radical redistribution of land. His murder, partly through 
coincidence, received national attention and forced the regime’s hand. In response the Free 
Officers set up the Higher Committee for the Liquidation of Feudalism (HCLF) to investigate 
the power relations in the countryside.134  
The investigations of the HCLF uncovered a potential social upheaval in the 
countryside over which the regime was losing control. The Committee was nominally set up 
to investigate lasting “feudal” relations in the countryside, but instead it uncovered the way in 
which the upper stratum of landowners  
continued to exert influence over high levels in local government and the party despite tight 
screening procedures imposed on the selection of key party officials. At the local levels, the 
families that traditionally controlled the ‘umda post continued to enjoy unmitigated influence 	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in the local communities.135 
The HCLF investigation also confirmed that the upper stratum families divided their holdings 
among the family members, so that no one member owned more than the legal limit. By 
activating extended family networks, they maintained control over land and local politics. 
Political control during Nasser was based on the administrative apparatus of the government 
and of the (single) party. And the HCLF found that the social hierarchy among the rural elites 
was replicated in those organisational hierarchies with political influence extending all the 
way to the urban centre of power.136 The investigations of the Higher Committee also 
revealed that the revolutionary changes were in part created by the regime as it attempted to 
mobilise the rural population, but it had lost control over the process to independent actors 
like Ṣalāḥ Ḥusayn.  
The ASU – where Ṣalāḥ Ḥusayn was a member – was created by the regime to 
mobilise the farmer for its political purposes. Hani Fakhouri, in a study of Kafr El-Elow 
describes how the villagers are appropriating the political rhetoric of the regime.137 However, 
the ASU was only the political arm part of the regime’s quest for control over the 
countryside, which also agricultural cooperatives came to be an integral part of. Firstly, all 
members of the cooperatives also automatically were members of the party, illustrating the 
connection between the two institutions.  
Secondly, the agricultural cooperatives were disciplining institutions.  The first 
cooperatives had been established for the beneficiaries of the land reforms. The initial idea – 
and it is worth noting that private cooperative societies have been present in Egypt since the 
1920s – was that state provided expertise and inputs would offset production decreases 
expected as a result of the land reforms. However, through the cooperative system, where the 
farmers received seeds, agricultural expertise, credit in return for selling fixed quotas of most 
grains and cash crops at fixed prices as well as regulating the market, the state managed the 
agricultural production. Through the system the state appropriated the agricultural surplus. 
Farmers, albeit indirectly, became state employees. Returning to Fakhouri’s text, in the 
chapter on the agricultural cooperatives, it is noted that the agricultural cooperative employs 
twelve guards and a supervisor who monitored the farmers’ debts and secured the cooperative 
its due.138 There was in other words a system of supervision and of labour discipline in place 	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through the cooperatives.139 A further example illustrates the underlying power of the 
cooperatives, and the way it organised the economic relations between the regime and the 
farmers:  
In May 1982, the Egyptian Government began to stage pre-dawn raids on villages in the Nile 
Delta. Police troops, helmeted and heavily armed, roused villagers from their homes. Masked 
informants identified suspects from the resulting line ups. In Daqahiliyya Province alone 
fourteen thousand peasants were dragged before the courts. When the police could not find the 
suspects they were hunting for, hey sometimes took members of their families hostage – a 
standard technique use ot intimidate the political opposition. But the villagers arrested in these 
raids were not members of the political opposition. They were merely peasant who had failed 
to grow the government-mandated quota of rice.140 
The regime in the 1950s and 1960s needed to appropriate the agricultural surplus in order to 
finance the large development projects of the time. Thus, the mobilisation effort in the 
countryside was more than a political effort. It was also an effort to mobilise and control the 
economy, both the natural and human resources at the behest of an expansive state apparatus.  
The mobilisation efforts increased in the middle of the 1960s as the regime faced its 
first economic slump. According to James Toth, a recession in 1965-66 was caused by a 
crisis in agriculture that began in 1961.141 Rural labour had moved from agricultural work to 
the large national development schemes, the High Dam and land reclamation projects in the 
Taḥrīr-province. Recurring crop failures due to labour shortage meant that agriculture had 
failed to deliver the surplus that the government needed to finance the industrial 
development. The search for hard currency compelled the government to negotiate with the 
IMF, which forced a devaluation of the currency of 14 percent.142 Rising living costs hit the 
rural poor hard, with rural wages dropping 10 percent in real terms between 1965 and 1967. 
Following the hardships, “public protests, marches, and hunger strikes were organised in the 
provinces, particularly in the Delta around large towns like Disuq, Damietta, Kafr al-Shaykh, 
and Damanhur.”143 It was against this backdrop of increased mobilisation and ensuing unrest 
that Ṣalāḥ Ḥusayn was murdered. Conservative and statist factions within the regime feared 
instability and social upheaval associated with the politics of popular mobilisation, and turned 
to a strategy of “retraditionalisation” to regain control over the countryside. The defeat in 
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June 1967 accelerated this process, though it had already been  under way by then. The rural 
elites were re-emerging at the centre and in the countryside.  
The appointment of Sayyid Mar‘ī as minister of agriculture is one symbolic example 
of turnaround in the mid-1960s. Mar‘ī was from an old landowning family, and one of 
several with such family connections that emerged close to power at that time; in 1969 
thirteen of the families investigated by the HCLF had members elected to the National 
Assembly.144 Under Sadat, Mar‘ī began to reverse the agrarian reforms despite that he had 
helped engineer them to begin with.145 The rapid re-emergence of the rural elites and 
landowning families in official political positions imply that their economic and social power 
had never been effectively broken, even at the height of the revolution.  
Locally, next to the political institutions associated with the government and the state 
party, both the agricultural cooperative societies and the village banks formed the base of 
landowners’ control. This role for the rural elite became more pronounced with the regime’s 
lack of interest in the “penetration of mass society” under Sadat and Mubarak.146 The 
cooperatives offered the control of considerable farming inputs and access to credit – prior to 
1976 when they were temporarily abolished and replaced by the village banks. For example 
several of the families investigated by the HCLF had members placed as directors, 
accountants or board members.147 By 1969 the strategy of “retraditionalisation” also 
influenced law making. Through law 51 of 1969 the regime helped the rural upper class 
fasten its hold on the agricultural cooperatives. The law raised the land ceiling from five 
acres (applicable to eighty percent of the board seats) to ten acres, and literacy was made a 
condition for election.148 Particularly the latter change excluded many small farmers from 
participating in elections, while the former made it easier for local landowning families to fill 
the board with agents.  
The rural upper class has since controlled the cooperatives. Abdel Aal writes that in 
1995 there was still a “clear reflection of the village power structure in the membership of the 
cooperative board.”149 One of my informants, an activist with the Land Centre for Human 
Rights, put it this way: “there is still a structure but it has no role.”150 Other farmers 	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concurred that the cooperatives were ineffective and had stopped providing any services. The 
continued existence of the formal hierarchy, however, suggests that the board members are 
able to benefit through the connections such positions enable. Smaller farmers, on the other 
hand, ignore the cooperative boards or accuse board members and officials of being 
corrupt.151  
Another example of the entrenched position of the social and economic hierarchy 
within public institutions is the village banks under the authority of the PBDAC. During the 
seventies and eighties it overtook the role of the cooperative as parastatal institution tasked 
with providing credits to farmers.152 The role of the cooperatives was briefly transferred to 
the PBDAC after Ahmed Yunis, the then head of the central agricultural cooperative union 
(CACU) challenged president Anwar Sadat in the 1970s.153 CACU established in 1970 to 
coordinate the agricultural cooperatives as well as maintain state control over these 
institutions. Ahmed Yunis used it as a base from which to challenge Sadat’s power. As a 
result, the entire union was disbanded in 1976, and several of the cooperatives’ functions 
were transferred to newly created village banks under the PBDAC umbrella. Although the 
cooperatives were partly resurrected a few years later, the regime took steps to ensure that 
they could no longer be used to rally support and create independent positions of power. And 
the PBDAC and the village banks were better suited to distribute rents within the patrimonial 
networks.  
After the reforms of the nineties the PBDAC became a regular bank albeit the 
government still owned it. Informants report that the PBDAC now charges interest rates 
upward of twelve to fifteen percent making loans prohibitively expensive for the farmers 
provided they are able to access them, which most are not.154 Access to loans is tied to the 
patronage networks within the Egyptian civil service, which ties the rural elites to the 
centre.155 For farmers with small land holdings, access to cash and credit is limited. The 
limitation hampers their ability to invest or manage the land sustainably, but it is caused by 
the monopolisation of access to subsidised capital by the upper stratum farmers.  
Nonetheless, the limited opportunities for poor farmers to access capital and therefore 
to invest in the land, was one of the regular arguments for the neoliberal reforms in general 
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and law 96 of 1992 in particular.156 The question is: why were there no reforms of the credit 
distribution system? Although agriculture is highlighted as a growth sector within the 
economy, little or no consideration has been given to opinions and needs of the smaller 
farmers. Ray Bush has called the regime’s catering to the interests of rich businessmen and 
the failing agribusiness sector “an agricultural strategy without farmers”.157 It is an apt 
description of the current agricultural policies where the interests of small farmers and 
tenants are systematically excluded.  
The exclusion of small farmers’ interests has historical reasons related to the 
formation of the state of the Free Officers. This state relied on a corporatist strategy towards 
society whereby institutions and organisation were co-opted and frequently economic 
benefits were traded for political quiescence. The notion that this state had autonomy from 
society conceals the significance of the internal interest groups within the state’s institutions. 
That is not to say that the state was a mere tool for private interests. Within the state and 
within the Free Officers’ regime there were factions with different ideological outlooks. In 
terms of rural policies where agricultural policy is a key part, it first was a testing ground for 
the mobilising policies of the radical faction of ‘Alī Ṣabrī, but later became dominated by the 
conservative factions which aligned with a broadly statist current within the regime. These 
two factions primarily sought stability at a time when the social upheaval in the countryside 
reached a breaking point symbolised in the events of Kamšīš.  
The regime groups also sought and depended upon social support. In the case of rural 
politics during the seventies and eighties that support increasingly came from the rural upper 
class. The state’s reliance on the landed rural interests also led to them being represented in 
the state’s rural institutions, such as the cooperative boards, local councils and village bank 
boards. The power of these institutions and the resources they gave access to, further 
augmented and complimented the position of the rural landowners. In turn this social group 
sought to shape the agricultural policies in accordance with their economic interests. The 
confluence of interests did not happen overnight. The policies – like law 96 of 1992 – often 
took time to be implemented, as different networks and alliances struggled against each other 
and against other interests within the state apparatus. However, the overall direction of public 
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policy was one of increasing complicity with the economic interests of the dominant rural 
classes.  
The expansion of the state apparatus in the countryside through the institution also 
had an ideological justification. Although the Free Officers implemented the land reforms 
law in 1952 with a social justification, the regime did not espouse a broader revolutionary 
programme at the time. However, during the 1950s, the regime gained a more coherent 
ideology centred on nationalism and anti-imperialism.158 The consecutive name changes of 
the single party set up by the regime illustrate the developing ideology. Initially it was started 
as the Liberation Rally in 1953. First it changed to the National Union in 1956, and to the 
Arab Socialist Union in 1962. Yet throughout the ideological cosmetic changes, from 
national liberation to pan-Arabism to (Arab) socialism, progressivism remained at the heart 
of the ideological expressions. It was this progressivism that was disseminated through the 
cooperatives and – after 1962 – through the ASU. As an ideology it justified the forms of 
power that the expansive state employed in order to structure and regulate agricultural 
production. Part of the success of the rural landed interests in the eighties and nineties was to 
present their class interests in the language of reform.  
On the other side, the efficacy of this strategy is also evident, as informants would 
draw on “Nasserist” ideology and notions of food security and national development to 
criticise the market reforms. The state of the Free Officers succeeded in expanding its 
apparatus and establishing an institutional hegemony in the countryside. However, these 
institutions became embedded in the social relations of the countryside, and as such they 
augmented the power of the local landowning class. More importantly, through monopolising 
control over these institutions the landowning class also gained access to the central state, as 
is evident in the recurring appointment of its members in influential positions, particularly 
relating to agricultural politics. And through that access agricultural policies came to reflect 
the class interests of the rural landowners.   
 
3.3 Fishing for profit: State, market and fishermen  
Neoliberal ideology, disseminated through the international financial institutions, justifies the 
market reforms by framing them as policies of progression. Neoliberal progressivism has a 
different content than the Nasserist version, meaning that it identifies other problems and 
authorises differing solutions. Nevertheless, the market reforms of the 1980s and 1990s and 	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the 2000s, consistently frame the market as a necessary institution for development – a 
hallmark of modernity. IMF, the World Bank and other large aid organisations continuously 
prescribe “the market” as the only way to develop and grow the economy.159  
To extend and clarify the argument about the market reforms, state policies, 
international development programs in rural Egypt, and hegemony, I want to look at the 
fishing sector. Fishing was never controlled in the same manner as agriculture. The General 
Authority for Fish Resources Development (GAFRD) regulated fishing, but it was never 
subject to the same degree of institutionalised control; the only exception was fishing in Lake 
Nasser. There the origin of the lake as the by-product of a national development project made 
lake fishing regulated from the beginning. 160  
In the last two decades, fishing has come under increasing pressure from the growth 
of aquaculture; that is, fish farming. While historically fishing in the four lakes in the 
northern Delta between Alexandria and Damietta was under pressure from agriculture 
through land reclamation projects, recent years have seen the expansion of another threat: the 
fish farms. The forces behind this development reveal the operation and the relations of 
power in the countryside.   
The four lakes are separated from the sea by a narrow tongue of land covered in sand 
that stretches from Alexandria to Damietta. From west to east, the four lakes are Maryūṭ, 
Idkū, Burullus and Manzala, the two easternmost being the largest. They are all brackish, 
receiving water from both the Nile and the Mediterranean. They are also shallow, with 
neither Lake Burullus nor Lake Manzala being deeper than 2 metres at the most, and Burullus 
is a mere 40 centimetres deep at its Eastern end. Marshlands used to surround the lakes, but 
these marshes have largely been drained to increase the land available for agriculture.  
Land reclamation has historically been the biggest threats to the lakes. Under the 
development state of the 1960s and 1970s the lakes were further drained, even though such 
projects continued well into the 1990s.161 The impacts of these policies on the lake are 
evident in the surface area statistics. Ray Bush and Amal Sabri estimate on the basis of 
GAFRD that of the officially registered lake surface areas in 1956, by 1998/1999 62 percent 
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of Lake Manzala, 88 percent of Idkū and 61 percent of Maryūṭ had been lost – to roads, fish 
farming or agriculture.162  
Land reclamation projects were common already during the monarchy. Parts of the 
marshlands on the southern and south-eastern borders of Lake Burullus had been drained in 
the twentieth century, and the lake surface had shrunk from an estimated 600 square 
kilometres to 460 in 1974.163 The GAFRD-statistics used by Bush and Sabri show only 
limited decreases in the lake surface area between 1956 and 1989. However, another survey 
based on satellite images of the lake shows the decrease from 1973 to 2011 to be from 430 
square kilometres to 246, with significant decreases in every decade up to and including 
2000-2010.164 The discrepancy between the two numbers for the early seventies is explained 
as the latter survey also includes plant overgrowth and expanding islands when calculating 
the lake surface. Thus, not all the lake loss is due to land reclamation projects alone, but a 
combination of agricultural expansion and overgrowing that slowly deprives the fishermen of 
their livelihoods.  
The other threat to the lakes is pollution. The proximity of Lake Maryūṭ to Alexandria 
means it has been used as a dumping ground for factory waste, pollution and waste disposal 
for Alexandria’s industry. Those who used to live off the fish are no longer able.165 Lake Idkū 
is also seriously threatened by industrial pollution, and the coastal highway has been built 
through the lake, dividing it into two. Lake Manzala receives most of its freshwater from the 
Damietta Branch of the Nile meaning that Cairo’s waste and sewage makes its way there.166 
The fishermen are aware of the poor conditions of the lake – and the reasons. A labour union 
leader expressed it like this: “you can see [the pollution] if you put your hand in the water, 
and after one week or two, your hand will be sick. We used to drink the water and cook with 
it, now you can’t put your hand in the water without getting ill.”167  
Prior to the construction of the Aswan High Dam, the Nile still partially flooded the 
Delta. During the yearly floods, Burullus and the other lakes were replenished, and waste that 	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came with the Nile and the drainage canals was washed into the ocean. Now the main 
freshwater supply is the rivers and drainage canals, meaning that the lakes functions like 
sinks for pollution and waste. Burullus is fairing better with regards to pollution, as the main 
water supply comes not directly from the Nile but from the Delta drainage canals. However, 
the nutritious agricultural waste, including high levels of fertiliser, causes the lake to become 
eutrophic – meaning that animal life is threatened as decomposing flora deprives the lake of 
oxygen, and accentuates the overgrowing.168  
Simultaneously, both the number of fishermen and the average yields in Burullus are 
increasing so that there is more pressure on the fish resources. Dumont and El-Shabrawy 
claim that historically, between 5000 and 8000 fishermen lived off the lake and fished it 
artisanally. Now the authors estimate that around 20 000 fishermen are dependent on the lake 
for their livelihoods.169 The increased pressure on the lake is also evident in the yearly yields. 
While they were stagnant at 4000-6000 tons of fish per year after the building of the Aswan 
High Dam, from 1986 on the reported yields increased to more than 50 000 tons per year.170 
There are sure signs that the current levels are unsustainable. Fishermen reported signs of 
overfishing to me, saying there was less fish in the lake, fewer types of fish, and that the fish 
had become smaller in size.171 Dumont and El-Shabrawy again report that the average fish 
size decreased by 30 percent during the 1990s, which is “a sure sign of overfishing”.172 And 
other reports support the fishermen’s claim that there are fewer types of fish, registering a 
reduction in commercial fishing varieties from 47 types of fish to 17.173  
The yields increases are simultaneous with the growth of aquaculture in the inland 
lakes, and FAO attributes all of the above growth in fisheries production to aquaculture.174 
The rapid expansion of aquaculture began in the late 1990s. Aquaculture has existed in Egypt 
for a long time, but it was a marginal subsistence activity, far from the modern industrial 
aquaculture. The first commercial fish farm was established in 1961, but the take-off came 
only after the World Bank along with USAID started a program advocating and supporting 
the expansion of the fish farming sector during the last twenty years. The fishermen on the 
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lake however also distinguish between the two forms, and they oppose the industrial, not the 
traditional, fish farms.175  
Travelling the coastal highway from Alexandria to Rosetta through Lake Idkū, the 
square ponds that stretch along the coast and well into the lake are a prominent feature. I 
observed similar sights along the borders of Lake Burullus, and all the way to Burj al-
Burullus. The sector has expanded rapidly (and illegally) to cover considerable parts of the 
lake coasts.176 As part of the expansion, fishermen lose both parts of the lake and access to it, 
as the fish farms gradually enclose the lake. The most common form of lake aquaculture is in 
freshwater pens separated by mud dikes. By turning lake commons into privatised ponds they 
prevent fishermen from using the coastlines to access the lake. Travel distances become 
longer and harbouring options more limited for the artisanal fishermen, while the lakes are 
gradually subjugated to a de-facto process of enclosure.   
The official accounts of the fish farms’ success that the development agencies 
promote stand in sharp contrast to some realities on the ground. Among others they are 
claimed to create employment opportunities, ensure a cheap and adequate protein supply for 
the poor and to increase per capita fish consumption. 177 And in terms of production, the 
success of aquaculture is clear. It is now estimated that two thirds of all fished consumed in 
Egypt is grown in privately own, industrial farms.178 Yet, for example on creating work 
opportunities the image is at best mixed. GAFRD estimates that the fish farms sector created 
around 25 000 jobs, comes at the cost of the 20 000 artisanal fishermen of Lake Burullus, and 
other thousands in the other lakes that rely on the lakes for their livelihoods.  
The impressive production statistics are also problematic. Although the tonnage is 
considerable, the intensive production brings with it a host of environmental problems. The 
most widely used intensive pond aquaculture in the lakes depletes the water by intensively 
cultivating the fish through high stock density. The high density makes the fish vulnerable to 
diseases, and antibiotics are added in sizeable amounts. This along with exogenous fodder 
depletes the water, which adds to pollution of the lake when it is dumped and replaced with 
fresh water.179 A further problematic practice of the fish farms is harvesting the fish fry and 	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fingerlings for the ponds in the lake. Bush and Sabri claim that there is an extensive black 
market in fish fry as the harvesting of wild fry for the use in fish farms is illegal.180 Yet the 
practice is widespread, and my informants among the fishermen confirmed that the practice 
was ongoing.181 Bush and Sabri quote one fisherman who tellingly reveals the compulsion 
that forces his hand in the matter: “This [capturig of fish fry] is destroying our tomorrow, but 
my family has to eat today.”182  
A final reason to be critical of the production statistics – or more precisely the yield 
statistics – is the frequent breaches of the imposed area restrictions. Fish farms require 
official permits, whereby specified areas of the lake are leased for five-year terms.183 
Transgressions are normal, and the fish farms are reported to expand far beyond the area 
included in the permit. In Lake Burullus for example, 130 fish farms have permits for 3000 
acres of the lake, yet the farms extend over 18 000 acres.184 The trend continued after the 
uprising. The leader of a trade union for fishermen and labourers in Burj al-Burullus claimed 
that in the first year after the 25th of January uprising, 30 000 further acres of lake had been 
turned into fish farm ponds.185 Although the number – which translates to 126 square 
kilometres, or half the remaining lake – is very high, it is likely that the illegal expansion of 
the lake after the uprising has continued in a large scale. Every fisherman I talked to 
mentioned the rapid expansion of the fish farms. In terms of the yield statistics, the illegal 
expansion means that they are inflated. The actual production area would be larger than the 
official numbers take into account.    
The ability of the industrial fish farms to externalise costs of hatching and growing 
fish fry, dumping the impoverished and polluted pond water into the lake, and expanding 
beyond set limits, is an important reason behind the profitability that makes aquaculture such 
a lucrative investment. These externalities are not part of the image of an industry with 
impressive growth rates, which the development agencies promote. The aquaculture sector is 
a market success story to the perceived development problems of Egypt: a nominally private 
industry that provides cheap food and protein to the impoverished population. The perceived 
success relates in turn to the standard development problem of Egypt, of a growing 	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population “trapped” on a narrow and stagnant strip of fertile land. The production yields of 
aquaculture are thus “a solution”. Fish has also become a part of the development discourse 
on food security that frames Egyptian agriculture. Institutionally, fishing interests have been 
subordinated those of agriculture. The associated state directorate, GAFRD, is an agency 
organised under the ministry of agriculture. Fishing was historically never an important part 
of the Egyptian discourse on food security and development. The government is promoting 
the industry in tandem with USAID, FAO and the World Bank, not least because of the 
development problems aquaculture purports to solve. Largely left out of the official accounts 
are the detrimental effects to the lake and the lake life. The Burullus fishermen on the other 
hand are aware of the state of the lake. One of them summed it up accordingly when I asked 
him about his expectations for the future: “In 50 years there will be no fishermen; there will 
be no fish.”186  
Similar to the case of agriculture, behind the development discourse there are social 
forces and economic interests that benefit from the reforms. There are important reasons 
connected to the relations of economic and political power that support these policies. 
Allegations of corruption and collusion at the top of networks between the responsible police 
and the GAFRD are levelled in the media – and were similarly made by informants among 
the fishermen.187 Although some of them complained, the government response had been 
non-existing. They said it was not possible to petition the government to do anything, as the 
perpetrators were the same as those tasked with protecting the lake. According to the 
informants, the fish farm leases are given to influential and connected businessmen, local 
elites and local government members like judges, police officers and other public officials.188  
This complicity of government officials in the aquaculture industry hampers 
government efforts to contain the transgressions, as members of the institutions of control 
have economic interests in the sector. The connections and links between the fish farm 
owners and members of government organisations, the bureaucracy, as well as security 
agencies show through the lack of ability – or will – to respond to the complaining fishermen. 
The story told by fishermen in Lake Burullus corresponds with that of Bush and Sabri on the 
situation of Lake Manzala. There, a “Manzala mafia” comprised of “government officials, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
186 Interview, Kafr al-Šayḵ, 24.10.2012 
187 Fu'ād and Al-Bandārī, "Al-Burullus taḥt "qabḍat" māfiyā al-'arāḍī." Interview, Kafr al-Šayḵ, 24.10.2012; 
Burj al-Burullus 27.10.2012  
188 Interview, Kafr al-Šayḵ, 24.10.2012; 30.11.2014; similar problems were reported with the land reclamation 
projects, influential groups used position and wealth to accrue ownership of the reclaimed lands in the area, 
although they were supposed to benefit landless farmers and the fishermen who lost access to the lake, 
interview, Kafr al-Šayḵ, 25.10.2012; see also ibid.  
	  59	  
bureaucrats and local elites” controlled the fish farms.189 One informant summarised the 
situation well when I asked him about the owners of the fish farms: “We cannot complain to 
the government about the owners [of the fish farms] because the government are working 
together with them. […] They [the owners] are the government.”190  
The fisherman’s words emphasise the complicity between private interests and public 
policy in a way that resembles the agriculture reforms in the 1980s and 1990s. The private 
interests have an ability to use the language of the reforms in shaping public policies. Thus, 
while aquaculture is promoted because it creates jobs, economic growth and contributes to 
Egypt’s food security, in economic terms, the sector transfers the surpluses of lake fishing 
from the commons to private ownership of elites. Fishermen are turned from self-employed 
to low-cost labour in the fish farms or forced to join the cadre of the rural unemployed. The 
spoils of growth go to the fish farms’ owners, and the increased fish production and 
consumption increases do not benefit the impoverished and unemployed former fishermen. 
The policies are pursued not because of an established rural class controlling the government 
apparatus, although it is also able to influence decisions. It is likely that government officials 
use their position to accrue the resources to join the privileged class. When viewed as a social 
structure, however, the promotion and expansion of the aquaculture industry in the lakes has 
benefitted an influential local upper class. 
The state, with the aid and assistance of international financial and development 
agencies, has promoted economic reforms in the fishing and agriculture sectors – reforms that 
were justified by reference to “development”. In both sectors the reform projects have served 
the interests of the rural upper class and landowners. The overlap in membership between the 
rural upper class and government institutions, which are influential in the implementation of 
these interests, is an important reason for the complicity between policy and class interests. In 
the nexus of class and state power, the concrete directions of rural development is shaped by 
the hegemony of the state and social institutions of the rural upper class, be it merchants or 
landowners. An important part of this hegemony is the ability to control the everyday 
behaviour of the subaltern classes.  
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The relationship between social forces and government institutions discussed in the previous 
chapter also raises questions about the acts of resistance and the ability of subaltern groups to 
organise and resist. In Egypt, there is a long tradition for popular uprisings. Diyāb, for 
example, argues that Egypt’s history is primarily one of repeated insurrections and 
revolutions.191 It is easy to become blinded by the large, city-based insurrections where the 
insurgents can be portrayed as a unified category of “the people” or “the nation”. This 
perspective underestimates the other daily struggles, such as labour strikes, smaller 
demonstrations, or local protests. In the countryside, these limited forms of political 
mobilisation are by far the most common. Yet they stand in a particular relationship to 
hegemony, and their form and content can be made to reveal how hegemony works.  
The forms of political mobilisation in the villages vary from simple protests to 
petitions, court complaints, to sit-ins, and blocking roads and railway lines and disrupt 
official services. There are also historically other more violent forms that are broadly 
conceivable political mobilisation. Nathan Brown and Sayyid ‘Ašmāwī extensively discuss 
for example theft and murder.192 There are also more economic tools, like setting fire to 
cotton harvests. In the following I discuss the overt forms of political mobilisation where the 
content of the protests are available. I look at forms of mobilisation before and after the 25th 
of January uprising. I start with the protests that Law 96 of 1992 triggered. Protests against 
that law marked a shift in the relationship between the state and farmers, and saw the return 
to large-scale mobilisation against the government. I then trace these protests into the post-
uprising political situation, before I relate them to a novel form of mobilisation in the 
countryside: the dissemination of trade unions. The way the trade unions spread and function 
reveals how political mobilisation in the countryside connects and disconnects with power 
struggles at the centre.  
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4.1 (Re)claiming the land 1: Law 96 of 1992 
Law 96 of 1992 was the culmination of the process of market reform in the countryside and 
the final piece of the reversal of the land reforms of the 1950s and 1960s. It also engendered 
the largest mobilisation of farmers since the events in the sixties, and the ASU-led 
mobilisation effort at that time. The events of Kamšīš in the mid-1960s, and elsewhere, point 
to an extensive mobilisation in the countryside. The retraditionalisation strategy that was the 
state’s answer, sought to quiet and control the political aspirations of radical groups, leftist 
organisations during the seventies and Islamist groups in the eighties and nineties.  
In 1990 Springborg identified four factors behind the success of the state strategy to 
bring about political quiescence.193 Firstly, and most importantly, from the very top there was 
an interest in stability and demobilisation of society.  Hosni Mubarak assumed the presidency 
consciously seeking to depoliticise the population, as Sadat had sought before him. The 
reorganisation of ASU as the National Democratic Party included the removal of the party’s 
mobilising potential. Other parastatal institutions like the cooperatives and the PBDAC that 
had enabled the state apparatus to intrude in rural society, were kept functional. The 
disciplinary power of these institutions eased the control and regulation of farmers in 
particular and the countryside in general. Secondly, the rural bourgeoisie, the primary 
constituency of the regime alongside the capitalist landowners, controlled local politics. The 
relationship with the rural upper class is maintained through patron-client relationships, 
Springborg argues.194  
Thirdly, Springborg emphasises the continuing albeit limited state support for the 
poorer segments of society through food and energy subsidies along with public employment 
opportunities. By the early 1980s, 31 percent of rural non-agricultural male employment was 
within the state apparatus. This share only increased, and by the beginning of the 2000s, 
Adams reported it to be between 40 and 50 percent.195 This led to inflated government work 
rolls; there are more workers than there is work. Although badly paid and routine, it is still 
attractive work because of the benefits like health insurance and social recognition. Samuli 
Schielke gives one example of the consequence of the inflated work rolls:  
Tawfiq has a government job […] as a health inspector […]. Every day he goes to the same 	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state-subsidised bakery where he, with two other inspectors, writes ‘condition: normal’ into 
the inspection book and signs his name, whatever the real condition of the bakery may be.196 
The pointlessness of the task Tawfiq is set to do illustrates another problem: the 
meaninglessness of available jobs – if there are at all available jobs, which adds to the 
frustration among the rural youth.197  It is as if the state further expanded the work rolls to 
partially make up for the 700 000 jobs lost in the countryside due to the market reforms.  
The protests of the farmers and in particular the tenant farmers who were targeted by 
the Law 96 revealed the fourth strategy of the state, its willingness to employ coercion. As 
Bush has argued extensively, however, violence was endemic in the countryside under and 
after the reforms.198 This violence was often directed by the state or by landowners with the 
knowing complicity of state institutions. During the nineties, the regime’s use of violence 
took place in the context of a low-level civil war with militant Islamists. A large presence of 
security forces would also prevent protests. Beyond this, it is possible that the existence of 
the militant Islamist insurgency made overt political opposition suspect in the eyes of the 
regime and its supporters. For example, the government was quick to blame Islamists when 
tenant farmers tried to resist the effects of Law 96.199 In such a climate, it is more formidable 
for dissatisfied groups to mobilise for political protests. Hence, the quiescence of the rural 
population cannot be confused with political apathy or belief in the government’s rhetoric. 
Rather the quiescence refers to the absence of overt protests, in other words behavioural 
conformity.  
Despite the combination of local control, patronage and (limited) support for the rural 
poor, protests seemed to materialise when economic interests and public policies directly 
challenged people’s livelihoods. Thus, tenant farmers protested all over Egypt when Law 96 
entered into force on 1st of October 1997. These protests started peacefully, by complaints 
and letters to newspapers, but they escalated to demonstration marches and strikes before 
they turned to counter violence when farmers responded to landowners who sought to take 
over farmland.200  
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Law 96 removed the secure tenancy that tenants had enjoyed since Law 52 of 1966, 
which modified the original land reform laws. Tenancy rights were extended from three years 
to indefinite, and tenants could be evicted only in the case of non-payment of rent, fixed at 
seven times the land tax in the 1952 laws. The first part of the act raised the rent on land to 22 
times the land tax. With the full implementation in 1997, rent ceilings were removed 
altogether causing immediate rent increases, which sometimes reached 400 percent.201 For 
example, Ray Bush reports that in the village of “Dandeet” in Daqahlīya, rents went from 600 
Egyptian pounds to 4800 in ten years.202 
Both the government and the opposition expected large protests with the law’s full 
implementation on 1st of October. This was partly caused by the protests preceding the 
implementation as tenants became aware of the law, and the government’s intention to 
implement it despite the breach of “the social contract” it implied.203 The Land Centre for 
Human Rights (LCHR) documented 32 deaths, 751 injuries and 2410 arrests in acts opposing 
the law from 1st of January 1997 until 1st of May 1998.204 And although the expected protests 
never materialised, from January 1998 until December 2000, the same centre recorded 
figures showing a continuation of the violence: 119 deaths, 846 injuries and 1409 arrests 
from January 1998 until December 2000.205 The large police presence in the governorates at 
the time – in expectation of conflict – contributed to the limitation of protests.206  
The protests against the law started before its implementation primarily because of 
two reasons. Firstly, the PBDAC implemented the law by arranging to seize the harvests of 
farmers who owed debts to the bank, fearing that they would either run away without paying 
their debts or losing their land. The very first protest against the law occurred, according to 
‘Ašmāwī, in Nāṣir in Banī Suwayf as 3000 tenant farmers staged a demonstration after the 
bank announced its measure.207 Secondly, the agricultural cooperatives started to transfer 
ownership deeds from the tenants to the owners, making the tenants ineligible for the 
cooperatives’ services. Simultaneously, many “owners” hastened to sell their lands without 
agreeing with the tenants.208 These spurred the first protests and forced the government to 
make some concessions, and letting tenants on state owned lands stay.  	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Some of the opposition parties also got involved in the protests. The Tajammu‘ party, 
for instance, organised demonstrations in Cairo and Daqahlīya. However, state security 
prevented them from holding meetings and organising protests in the countryside. Ḥamdīn 
Ṣabāhī, for example, was arrested during this period. Another attempt to protest was a 
petition opposing the law that had collected 350 000 signatures. Former minister of 
agriculture Yūsuf Wālī rejected the petition, however, because he did not believe that so 
many could oppose the law.209 This is despite estimates that the law affected almost one 
million tenants and their families.210 The rhetorical incredulity against the level of opposition 
stands in contrast to the government’s official response. Alongside the security presence, the 
government established reconciliation committees that were supposed to mediate in conflicts 
between tenants and landowners. The high success rate of the committees, over 95 percent, 
was reported in the state media. Some of the success rate of the committees owed to the 
wealthier tenants, who were able to buy the land, or owned other plots of lands, and thus 
“broke the lines”.211 However, Saad reports instances where the police accompanied the 
landowners in the committees, and tenants were forced to sign under threat of torture.212  
 
4.2 (Re)claiming the land 2: state, market, violence 
The most prominent feature of the post-Law 96 protests is the collusion between landowners 
and the state’s security apparatus. This went beyond the reconciliation committees and 
extended to the concrete actions on the ground. A symbolic example of the times was the 
following event in Kamšīš. The village known for its revolutionary proclivities saw the return 
of the old landowning Fiqī family. Members of the Fiqī family returned to (re)claim lands 
given to the farmers under the agrarian reform laws.213 A press release from the LCHR 
provides the story with details:  
[…] in the evening, Sunday 12th of September 1998 the Al-Fiqī family used threats and 
intimidation against the farmers of Kamšīš, and then sought to use their influence within the 
Ministry of Interior. After exhausting [those] methods, they resorted to vandalism, road 
blocking, and hired thugs to push farmers off the land by force. 214  
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Through the press release it becomes clear that the family had first sought to obtain a court 
ruling in their favour. “The Fiqī-family hired the thugs and went to Kamšīš land located in 
the Zimām of Baḵātā and demolished animal shelters, filled canals and drainage ditches, and 
opened fire on the farmers.”215 When the farmers responded and, according to the press 
release, surrounded and chased the thugs, some of the Fiqī family members were able to get 
the police to arrest 16 of them. They were later charged on account of possession of illegal 
weapons, which the press release said they captured from the Fiqī family’s thugs, although 
these charges were eventually dropped.  
The Fiqī family did not have legal title to the land in question.  The land was subject 
to a legal dispute and therefore a caretaker was appointed at the time.216The struggle 
continued in 1999 as the Fiqī family obtained an administrative order from the governorate 
forcing 900 tenant farmers from around 2000 acres of land, according to another LCHR press 
release, which led to renewed clashes between security officers and farmers.217 The ability of 
rich and powerful families like the Fiqī family to exploit the security apparatus for its 
purposes is commonplace in the countryside. Throughout the events, police and security 
forces locally, as well as administration at the governorate level were involved on the 
landowners’ side.  
The incidents reveal an additional feature of the violence in the countryside; the use 
of thugs in the guise of private security as a corollary to state employed force. Numerous 
other reports also mention private security operating close to the logic of armed gang that the 
police leaves unchecked are another form of this collusion. Bush and Sabry reported 
fishermen who complained that armed gangs were patrolling the fish farms on lake 
Manzala.218 And during interviews, fishermen on the Burullus echoed this concern after the 
revolution. They claimed the situation had only grown worse as the police force had 
completely retreated leaving the lake to its own devices.219  
The collaboration of the police with the landowners to implement the law went 
beyond quelling demonstrations and supporting landowners in confrontations. The LCHR 
separates between eight types of conflict in rural Egypt: “Some of these correlated strongly 
with consequences of the implementation of law 96, other disputes were linked with the 
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deterioration of rural Egypt’s economic and social situation […].”220 Expulsion of tenants, 
contesting land ownership, disputes over awqāf land, agrarian reform lands, alluvial land, 
dwellings on farmlands, and boundaries and irrigation caused incidents – violent or otherwise 
– that the centre recoded. And although violence did not always manifest as clashes or 
protests, expelling tenant farmers from their lands and dispossessing them of livelihoods is 
also a form of violence.  
I want to mention one other incident from the examples of conflict listed above. Law 
96 pertained only to land that was rented. Land that had been redistributed under the agrarian 
reform laws – meaning confiscated by the state and sold to farmers – was not included. One 
such case, however, where law 96 was used to mislead the farmers, is noticeable due to its 
links with the state. Specifically it involved 75,25 acres of land that had been confiscated 
from Amīn Wālī, the grandfather of the then minister of agriculture, Yūsuf Wālī. Members of 
his family sought the land back, despite that the farmers who had received the land – 
originally 52 farmers who received 1,19 acre each – had initiated the procedure to purchase 
the land. The Agrarian Reform Authority had neglected the farmers’ claims. They appealed 
to the Supreme Administrative Court, but Wālī family members and local police started to 
“terrorise” the farmers in an effort to force them to leave the land before the court’s 
verdict.221  
Another example of the contestation over land as a resource is the fishermen’s 
protests against the land reclamation projects of the southwestern part of Lake Burullus. Both 
in the 1980s and again in 1998/9, the government cut off and dried out parts of the lake.222 As 
a consequence, the water table of the lake and the surrounding canals are higher than the 
bordering fields. The effects are also visible on maps where Lake Burullus’ western edge is 
completely straight. For the fishermen, it meant that the lake became more difficult to access. 
While the village in the beginning of the 1900s had been located on the edge of the lake, by 
the 2000s the lake was a 10-15 minutes drive away on bad roads. During the land reclamation 
projects, the fishermen had protested vocally, organising marches to the district centre and 
trying to stop the work on the damming of the lake. State security had responded violently 
against these protests. At one point during the conflict in 1998 they had set up a detention 
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facility outside the village to be able to stop the protesters. An informant told me that several 
of the fishermen had been detained and many beaten or otherwise threatened.223 
The state simultaneously promised the affected fishermen right of first refusal on 
stocks on the land in the reclaimed lands. Some fishermen accepted this offer, but most 
refused to buy any land. The problem was that most of the land ended in the same hands that 
later came to control the fish farms, namely government employees at various levels. 
Springborg uncovered that the method the government used was a program established under 
Sadat that assigns land to agricultural “graduates.” However, “[s]urveys of property owners 
in reclaimed areas that have been sold to “graduates” on highly concessional terms reveal 
these owners to be exclusively government employees.”224 In interviews, the fishermen 
reported that some of the reclaimed lands closest to the lakeshore are being turned back into 
“lake”, meaning fish farms because of the profitability of aquaculture.225  
The different local conflicts reveal the wider project which the Egyptian countryside 
was subjected to, and of which law 96 was a part. More than just reversing the land reforms 
of the Free Officers, it reflected the potential value of the land on the market, which had 
increased significantly. Ray Bush quotes land price increases from 50 000 to 250 000 and 
300 000 Egyptian pounds per acre between 1997 and 2007. This came on top of considerable 
price increases during the 1980s, which can be considered part of the motive. Springborg 
reports the average price of state land in 1986 to 12 000 pounds per acre.226 In the Kafr al-
Šayḵ village, the price was said to be 300 000 pounds per acre, though sometimes more.227 
The increases in the “market price” of land formed the economic incentives behind 
the reversal of the land reform laws. The reforms of the agricultural sector were the 
precondition to “realise” the, until then, hypothetical profits. Behind the reforms was a 
situation where the state saw its interests align with the economic interests of the rural 
bourgeoisie and the old landowning class rather than those of the rural poor. Unrest had 
initially forced the government to a partial retreat, and not to implement law 96 in state lands. 
By the year 2000 the scales had changed, and the ministry of agriculture completed the 
liberation of “the market in land” and reversed its previous decision. The ministry dismissed 
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the tenancy agreements with farmers on state owned lands, thus the government dispossessed 
an additional 15 000 tenants of their lands and hence their livelihoods.228 
The market reforms of the previous two decades have altered the Egyptian 
countryside. Portraying the market as opposed to the state – as in the classical economic edict 
that a free market must be liberated from undue state influence – misses how the market 
reforms of the agricultural sector represent a reorganisation of the method of distributing 
spoils. This holds true whether it is the market for land or the market for fertiliser. The 
“market” has become a trope for an economic system to distribute wealth from the poor to 
the rural bourgeoisie and the landowning class.229 Similar thinking about the desirability of 
markets permeated the government.230 The real object of the market reforms was not the 
state, but society. And in order to complete the transformation, the coercive apparatus of the 
state along with “private security” forcefully controlled and limited opposition and dissent. 
An important element in the coercive strategy was limiting the localised areas, and prevent 
wider organisation that could mobilise and direct the popular discontent.  
 
4.3 (Re)claiming the land 3: “Second phase of the Egyptian revolution”231 
Despite the apparent success of the regime’s coercive strategy, conflicts continued in the 
countryside after 2000. In January 2007, Ray Bush reports 7 deaths and 54 injuries caused by 
conflicts over landholdings. And in March that year, he mentions a sit-in in the town of 
Dikirnis in Daqahlīya where farmers protested against the heir of a landowning family 
attempting to reclaim holdings of fifty families who had legally purchased the land.232 Rural 
protests occurred also in instances when they were not directly related to issues over land. 
For example, the people of the fishing village Burj al-Burullus blocked the international 
coastal highway in 2008 for seven hours. They were protesting the decision of the governor 
of Kafr al-Šayḵ to halt flour deliveries.233  
In the two years before the revolution, activity in the countryside continued at a stable 
level. Ray Bush reports 80 and 91 sit-ins, and 66 and 75 demonstrations, in 2009 and 2010 	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respectively. Another indication is the numbers of those arrested, as they directly relate to the 
security effort of the state. According to Bush, in 2009 there were 1333 arrests, while 1687 
were arrested in 2010.234 It is difficult to gauge the trends based on statistics of two years, but 
compared to the beginning of that decade – 1409 arrests total in 1998 and 1999 – the numbers 
are increasing. Similarly, the amount of deaths and injuries in events in the countryside rose 
from 192 deaths and 1066 injuries to 297 deaths and 1451 injuries between 2009 and 2010, 
which supports the hypothesis that levels of rural unrest were increasing. The problem is that 
these statistics do not tell if the increases are due to protests spreading or if regime repression 
was intensifying. Either way, the numbers reflect a restive countryside.  
After the uprising on 25th of January, some farmers took advantage of the political 
situation to reclaim some of their losses. Basheer Sakr of the Peasant Solidarity Committee 
documented several cases where farmers used the post-uprising political situation to take 
action. In villages in the Buḥayra province and the Daqahlīya governorate, farmers used the 
atmosphere to seize lands that government employees or relatives of old landowning families 
had acquired the previous decade. One example is the farmers in Ma‘mūra east of Alexandria 
who seized 66 acres sold by the Awqāf-authority in 2008 to a group of judges and police 
officers.235 There were other examples of similar events. In Daqahlīya an estimated 10 000 
farmers from different villages participated in a demonstration in front of the governor’s 
office in Manṣūra.236  
There were other kinds of rural conflicts not as directly connected to the farmers’ 
struggle as such. However, they were a different manifestation of the neglect of the 
countryside. A telling example is the villagers of Taḥsīn in the Daqahlīya province. The 
villagers declared the village “administratively autonomous” on the 22nd of September 
2012.237 They protested against the lack of basic government services like roads, electricity 
and waste management. The villagers had been protesting since 2008, including several 
instances of civil disobedience, hunger strikes and keeping their children out of school.238 
Their efforts had failed to get any response from the governorate. When the situation 	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continued after the 25th of January uprising, the solution was to declare the village 
“administratively autonomous” from the governorate in an attempt to gain national attention 
for their cause: to get a proper road that would ease transport to and from the village.239  
There are no statistics on rural unrest. An overview for 2012 by the ECESR points to 
a significant increase in the frequency of protests, but does not disaggregate the statistics 
except on governorate level.240 Generally, protests occurred in all of the governorates, but the 
cities of Cairo and Alexandria have the largest share along with the Delta governorate of 
Ḡarbīya. Ḡarbīya includes the cities of Ṭanṭa and Al-Maḥalla al-Kubrā, famous for its labour 
activism, which explains the large number of protests there. Outside of that, the highest 
frequency of protests in the Delta occurred in Šarqīya, Daqahlīya and Kafr al-Šayḵ, but the 
report does not specify how many were “rural” in origin.241 It is thus hard to say if there was 
a wider mobilisation in the countryside or if incidents like the ones above were limited to a 
few instances.  
One trend that emerges from the above examples is the roots of the post-uprising 
protests in the pre-uprising events. Dispossession of land at the hands of groups linked to the 
state and marginalisation of local communities were the underlying causes. Another feature is 
the failure to link to other similar social and political protest movements. The rural protests 
discussed above remained local in scope and outlook, and rarely aimed to organise beyond ad 
hoc networks. Though Bush promotes the strength of the “fluidity” of these networks, I 
would like to point out the corollary weakness of fragility.242 The willingness of the state and 
its social allies to use force in the countryside meant they disrupted attempts at wider 
organisation and mobilisation, and conflicts were resolved in violent standoffs.  
 
4.4 The spread of labour unions 
Independent trade unions became a widely used method of political mobilisation after the 
25th of January uprising to overcome the pressure against organisation, in the cities as well as 
in the countryside. Unionisation was traditionally regulated and limited to one official 
syndicate for each sector, but on the 12th of March 2011 the “Declaration on Trade Union 
Freedom” by the then minister of labour power, Aḥmad al-Bura‘ī, enabled the formation and 	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registration of independent trade unions. The declaration was supposed to be succeeded by a 
legal amendment, but that law has never been passed. According to a lawyer in the Egyptian 
Centre for Economic and Social Rights (ECESR), the declaration had been sufficient in the 
post-uprising political climate to successfully register independent syndicates.243 Another 
lawyer, from the Land Centre for Human Rights (LCHR), corroborated the story of the 
ECESR informant: “It is not a problem to register new syndicates. They [the bureaucrats] are 
all afraid of us now.”244 By November 2012 the ECESR alone had provided legal assistance 
to approximately 120 unions to register, in almost all sectors, including agriculture and 
fishing. The lawyer further estimated that around 300 independent unions had emerged after 
the uprising.  
In the countryside, more than 80 different farmers’ unions appeared within the first 
two years.245 The multiplicity of farmers’ unions reflects the dividing lines that separate 
them, and the difference in reaching out on a national level. Of the more than 80 farmers’ 
unions, four have managed to established a presence at the national level and across a 
majority of the governorates. All of these four have in common, however, that they are tied to 
different political forces. These linkages are also clear in the spread and mobilisation efforts 
of the farmers.    
One of the four syndicates, the Union of Small Farmers’ Syndicates (USFS), is an 
umbrella organisation for local unions tied to the network of the Land Centre for Human 
Rights.246 The union has member syndicates in 16 of the governorates. One activist told me 
that they had started organising the syndicates aimed for farmers with holdings of less than 
five acres, shortly after the revolution. He had been to 15 governorates to assist in 
establishing local syndicates there.247 Another LCHR representative asserted that they had 
chosen a decentralised model because even though the farmers’ struggles are connected, the 
problems manifest differently locally between for example “Fayyūm and Kafr al-Šayḵ”.248 
Members of the LCHR were still heavily involved in the USFS, and it builds on the centre’s 
national network that they have acquired since their start in 1997. Thus it primarily connects 
farmers who have previously been involved in rural conflicts. One example is the branch 	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organised in collaboration with the local farmers’ union in Qūta Qārūn in Fayyūm. These are 
the farmers who were involved in a struggle over land rights with the Wali family, relatives 
of the previous minister of agriculture Yūsuf Wālī. The family used the land reforms and its 
influence within the governorate administration and the ministry of agriculture to try to 
reclaim land distributed under the land reforms. The farmers supported by the LCHR were 
struggling to hold on to the land. The unionisation of these farmers was then a direct 
extension of the farmers’ struggle in the area.  
As mentioned, there were also three other unions, all of which relied on political 
forces from which they appeared. The General Syndicate of Farmers (GSF) was started by 
veteran activist Muḥammad ‘Abd al-Qādir.249 He was also the leader of the union until his 
death in September 2013, after a internecine struggle, Usāma al-Jaḥaš was appointed the 
leader by then minister of manpower, Kamāl Abū ‘Ayṭa. Two factions were involved in the 
struggle for leadership. One faction was centered on Usāma al-Jaḥaš and Rif‘at Jūda Dāḡir 
while the other on Muḥammad al-‘Aqārī. The appointment of Usāma al-Jaḥaš at the hands of 
the ministry settled the conflict – at least for the time being.250  
The GSF was nominally established on the 11th of April 2011, shortly after the 
revolution. Founder and former leader Muḥammad ‘Abd al-Qādir had been trying to establish 
a farmers’ syndicate since 1996. Before the revolution, however, he faced opposition from 
the state bureaucracy: “I went to Mr. Ṣafwat al-Šarīf in 1996 and he ripped up the application 
and threw it in my face. After that I went to Mrs. ‘Ā’isha ‘Abd al-Hādi, the minister of 
labour, but she mocked me and said ‘it would be better for you to electrocute yourself.’”251 
‘Abd al-Qādir’s history of political involvement under the old regime is symptomatic for the 
GSF, as its leadership on governorate and branch level is largely built on networks formed 
during political work before the uprising, for example involvement in village boards or the 
cooperatives’ union.  
The third large farmers’ union is the General Syndicate of Egypt’s Farmers (GSEF). It 
was established formally on the 5th of August 2011, and ‘Abd al-Raḥman Šukrī, a member of 
parliament from the Freedom and Justice Party, is the leader.252 The syndicate draws most of 
its leadership from different professions, although these are also involved in farming 
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enterprises on the side.253 The GSEF relies on the networks of the Muslim Brotherhood for 
support and recruitment, which has led competing unions to complain that it is just an 
organisation for the Brotherhood. Šukrī acknowledged the backing of the Muslim 
Brotherhood and the Freedom and Justice Party in an interview, but he denied that all 
members are also members of the Brotherhood.254 However, the union’s obscurity after the 
coup d’état on the 3rd of July 2013 suggests it was close. If not all members were Muslim 
Brothers, its key leaders were, enough to be rendered inoperable with the outlawing of the 
Muslim Brotherhood.  
The fourth large farmers’ union is the Union of Egyptian Farmers (UEF), led until 
recently by ‘Abd al-Majīd al-Ḵūlī.255 It was registered on the 30th of April 2011 – the 
anniversary of Ṣalāḥ Ḥusayn’s murder – although it had been under planning since 1983.256 
On the 30th of April 1983, an assembly of 316 farmers from fifteen governorates gathered in 
Kamšīš, but state security had obstructed the registration ever since.257 The UEF was started 
by a group of farmers tied to the leftist party of Tajammu‘ Party, prominent among them 
Šāhinda Maqlad, the widow after Ṣalāḥ Ḥusayn. The historical reasons for this relation trace 
back to the socialist ideology that came to dominate the struggle against the Fiqī family in the 
fifties and sixties.  
The UEF and the USFS were both linked directly to the past of the farmers’ struggle, 
while the other two syndicates grew out of established political networks and movements. 
For example the UEF held its inaugural meeting in Kamšīš, symbolic of its claims to 
legitimacy, but also suggestive of the network to which it belonged. The USFS drew on its 
linkages with the LCHR and the struggles against law 96. All of the syndicates tried, to 
varying degrees, to draw the political legitimacy of the farmers’ struggles. However, their 
most defining feature was the networks to which they were tied.  
 
4.5 Trappings of power: politicisation from above 
Two of the above unions were active in the Kafr al-Šayḵ village, where I did fieldwork. 
There was a local branch of the GSF organised by one of the villagers, as well as a branch of 	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GSEF organised from a nearby town that had recruited members in the village. The local 
leader of the GSF had worked since the spring of 2011 in order to establish it. He had heard 
that a friend of his had set up a branch in the governorate of Kafr al-Šayḵ. He contacted this 
friend and proceeded to establish a local unit of the trade union through mobilising his 
network: “When I sought to establish the syndicate [branch], I told my friends and 
acquaintances that were farmers, I made pamphlets and posters and distributed and I 
announced the syndicate from the mosque.” He claimed that by October 2012, the union had 
74 members, out of approximately 2000 farmers in the village, and that it was steadily 
increasing. A year and a half after starting to recruit members for the local branch, he still 
considered it to be in the “stage of establishment.”258  
The presence of the GSEF in the village created considerable confusion for many 
farmers.259 An old farmer, for example, asserted that he was a member of both syndicates. He 
knew of the local GSF leader and stressed that he was a member of his organisation. The two 
membership cards he showed were, however, both issued by GSEF. Two men the old farmer 
identified as members of the Muslim Brotherhood, who did not come from the village but a 
nearby town, had recruited him while he was working in the field. They had asked all the 
peasants in the area to join their union, the GSEF. He had thought at the time that a farmers’ 
trade union was a good idea, so he had paid a fee of thirty Egyptian pounds to become a 
member. By December he was dissatisfied with the unions and he had decided he did not 
wish to renew his membership. He said it was because “nothing had happened.”260 Other 
farmers were not members at all. His neighbour, for example, a middle-aged farmer, had 
refused to join the syndicate. His refusal was grounded in a general misgiving about the 
syndicates: he did not think syndicates would be able to change the situation for farmers.261  
While the farmers above appeared not to differentiate between the two syndicates, 
other farmers did. They were suspicious of the GSEF, and accused it of being a Muslim 
Brotherhood ruse to control the farmers. The GSF branch leader was among those that were 
aware of the political affiliations of the GSEF. According to him, the Brotherhood had 
established the syndicate because they failed to take control over the GSF after the 
revolution. The branch leader, on the other hand, claimed that GSF was politically 
“independent”: “We don’t want to align the syndicate with any political group or 	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movement… we care only for our goal: concern for farmers’ conditions.”262 And though it is 
true that the GSF has not committed to a political party, the leadership is tied to the pre-
uprising political networks on which the state relied. One of the lawyers I interviewed 
straightforwardly called it a “governmental” trade union.263  
On the local level the links with the unions shows reliance on the traditional rural 
hierarchy. The GSF branch leader had met his contacts in the syndicate through a position in 
the agricultural cooperative where he had previously sat on the board. He claimed that the 
other board members had prevented him from being re-elected after a feud, because they 
realised he wanted to defend farmers’ rights, while they wanted the corruption to continue.264 
The GSF branch leader’s landholdings and past membership of the agricultural cooperative 
board, as well as his political affiliation to the Wafd party, identify him as member of the 
rural middle class. Locally the GSF seems tied to the same rural classes that have dominated 
the agricultural cooperative societies and village banks since their establishment.  
On a national level it is clear that the affiliation to the state’s order affords the GSF 
resources and opportunities for influence that are not open to the other unions. The syndicate 
has for example been offering its members the opportunity to buy plots of reclaimed land in 
Wādī al-Naṭrūn in the Buḥayra governorate. This land was also advertised in the village in 
Kafr al-Šayḵ in a recruitment campaign. However, allegations of corruption between the 
GFS’s leader, businessmen and the government agency responsible for the land in Wādī al-
Naṭrūn have been recurring.265 Hāšim Faraj, the president of the USFS, claimed that both the 
agency and the Ministry of Agriculture had appeared to be favouring the GFS, as other 
farmers’ associations had been prevented from attending the previous auctions.266 As a 
consequence of the allegations, the responsible government agency was forced to cancel an 
auction for more land in September 2013, after an investigation into these auctions had 
begun. Whether or not corrupt, the ability of the GSF to offer its members this land is clearly 
a result of the close links with the agricultural establishment.  
The alliance of the GSF with the old agricultural establishment is also evident in its 
political trajectory vis-à-vis the political event in post-25th of January Egypt. Whereas the 
GSEF enjoyed preferential position under the Mursī-government, the GSF emerged in this 
role after the coup d’état of the 3rd of July. Under the Mursī administration ‘Abd al-Raḥman 	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Šukrī was the preferred farmers’ union leader. He was for instance the one called upon to 
represent the farmers’ view in a committee of top government officials tasked with solving 
the agricultural problems.267 After the 3rd of July coup, the GSF took over this role with the 
interim cabinet under then president ‘Adlī Manṣūr. Former leader Muḥammad ‘Abd al-Qādir 
was for example appointment as the farmer representative to the fifty-member constitutional 
review committee. This preferential access comes at the cost of the independence of these 
movements. During Mursī’s presidency, the GSEF’s chairman ‘Abd al-Rahman Šukrī 
defended a negligible increase in official government prices for sugar cane, which he justified 
with “a promise” of better prices to come.268  
The loss of political independence is still clearest in the role of these organisations in 
the political game. Acting as the nominal representatives of their sectors, they express 
support or opposition to different political initiatives. One illustrative case is the presidential 
decree that former president Mursī announced on the 22nd of November 2012, where he 
claimed immunity from judicial oversight for a limited period. The decree was very 
controversial at the time and contributed to a resurgence of demonstrations and protests. The 
GSEF supported the decree, while the GSF condemned it.269 Lately, the new chairman of the 
GSF Usāma al-Jaḥaš has been a vocal supporter of the presidential bid of General ‘Abd al-
Fattāḥ al-Sīsī. Before Sīsī announced his candidacy publicly, the GSF’s deputy threatened to 
mobilise the farmers to protest lest the general run for office.270 In return, the GSF under his 
leadership was allowed to make suggestions for the agricultural part of the election 
program.271  
Thus while the close links to established networks have opened opportunities for 
influence at different times for the GSF and the GSEF and in particular their leaderships, 
these links have also tied them to the power they have come to rely on. This way of dealing 
with organised interest groups dates to the Free Officers’ regime. In the fifties and sixties, 
trade unions and labour syndicates were incorporated into the state apparatus. This offered 
the workers’ (and farmers’) movements increased access to government, higher wages and 	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better social benefits, but at the cost of their independence. Over time they became 
institutions of the regime rather than representatives of the popular movements. Both the GSF 
and the GSEF, because of their close links to other political forces, seem to be susceptible to 
such influence; they become the government’s representatives to the farmers rather than the 
farmers’ representatives to government.  
Underlying the system of the Free Officers is a corporatist thinking wherein society is 
viewed as consisting of different sectors, for example agriculture. Furthermore, it is assumed 
that all the members of each sector – in this case, farmers – have the same interests, which 
implies that there is only one representative needed. Hence the Free Officers’ enacted 
legislation, which limited syndicates and trade unions to one for each sector or profession. On 
the other hand, membership in these syndicates is compulsory for all workers in the 
respective professions.  
Thus, according to the logic of corporatism there can be only one “true 
representative” for each sector. That creates competition between different organisations in 
each sector in order to be that one representative. This competition explains the lack of 
cooperation between the syndicates even though their goals are similar on paper. In the 
agricultural sector, the competition also extends to the agricultural cooperative union– the 
modern day equivalent to CACU. The former leader of the GSF is thus reported to have said 
the following about the leader of the cooperative union, after a heated debate in a meeting in 
the office of the minister of agriculture: “I will show him who the leader of the farmers is.”272 
This was a response to the cooerative union’s leader who had claimed to be the only 
legitimate representative of the farmers. These fights make sense only in the context of 
corporatism. Similar considerations are needed to understand the reasons why the minister of 
agriculture, Ayman Farīd Abū Ḥadīd, is airing the idea that the different unions should be 
merged together by law.273 Notwithstanding the lack of cooperation, it will be a blow to the 
independent organisations that has been growing since the uprising.  
 
4.6 Rural revolutionaries: politicisation from below 
The competition for influence at the centre affects the base of these syndicates. The 
organisations that are the closest to power also seem the farthest from the countryside. In a 	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competition to be the “true representative”, long membership lists become more important 
than the individual member’s participation, especially if, as it seems with respect to the GSF 
and the GSEF, that the mobilisation of the farmers is secondary to the politics of their 
organisations. The prioritisation at the top levels of the organisations translates to neglect of 
the members that constitute its foundation. The old farmer in the village, for example, said he 
had heard nothing from the syndicate after they recruited him.274 By demobilising the 
members in this way, the power of the organisation itself dwindles. Members become 
dissatisfied with the syndicate. The farmer said that he was disappointed, and he that thought 
the membership fee was wasted money. He would not renew his membership.275 The erosion 
of the membership base further increases the dependence of these syndicates on their political 
patrons, and thus they further lose their ability to act independently.  
In the Kafr al-Šayḵ village, there was a third attempt at unionisation – among the 
fishermen. Opposite the experience of the farmers, the fishermen had chosen to organise their 
own syndicate. They chose to keep it independent in order to retain its ties with the fishermen 
there, and to be a legitimate expression of their concerns. They did cooperate with another 
syndicate for fishermen based in Burj al-Burullus. The syndicate in Burj al-Burullus also 
provided some technical assistance during the process of registration, which remained 
bureaucratic and difficult, despite Bura‘ī’s declaration. The role of the Burj al-Burullus 
syndicate was foundational for the village union. The inspiration to start the village syndicate 
came from the one in Burj al-Burullus after the village fishermen were invited to its opening. 
The leader in Burj al-Burullus had in turn sought to start a trade union for the fishermen after 
meeting and talking to long-time labour activist Ḵālid ‘Alī at al-Taḥrīr Square during the 25th 
of January protests.276 The dissemination effort here differs from the organised attempt at 
organisation, which for example the GSF and the GSEF and even the USF typify. The village 
syndicate organises the post-uprising politicisation of the fishermen for their own purposes. 
The trade union grew out of the fishermen’s need to act, and the realisation that existing 
institutions were incapable of answering their needs.  
It was a continuation of a preceding politicisation. Some of the founding members 
had engaged politically during and after the ousting of Mubarak. For example they 
participated in a sit-in at the local mayor’s office. These members have made efforts to 
engage with existing institutions as well. For example the initiated a call for, and succeeded 	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in organising elections in the fishermen’s society – comparable to the cooperative societies of 
the farmers. They told me that the society had not had competitive elections for years. 
Usually, only seven fishermen had been nominated, making elections superfluous for the 
seven seats on the board, which had become monopolised by the sitting members. After the 
25th of January uprising, they sought to take control over the board, forcing a general 
assembly where they nominated competing candidates for all the seats. The general assembly 
ended in a verbal quarrel, and the election was postponed for a year.277  
The people who initiated these events had not previously participated in the organised 
politics of the Mubarak-regime. The trade union is an extension of this political engagement. 
One of the leaders told me: “Before there was no awareness, but now awareness is 
spreading.”278 To the leaders and the other members, establishing and joining the local 
syndicate is a conscious choice and a continuation of their struggle in the village after the 
uprising. However, the politicisation has roots that precede the uprising. The fishermen that 
are forming the union were some of the same that were active in the protest against the land 
reclamation project in the area in 1998. The case of the fishermen is similar to that of the 
USFS – and partly the UEF – where the organisation into trade unions and syndicates sustain 
a politicisation that preceded the uprising. Organising trade unions is also a manifestation of 
the will to mobilise beyond the immediate circles that took initiative. In the case of the 
fishermen, their active recruitment, whereby the trade union grew from 147 to 169 members 
in less than a week.279 In the case of the USFS, it is done with the help and assistance of an 
established network. The novelty is the ability and opportunity to organise without the state 
apparatus preventing it.  
The problem of these unions, both the fishermen’s and the USFS, is to break out of 
their established networks. The fishermen had taken a conscious decision to retain the 
syndicate on village level rather than to organise it as a branch under the larger union in Burj 
al-Burullus in order to keep the control of the syndicate.280 Estimating that around 4000 in the 
village were fishermen for a living, he said around 500 had authorisation to fish in the lake, 
meaning their identity cards stated they were fishermen. In late October, they had 167 
members, and it was still increasing. However, incidents like the one involving the 
fishermen’s society suggests that there internal conflicts. The USFS faced problems when it 
attempted to go beyond the LCHR’s network of farmers. One of the informants from the 	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278 Interview, Kafr al-Šayḵ, 24.10.2012  
279 Interview, Kafr al-Šayḵ, 24.10.2012; 28.10.2012 
280 Interview, Kafr al-Šayḵ, 24.10.2012 
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centre had also tried to establish a syndicate branch in his native village in Qalyūbīya, but 
without success. Speculating about the possible reasons for failures, he mentioned the 
suspicions of farmers: “because unions are something new, they [the farmers] don’t 
understand why they should become members. They might think it is just another 
organisation that will take money without doing something because they don’t see any 
immediate improvements.”281 This is precisely what the middle-aged farmer in Kafr al-Šayḵ 
gave as his reason. The performance of some of the other farmers’ unions that emerged after 
the uprising justifies the suspicious nature of those farmers.  
 
4.7 Dialectics of protest: Post-uprising political mobilisation  
The novelty of the post-uprising politics in the countryside was the ability and will to 
organise independently. Despite the apparent political openness – the re-emergence of the 
street as a venue for politics – the most common associational form was that of labour 
syndicates. The conflicts that the syndicates represented locally had roots in the near past. As 
such, the most successful politicised unions were those that built on protests that preceded the 
uprising – they were a continuation in a different from. Simultaneously, not all conflicts 
became “unionised.” Instances of farmers organising spontaneously to retake land from 
which they have been dispossessed, or organising protests and roadblocks, occurred in 
parallel to the dissemination of trade unions. There were also rural conflicts of related but 
different kinds, like the village of Taḥsīn, which did not fit into the framework of the union. 
Nevertheless, the villagers were able to escalate the protests after the uprising. And 
conversely, not all instances of the spread of trade unions were based on preceding conflicts. 
Some were instead allied to different political forces, and thus they came to partly reflect the 
political ambitions of these forces.  
The rural protests have a common characteristic, which is their avoidance of overly 
political forms of organisations. Political forces, with the exception of the Muslim 
Brotherhood and the regime-NDP, struggled to organise and mobilise the countryside. Part of 
the appeal of labour unions as a form of organisation in the countryside was its “apolitical” 
nature. The fishermen for example stressed that they did not want “a political syndicate, but a 
service-syndicate” to defend the interests of the members.282 However, they did not oppose to 
engage politically with state institutions. Rather it was a reference to the “politics” of parties, 
parliaments and patronage.  	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The active avoidance of organising “politically” is a function of hegemony. Labour 
unions do not challenge hegemony in the same way as a political party does. There is a 
history of state involvement and surveillance tied to organisations that sought to mobilise the 
rural population or farmers, like the ASU or the cooperatives respectively. This history can 
be an important reason for caution and scepticism among the rural population towards 
organisations generally, and political organisations specifically. Memories of such 
organisations can be an important reason why farmers were hesitant to join organisations. It 
can also be such misgivings that are expressed by the middle-aged farmer that did not believe 
the syndicates would be able to change anything.  
Hegemony manifests in other obstacles for the political mobilisation of the 
countryside. What appears as a purely practical limitation, the lack of experience in managing 
organisations and syndicates, is the consequence of the state apparatus’ ability to prevent 
farmers and fishermen from organising. There was never a stable organisation through which 
the farmers could gain experience in directing their political aspirations. The UEF’s founders 
sought to establish the union already in 1983 as a rural arm of the then legal Tajammu‘ party. 
State security prevented it from being a legal organisation and to actively mobilise farmers in 
the countryside. The LCHR represented another form of organisation as a network, but 
inherent with its own limitations. Operating as a non-governmental organisation (NGO), the 
LCHR lacked the ability to mobilise masses, unlike what trade unions are able. So although 
the centre’s network was useful for collecting information, the centre was unable to 
coordinate or mobilise proactively. And in the transition from NGO-based network to trade 
union, the leaders of the LCHR and the USFS face critical problems.  
Another such practical difficulty that exacerbates the difficulties of mobilising 
farmers and fishermen and building organisational capacity is the demand that the unions can 
only organise those who are officially recognised in that profession. On every identity card 
the authorities have written a profession, and only those that the government recognises as 
“farmer” or “fisherman” have the right to join a union. Thus one of the most politically active 
farmers in the Kafr al-Šayḵ village could not become a syndicate member because he also 
worked as a teacher. Ownership to the land was still registered to his father, but the yields 
were not sufficient to sustain the extended family. This measure decreases the membership 
potential of the trade unions because many of those who work on the land either as day 
labourers or extended families are prevented from organising. The effect is hegemonic 
because it diminishes the potential of the syndicates.  
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Those that have organised the most widely – that is, they are present in the most 
governorates – are the syndicates that were able to draw on established political networks like 
the old agricultural establishment or the Muslim Brotherhood.283 This in turn means that the 
organisations are often subsumed under political aspirations that are not the farmers’ or 
fishermen’s own. The GSEF expressed the political exigencies of the Muslim Brotherhood, 
while the GSF to a large extent answered to the interests of the old regime remnants, and 
relied on the networks of parts of the old rural order. It has become the synthesis of dialectics 
of protest. In the first instance an aggressive project of dispossession through interested 
political forces created an antithesis in the form of localised, ad-hoc and reactive protests. As 
these protests changed after the revolution as the organisational form of trade unions spread, 
the political groups sought to control the direction of the rural political mobilisation through 
co-opting or establishing competing organisations. Thus they form a part of the hegemonic 
project rather than oppose hegemony.  
“What did the revolution do?” A farmer asked the question rhetorically after I asked 
him about the impact of the 25th of January uprising. “Nothing has changed,” he continued.284 
The dissemination of trade unions appears a novelty only on a superfluous level. They are 
built on pre-existing networks of domination, or they representing old conflicts and struggle 
to go beyond the confines of these conflicts. However, as attempts to organise the rural 
conflicts, they have the potential to move beyond these confines and in the longer term 
become a meaningful expression of the political aspirations of people in rural Egypt.  
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5 Elections, mobilisation, politics 
 
The presidents left, the regimes are still here.  
Marina Ottaway, 2011285 
 
Farmers have always been under the heel and they are still under the heel. 
Farmer, 26.10.2012, Kafr al-Šayḵ 
 
It is a paradox that the rural poor, who are the least able to voice their concerns and influence 
policy outcomes, are nevertheless consistently accused of determining the electoral outcomes 
in Egypt. Hani Shukrallah for instance pits the revolutionary cities against the 
counterrevolutionary countryside that thwarts the revolutionaries through winning election 
after election:  
Not only has the Egyptian Revolution been an overwhelmingly urban phenomenon (with the 
countryside basically standing on the sidelines). But as one ballot after another since the 
Constitutional Declaration of March 2011 and up to last December’s referendum have shown, 
the countryside has acted as a bulwark, or strategic reserve for the counter-revolution […].286 
According to Shukrallah, the revolutionary forces are consistently outdone at the polls 
because of the rural voters, like sheep, all follow the counterrevolutionary forces of either the 
old regime or the Muslim Brotherhood. Thus he continues:  
Egypt in 2012/3 is a largely urban society […]. The fact that this is yet to express itself in the 
ballot box is a function of a number of factors, including big pro-democracy majorities in the 
cities as opposed to overwhelming pro-authoritarian majorities in the countryside; the bussing 
or rather half-trucking of rural voters – en masse – to the voting stations […].287 
And although Shukrallah is only one commentator, he expresses a common prejudice. The 
same sort of argument, although in different terms, was made in the commentary on the 2014 
presidential elections to explain the victory and the voter turnout. The rural voters are cited as 
the reason for ‘Abd al-Fattāḥ al-Sīsī’s high support; in absolute terms he won more than 23 
million votes:  
According to Mohamed Fahmy Menza, a professor of political science at the American 
University of Cairo, Sisi’s sweeping victory over his opponent, Hamdeen Sabahi, in the 
provinces was secured through the coordinated efforts of rural leaders mobilizing local 
communities to vote in his favor.288 
The methods used by NDP to mobilise the rural population to participate have been 
well documented. In Upper Egypt, the party relied on tribes and clans.289 In the Delta, the 	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286 Hani Shukrallah, "Cairo: the city vanquished? The Muslim Brotherhood and the ruralisation of Egypt," 
Ahram Online 2012, 31. December. 
287 Ibid.  
288 Safa Joudeh to Al Monitor, 2014, 30. May, http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2014/05/egypt-
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289 Hans Christian Korsholm Nielsen, "Tribal Identity and Politics in Aswan Governorate," in Upper Egypt: 
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rural bourgeoisie fulfilled a similar role.290 Other strategies such as vote buying were also 
reported. For example, Ninette Fahmy interviewed a farmer who had voted in the 1990 
elections: “I just put a mark on a piece of paper. It only took me one second and I earned a 
10£E [Egyptian pounds] note. Not bad at all.”291 Other times, coercion was used to force 
voters. Fahmy continues about of a group of villagers that decided to boycott the election, but 
were arrested and not released until they had voted for the NDP.292 Given the corrupt 
methods used to mobilise voters, it is possible to ask about the raison d’être of elections in an 
authoritarian state. Lisa Blaydes argues that elections were an important method for 
distributing scarce resources.293 Thus it might be expected that voter mobilisation in the rural 
areas drop as the elections lost their distributive functions after the uprising.  
 
5.1 From voice to vote: rural electoral mobilisation 
The presidential election in 2012 was divided into two rounds. The first fielded an open 
round of several candidates, and the two candidates with the highest shares of votes went on 
to a run-off round. The votes were counted with the country as one district, meaning that one 
vote counted the same in all the districts.294 I chose this election due to the opportunities for 
comparison offered by the two rounds. Additionally the ties between different candidates and 
political forces meaning it is easier to recognise ideological preferences across the voting 
pattern than in the constitutional referenda.  
In the first round the top five governorates in terms of percent of voters that 
participated can be classified as urban. They were, in order of highest percentage of turnout 
(turnout percentage in parenthesis): Port Said (60,1), Alexandria (55,6), Cairo (55,6), Suez 
(55,1), and Damietta (53,5). Then followed the ostensibly rural provinces of Minūfīya (52,0) 
and Qalyūbīya (51,8), before the two other urban governorates of Giza (51,1) and Ismā‘īlīya 
(50,7) rounded off the top ten.295 These were also the governorates that achieved a voter 
turnout above 50 percent, while Port Said was the only (and just barely) above 60 percent. 
This seems to contradict the above – that rural voters are the most active.  	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When compared to the second round of the 2012 presidential elections, the picture 
changes. Then the top ten governorates in terms of voter turnout were Minūfīya (61,6); Port 
Said (58,1); Qalyūbīya (58,0); Šarqīya (56,6); Suez (56,0); Damietta (55,9); Banī Suwayf 
(55,9); Ḡarbīya (55,8); Ismā‘īlīya (55,5); and Cairo (54,8). The difference is clear with the 
rural provinces of Minūfīya, Qalyūbīya, and Šarqīya filling three of the highest posts. By the 
second round of the election, rural voters were again dominating the ballot. Ḡarbīya is a 
special case, consisting both of large rural parts yet including the two cities of Ṭanṭā and Al-
Maḥalla al-Kubrā, which makes it difficult to determine at the provincial level. The final 
noticeable feature is the high turnout in Banī Suwayf, the only “southern” province in the top 
ten.  
Another interesting aspect that can illustrate the urban–rural divide between the two 
rounds of the election is the increases in turnout in some governorates. The trend was 
particularly noticeable in precisely several of the rural districts in Middle and Upper Egypt, 
from Fayyūm to Aswan. The single highest increase in the turnout percentage occurred in 
Minyā. In the first round 37,8 % of registered voters had participated while in the second 
round 51,8 did the same – a difference of 14 percentage points. The surrounding districts of 
Banī Suwayf, Sūhāj, and Asyūṭ all saw more than 10 percentage points increases while 
turnout in Fayyūm grew by 9,4 percentage points. The only governorates to rival these surges 
in turnout were Minūfīya and Luxor, which makes the former something of a special case 
within the Delta.  
These election data reveal not only that rural voters were mobilised for the final round 
of the elections, but they also suggest who mobilised them. In the previous chapter, I noted 
the limited spread of political parties in the countryside compared to the spread of trade 
unions as forms of organisation and mobilisation to gain a voice. However, the election result 
shows that electoral mobilisation – the act of voting – is more prevalent in the countryside 
than in the cities. The second feature is that whereas voter turnout in the cities was stable or 
slightly decreasing from the first to the second round, some rural governorates saw 
significant leaps in the turnout percentage. This suggests that the two candidates that 
competed in the second round run-off both were able to mobilise the countryside, rather than 
the cities, for the additional support.  
The two candidates were Muḥammad Mursī of the Muslim Brotherhood, and Aḥmad 
Šafīq, who was widely perceived as the state and old regime’s candidates. The make-up of 
the race thus suggests that the Brotherhood and the old state party, the NDP – even though it 
was officially dissolved – relied on and were able to garner their votes primarily in the 
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countryside. This seems to support Shukrallah’s thesis, that the voters in the countryside 
determines the election outcomes. However, this argument underestimates the absolute 
numbers of voters in the cities. Had the turnouts been higher in the large cities, it would 
easily have made up for the extra votes the two campaigns gathered in the countryside. For 
example, one percent higher turnout in Cairo is in absolute terms twice that of Buḥayra or 
more than four times the votes of one percent in Fayyūm. Hence, the clearest aspect that 
emerges from the election statistics is that both the Muslim Brotherhood and the campaign of 
Aḥmad Šafīq looked to the countryside rather than the cities to mobilise the extra voters for 
the run-off round. That the campaigns sought support in the countryside lends credence to the 
suggestion that established networks like tribes and clans are able to mobilise and “deliver” 
voters there. The specificity of the governorates that supported the respective candidates 
further reveals the characteristics of these networks.  
The campaign of Aḥmad Šafīq had its clearest victory in the governorate of Minūfīya. 
He won 71,5 percent of the votes in the governorate, and more than 60 percent of the votes in 
every district (markaz) except one. Minūfīya was also remarkable for the leap in voter 
turnout; it was the only governorate in the Delta growth where the turnout came close to 10 
percentage points. It also had the highest overall turnout of the governorates, 61,5 percent. 
Aḥmad Šafīq won the governorate in the first round as well, when he got 53,5 percent of the 
votes. In absolute numbers his increase from the first to the second round was more than 
votes for all first round candidates put together except Muḥammad Mursī. Mursī’s share of 
votes also increased in absolute numbers from the first to the second round, though less than 
Šafīq’s share. If it is assumed, however, that the first round votes of the other Islamist 
contender, ‘Abd al-Mun‘im Abū al-Futūḥ, are added to Mursī’s second round tally, that 
would account for almost 90 percent of Mursī’s “new” votes in the second round. In that 
case, the electoral mobilisation managed by the Šafīq campaign was considerable, and they 
were able to draw on established networks for electoral mobilisation friendly to the state 
apparatus.  
The number indicates that the rural bourgeoisie on which Aḥmad Šafīq’s campaign 
relied to mobilise voters, has an especially strong position in Minūfīya. Furthermore, 
Minūfīya is the governorate in the Delta that had the fewest registered protests in 2012.296 
Together they are an indication of a nexus between electoral mobilisation, political 
quiescence, and the domination of the rural bourgeoisie in the lower Delta. The forces that 	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mobilise rural voters for the elections are the same as those that contribute to the political 
demobilisation. Malak Rouchdy, for example, describes these mechanisms in the village of 
Batra. There the social and economic domination of the rural upper class secured the political 
leadership of the prominent families. These families were able to “promise” the votes of the 
village in return for political concessions from the state.297 Batra is an example of how social 
and economic power translates into political domination.  
Another province with a relatively low frequency of protest is Qalyūbīya. The 
governorate had the second lowest number of protests of the rural Delta governorates.298 It 
also resembles the neighbouring Minūfīya in terms of the electoral trajectory. Šafīq won the 
governorate in the second round after receiving the most votes in the first. It also saw a 6,2 
percentage point increase in turnout. The similarities are even bigger in the districts bordering 
Qalyūbīya where Šafīq won with similar votes, over 60 percent of the votes. One of my 
informants in Qalyūbīya stressed precisely the problems the village faced with the 
descendants of a large landowning family that dominated the local administration and the 
governorate administration.299 This was the same village where they had attempted to 
establish a trade union, but had failed to recruit members. Thus, when I asked how they 
defended their interests as farmers, the answer was that they use middlemen (wāsṭa).300 Thus 
the informant describes how the political economy of patronage permeates the local 
community. At the same time, it prevents the establishment of organisations independently of 
networks, and yet it is able to thoroughly mobilise the community for elections.  
 
5.2 The Islamist vote 
Disaggregated to district level the election results in the two governorates show another 
pattern of electoral mobilisation. As Eric Schewe uncovers, Šafīq dominated the “older” 
agricultural parts of the governorates close to the Nile.301 The Islamists dominated in the 
desert border districts in the Delta, such as the Sādāt district. This is the only part of Minūfīya 
that is located west of the Nile, in areas of what formed the Taḥrīr province in the 1950s and 
1960s. The Taḥrīr province stretched from Cairo to Alexandria, and incorporated all the areas 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
297 Rouchdy, "Batra," p. 243. 
298 Damietta had fewer registered protests, but it is commonly considered an urban governorate.  
299 Interview, Qalyūbīya, 2.12.2012; the informant had voted for Mursī on the grounds that Šafīq was the 
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subject to the land reclamation projects of the Free Officers’ regime. The same pattern 
emerges at the district level in Qalyūbīya. The further away from the “old” lands, the more 
Mursī replaces Šafīq as the preferred candidate of the voters. Looking at Buḥayra, a province 
that like the Sādāt district consists of areas of reclaimed lands of the Taḥrīr province, the 
pattern is the same. The further away from the Nile’s Rosetta branch and into reclaimed 
lands, the larger the domination of the Islamist candidates. In five of the six districts located 
on the west bank of the Rosetta branch, Šafīq won more than 50 percent of the votes. The 
exception was the district of Rosetta on the coast. However, in the outlying districts, Mursī 
claimed more than 60 percent of the votes, some places winning with 70 or 80 percent.  
Historically, the Taḥrīr province was subject to different developments than the rest of 
the Delta. Under Nasser and Sadat, the province was the testing ground for agricultural 
policies shifting form large public farms to privatised agribusiness.302 The common thread 
was the general exception to the landownership ceilings. Much of the land was organised in 
large state farms. These state farms were later privatised and partly sold to landowners and 
agribusinesses under Sadat and partly divided by the agricultural workers at the disbanded 
state farms.303 However, beginning in 1987 under the aegis of the Mubarak project, reclaimed 
lands were increasingly given to the large cadres of educated unemployed. These graduates 
were after 1997 joined by some of the tenant farmers evicted due to the implementation of 
law 96.304  
All the authors who have studied the new lands note the high degree of absenteeism 
among the graduates.305 Meyer estimates that only 40 percent of graduate beneficiaries were 
actively involved in the farming in one of the earliest projects, with 15 percent of the houses 
permanently occupied.306 Malm and Esmailian report similar figures in other recent 
projects.307 As Springborg has noted, the graduate scheme was used to reward government 
employees, which explains the high degree of absenteeism and the propensity of the 	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graduates to sell or lease the land.308 And it is logical, as Meyer found, that the graduates that 
stayed on in the reclaimed lands were those with an agricultural degree or background.309  
These new villages have a different social composition than the “old” lands do.  As 
new villages they lack the old class of the landowners, the rural bourgeoisie. That means that 
the strategy of retraditionalisation unsuitable to dominate the political life in these lands. The 
domination of the Islamist vote in the new lands, in other words, illustrates the geographical 
and social limits of the retraditionalisation as a strategy for electoral mobilisation and control. 
Yet the shortcomings of the state’s preferred strategy for dealing with the countryside does 
not explain why the Islamists came to dominate in these areas.  
The Muslim Brotherhood has historically been an urban movement, but Hossam 
Tammam argued that the movement has been undergoing a process of ruralisation since the 
late 1980s. He shows how their leadership at top and middle levels increasingly came from 
rural backgrounds, one prominent example being Muḥammad Mursī. He suggests that the 
growing appeal of the movement in the countryside reflects a traditionalisation of the 
movement’s ideology towards a stance that is acceptable to conservative, but not radical, 
rural voters. In universities, the Muslim Brotherhood attracts newcomers to the cities rather 
than original city dwellers.310 Drawing on Meyer’s insight, that the graduates that stayed on 
in the new villages came from agricultural backgrounds, they are from a social background 
that Tammam suggests makes them likely recruits of the Muslim Brotherhood. These 
graduates can form networks that can be used to mobilise voters together with the 
dispossessed former tenant farmers. I noticed that some of the project villages along the 
coastal highway in Kafr al-Šayḵ were visibly in favour of Mursī. Large banners, flags, and 
posters in the villages illustrated the dominance of Muslim Brotherhood in these villages.  
The ruralisation of the Muslim Brotherhood could also be an unintended result of an 
effort to build an electoral machine capable of competing with the NDP in the semi-open 
parliamentary elections in the last twenty years of Mubarak’s tenure.311 This manifested 
especially in the governorates of Fayyūm, Banī Suwayf, Minyā, Asyūṭ, and Sūhāj, the 
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stronghold of Egyptian Islamism.312 The Islamist forces dominated the elections there. In the 
first round, Abū al-Futūḥ and Mursī both did well with Abū al-Futūḥ placing second in front 
of Šafīq – and behind Mursī – in Fayyūm and Banī Suwayf. In the second round, the Islamist 
dominance translated into wins where Mursī generally received well over 60 percent of the 
votes. On the district level, the results show the discrepancy between the towns where Šafīq 
did comparatively well, getting more than or close to 50 percent, and the countryside, where 
the Islamists predominated. Mursī regularly got more than 70 percent of the votes there.313  
The Islamic movements were able to rely on similar tactics as the Šafīq campaign did 
in the core of the Delta. In that regard it is noteworthy that the turnout was generally higher in 
the provincial towns where Šafīq’s campaign, judging by the results, was more competitive. 
This seems counterintuitive. Looking more closely at voter mobilisation, however, the 
increase in turnout is far larger in the rural voting districts from the first to the second round. 
In Minyā governorate, which had the highest overall leap in voter turnout, the increases vary 
from 12 to 18 percentage points. Simultaneously, both campaigns had networks in the towns 
and were able to mobilise supporters there, which explains the higher turnout. These results 
show that the Muslim Brotherhood has succeeded in building the capacity to mobilise large 
numbers of rural voters.  
The Muslim Brotherhood drew their support from other rural areas as well, notably 
the North Western coast, but also the Delta. In Ḡarbīya several rural areas as well as the 
industrial cities voted in favour of Šafīq. The Islamist current struggled there in the first 
round as well, with Šafīq getting large percentages in especially the southern rural districts 
bordering Minūfīya, while Ṣabāḥī won al-Maḥalla al-Kubrā. In the other rural Delta 
governorates – Šarqīya, Daqahlīya, and Qalyūbīya – Mursī got between 40 and 45 percent of 
the votes.  
The ruralisation of the Brotherhood reappears in the voting patters as the ability to 
mobilise rural voters, which in some areas was impressive. The difference in voter turnout 
between the first and second rounds of the 2012 presidential elections confirms the 
assumption of the rural electoral mobilisation. This is despite the fact that city governorates 	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had higher voter turnouts on average than did the rural, and that voter turnout in the cities 
matter more than most of the rural provinces. However, the key mobilisation efforts by both 
the Mursī and the Šafīq campaigns were in rural areas.  
 
5.3 Mursī’s farmers  
The Muslim Brotherhood effectively mobilised rural voters for the presidential election. The 
question is whether these voters had any influence on the policies of Muḥammad Mursī’s 
presidency. Mursī addressed the situation of farmers once during his brief tenure. The 
occasion was the 9th of September 2012, the date when Egypt celebrates ‘īd al-fallāḥ, the day 
of the farmers, to commemorate the signing of the first agrarian reform law by the Free 
Officers.  
Mursī announced two initiatives from the state to improve the situation of farmers on 
the sixtieth anniversary of the land reforms. First, farmers who owed money to the PBDAC 
would have them cancelled when the debts were less than 10 000 pounds. Second, Mursī 
announced that the state’s official price of rice would increase roughly ten percent, from 
around 1800, which was current market prices, to 2000 pounds a ton. The state would also 
forgive fines imposed on farmers for growing rice in excess of the quotas. Although both 
were positive measures on paper, they were limited.  
The debt cancellations of PBDAC loans for example estimated to benefit around 
44,000 farmers. However, the PBDAC is a part of a structure of patronage. Therefore farmers 
with these loans are those with access through connections and networks. A significant 
portion of the loans was also non-performing, which is expected when the system is managed 
according to patronage logic. Thus debt erasure would not benefit the broad mass of rural 
poor, but a few, presumably farmers with some influence and financial capacity. Regardless, 
one informant doubted that they would be able to implement the measure because of the 
financial restraints on government spending.314 Equally important is the existence of vested 
interests within the bank that would work to stop such measures.  
The story of the Egyptian rice market is another instance of market failure in Egyptian 
agriculture. According to Timothy Mitchell, after the government had removed the 
restrictions on rice-growing, like area limitations and delivery quotas, by 1992, farmers grew 
so much that the government was forced to re-impose the quotas and issue fines for 
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transgressions in order to save water.315 Nevertheless in 1996 the farmers grew rice in an area 
of 1,2 million acres, 300,000 more than stipulated by official regulations. By 2011 this 
number had increased even more, and rice was grown “illegally” on 500,000 acres.316  
The internal fluctuations in the Egyptian domestic market are significant. As late as in 
2011 the rice price was reported to reach new highs as domestic demand had surged ahead of 
Ramadan.317 The increase in “illegal” rice cultivation comes despite fluctuations in price of 
rice. This is similar to the increases after the reforms, which happened in the face of 
decreasing prices. In other words, the increases in rice production contradict the market’s 
logic. The consistent level of “illegal” production suggests that rice is grown primarily for 
household consumption rather than the market given that rice is the staple food in the 
northern Delta. This in turn would explain the annual shortfalls of rice during the summer.  
The price increase Mursī announced was in response to the low prices of rice at the 
time. Just after the harvest season, the price of rice had dropped to around 1800 pounds per 
ton. This reflects the increasing demand during harvest season because Egypt produces more 
rice than it consumes. Excess rice is not exported because of a government imposed export 
ban in place since 2008, which leads prices to fall during harvest as supply increases. Mursī 
attempted to respond to the falling prices and to adjust the market by effectively setting a 
price floor – returning to the policies of the early 1990s. The price Mursī referred to, 
however, was not an official market price, but the price of the buying tenders of the ministry 
of supply for the subsidy program that the government runs. About a quarter of the rice 
consumed yearly is distributed through the government’s food subsidy program, with more 
than sixty million Egyptians receiving subsidised rice. The export ban in effect since March 
2008, which caused the price fall, was originally a response to high prices in the spring.  
Mursī’s policy failed to account for the complexity of the agricultural sector, and he 
was unable to address the underlying problem. Trying to raise the price of rice addresses the 
symptoms of market failure, but not its cause. The opposition was no better, however, 
criticising Mursī not for failing to solve the structural problems in the rice market, but 
because it increased the financial burden on the state. Mursī’s familiar approach to 
agriculture is illustrative of the limitations of the politics of Cairo in a situation where those 
who are the most affected of the state’s rural policies have the least to say. Mursī’s farmers – 	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the constituencies that his policies were supposed to benefit – were not landless rural 
labourers or small farmers, but richer farmers either able to benefit from access to loans in the 
PBDAC or producing rice for marketing rather than subsistence.  
Mursī’s failure illustrates that the disconnection between rural voters mobilised in the 
election and the policy outcomes also apply to the Muslim Brotherhood. Seeing the process 
of ruralisation in the context of the growth of the Muslim Brotherhood out of the universities 
into a populist movement, the pro-market discourse gave way to criticisms of the neoliberal 
policies that successive governments have pursued since the 1990s. Yet, as Sameh Naguib 
points out, the criticism of these reforms did not imply that the Brotherhood “abandoned” 
their free market convictions.318 An important part of the movement was always linked to 
Sadat’s economic policies and emerging free market in the 1970s and 1980s.319  
Not all blame for the failure is rightly placed at the feet of Mursī and the Muslim 
Brotherhood. Another reason for the policy outcome is the institutional inertia of the 
Egyptian state apparatus. As I argued above, there are vested interests both within and 
connected to the bureaucracy that promotes the continuation of neoliberal reforms. And the 
bureaucrats were the same as well. Mursī’s first measure in the agricultural sector, to delete 
the debts, was a rehash of a measure announced by the then prime minister, Kamāl al-Janzūrī 
in mid-December 2011.320 This case supports the argument that the rural and agricultural 
policies are subject to the influence of interested social forces embedded in institutions and 
networks of market reforms that have taken shape since the 1980s. The Brotherhood’s 
ideological shift in a neoliberal direction on economic matters at the time of uprising is 
indicative of its continuing links with these social forces of the market reforms.  
 
5.4 Conclusion: Hegemony and rural political mobilisation  
Electoral mobilisation was a part of hegemony in the countryside. The NDP had a strong grip 
on the countryside through local intermediaries such as tribes or the rural bourgeoisie. Voters 
were mobilised through these networks that span from the centre to the periphery prior to the 
uprising. Lisa Blaydes argues that elections were essential for the survival of the authoritarian 
regime in Egypt; through them scarce resources could be distributed to the key 
constituencies.321 In other words, elections functioned to maintain the regime’s position. 	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They became an institution of hegemony. The regime encouraged and regulated the practice 
of voting as part of this hegemony. Through voting in elections when the outcome is known 
beforehand, voters who participate confirm their acquiescence to the regime. Voting in 
fraudulent election structures people to behave as if the elections were honest. The 2014 
presidential election is a case in point, where the Sīsī campaign openly declared its need for a 
high turnout. Without the usual mobilisation of voters, however, the election offices remained 
empty until the Presidential Election Commission took measures. Without a high turnout, the 
election would be meaningless because the regime would not be able to demonstrate popular 
acquiescence. Thus the election illustrates how voting can be an element of hegemony and 
provide an authoritarian government with legitimacy.   
Elections do not have to be an institution of hegemony; they have a counter-
hegemonic potential. After the uprising the government lost control over the outcome of 
elections as it lost the ability to forge results. Hence it also lost control over the voting 
practice. This opened for competitive elections that had the potential to mobilise voters for 
counter-hegemonic projects. The first round of the 2012 presidential election in Kafr al-Šayḵ 
is an example of this. The result was that Ḥamdīn Ṣabāḥī, one of the “revolutionary” 
candidates, emerged as a clear winner in a rural governorate. According to Samuli Schielke, 
the Ṣabāḥī campaign had succeeded in reactivating old leftist and Nasserist networks. In the 
village he cites as an example, that network had at first consisted of six Nasserist families, 
but as the campaign unfolded, many of the young “village revolutionaries” had joined.322 And 
according to the election result, in the first round Ṣabāḥī took 62,1 percent of the votes, 
meaning that his campaign had successfully provided a non-hegemonic alternative at the 
time.  
However, the 2012 contest was ultimately dominated by the two campaigns that most 
closely imitated the mobilising strategies of the NDP. The successful campaigns of 
Muḥammad Mursī and Aḥmad Šafīq showed how the networks between the state and the 
influential rural upper class continued to function after the uprising. The election result also 
illustrated the social and geographical limitations of these networks. This limitation of the 
respective networks explains the effort by both sides in the fight between the state interests 
and the Muslim Brotherhood to co-opt the farmers’ trade unions and through it direct the 
political mobilisation in the countryside.   
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The rural networks that dominate the politics of the countryside bridge the economic, 
social, and political categories. The networks have their roots in the 1960s when extended 
family networks from the rural bourgeoisie over time came to dominate the state’s rural 
institutions. This in turn abetted the power of these family networks and provided access to 
patronage resources. The resulting networks go beyond the imagined spaces of “state” and 
“market”. Although this is symbolised in the emergences of persons like Yūsuf Wālī that 
embody both categories, it is also articulated in agricultural policies that corresponded to the 
class interests of rural bourgeoisie. Similarly the market reforms came at the detriment of 
small farmers, tenants, and the rural poor.  
Hegemony in the Egyptian countryside is not limited to the instances of political 
mobilisation. Hegemony, I have argued, structures everyday actions through the force of the 
“silent compulsion of everyday relations”. The removal of social security and support 
systems for the rural population through the market reforms or through the deterioration of 
the state’s services has had the effect of reinforcing hegemony by accentuating the 
vulnerability of subaltern classes. My informants reported that the material situation had 
become increasingly difficult after the 25th of January uprising. Negative trends continued or 
increased. Informants reported that the costs grew, while the returns for selling the harvest 
decreased. As previously mentioned, one of the farmers summed it up like this: “The farmer 
has always been under the heel, and he is still under the heel.”323 Similarly, on the lake the 
illegal expansion of the fish farms quickened, as did illegal fishing. One of the fishermen 
described the situation like this: “Before there was a corrupt police, now there is no 
police.”324 Although the uprising successfully challenged (and defeated) the police on the 
streets in Cairo and toppled the president, the power holders in the countryside were left 
unchecked; the regime was still there.  
The project of dispossession of land and lake that the market reforms entailed gave 
rise to protests and demonstrations by the rural population. The relationship between the 
dispossession projects and the rural protests was dialectical. At the beginning they mobilised 
locally and ad-hoc as an antithesis of the land reforms. After the uprising the form of political 
mobilisation changed from protests and demonstration to the organisation of trade unions and 
syndicates. However, as the political mobilisation converged into organised trade unions and 
syndicates, political forces emerged to control the farmers’ movement and use it for political 
purposes: a synthesis. In the post-uprising political situation in particular two syndicates that 	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emerged illustrate this tendency, the GSF and the GSEF. The former has built upon the 
network of rural bourgeoisie, state institutions like the PBDAC, the agricultural cooperatives, 
and the now disbanded NDP. The latter is tied to the Muslim Brotherhood. The two 
syndicates were thus connected to the same political forces that supported the Šafīq and 
Mursī campaigns. The success of these campaigns during the 2012 presidential election 
indicated the mobilising potential of these political forces as well as the networks on which 
they relied.  
There are, for the time being, also examples of political mobilisation in the 
countryside that happen independently of the networks of power. There are local trade unions 
and electoral mobilisation efforts that are able to mobilise the rural population outside the 
networks of power described above. These efforts have until now not successfully established 
a lasting counter-hegemonic organisation. Efforts to mobilise against the hegemonic 
institutions are difficult as hegemony is tied to the everyday acts of survival. The most 
successful attempts are those trade unions and political networks that remain local seeking to 
avoid the networks of power. And if these organisations expand, there is a risk that they will 
be co-opted into the existing power structure and hence become another hegemonic 
institution. However, the existence of these efforts proves that there is space for counter-
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